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The capstone U.S. Defense Department study on the future operational environ-ment declares, “China’s rise represents the most significant single event on the 
international horizon since the collapse of the Cold War.”1 Understanding and assessing 
changes in China’s traditionally defensive naval strategy, doctrine, and force structure are 
of obvious importance to the U.S. Navy (USN) and other Pacific navies concerned with 
the possible security implications of that rise. This chapter examines the development of 
the Chinese navy’s Houbei (Type 022) fast-attack-craft force and its roles and missions 
in China’s near seas and discusses implications for the U.S. Navy and other navies in 
the region. The author argues that this force, when integrated with People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) units and task groups in joint operations, provides an offensive sea-
control capability beyond simple coastal defense (coastal defense here being a limited 
form of sea denial). Indeed, linked fast attack craft operating collectively may present 
a significant potential offensive threat to American capital ships and strike groups well 
beyond the littorals.2 
Origins of the Houbei Fast Attack Craft
PLAN doctrine outlined the purpose of the fast-attack-craft force as early as 1950. Bei-
jing sought a modern, lightly armed offshore coastal-defense element to place alongside 
the key PLAN forces, naval aviation and submarines.3 These fast-attack-craft units con-
sisted of relatively fast (thirty-plus knots), single-mission hulls, including subchasers and 
torpedo boats (later, guided-missile boats) that operated in speedboat zhidui (“flotil-
las”).4 Early fast attack craft were adequate to the coastal-defense missions of countering 
Nationalist Chinese “invasions” and later, Soviet and American amphibious threats over 
home waters;5 they were available in large numbers and could be rapidly deployed along 
interior lines. They were, however, very limited in endurance and range.6 Nonetheless, 
because PLAN resource limitations precluded the development of large combatants be-
fore the 1980s, the occasional maritime clashes that did occur involved fast attack craft—
including the sinking of several adversary fast attack craft and small combatants. 
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In the 1980s the PLAN commander, Adm. Liu Huaqing, played an important role in 
changing the service’s mission (and mind-set) from coastal defense to offshore de-
fense—or “near-seas active defense”—with a commensurate change in fast-attack-craft 
roles and missions. Naturally, this doctrinal shift called for a different force to cover a 
much larger area, a force relying less on fast attack craft for coastal defense and requir-
ing more offshore-patrol vessels for longer-duration patrols in the three near seas. Fast 
attack craft still had a significant support role for amphibious operations against Taiwan, 
but other near-seas missions, like protection of sea lines of communication and patrol 
of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), demanded a new force of multimission vessels 
with improved blue-water seakeeping and endurance. During this period, accordingly, 
PLAN fast attack craft, numbering some two hundred by 1990, obsolesced as demand 
decreased.7 As the PLAN cast its gaze beyond the EEZ, however, the need for a modern, 
offensive fast attack craft became apparent. Offshore-patrol vessels persisted, and in 
greater numbers than fast attack craft (they continue their missions to the present), but 
they could not serve as fast attack craft in the modern sense. The Houbei class answered 
that requirement. 
Sources on PLAN requirements for a new fast attack craft are either unavailable or pro-
tected, but it seems clear from early acquisition activity that the need for a modern fast 
attack craft had become pressing by around 1998. For example, China sought to acquire 
Molniya-class fast attack craft from Russia in the early 2000s, though the sale never 
reached fruition.8 Houbei hulls began appearing in 2004. 
The Houbei represented a marked change from previous-generation fast attack craft and 
offshore-patrol vessels. It is not just a replacement for the Chinese versions of the Osa 
and Komar coastal-defense fast attack craft; it represents a capability shift decidedly in 
the offensive direction, a shift relevant to the “active defense” aspect of near-seas opera-
tions. ONI analysts emphasize Houbei’s “better sea keeping, speed, and mission flex-
ibility” in comparison to the older missile boats.9 It is certainly not simply an offshore-
patrol vessel replacement, as the Type 037 variants are still relatively capable and thus 
not in dire need of replacement; in any case, the Houbeis do not have the offshore-patrol 
vessels’ long range or endurance. 
While still viable for other missions, the older Houjian, Houxin, Haiqing, and Haijiu 
classes cannot serve as modern fast attack craft: they are too slow, most are not data-link 
capable, and none have long-range antiship missiles. The PLAN designed the recently re-
vealed Type 056 corvette to replace the Houjian—with an escort and air-defense mission 
for the farther reaches of the near seas—a development supporting the assertion that the 
Houbei is not a follow-on offshore-patrol type.10 For now, the more than sixty “combat 
operational” Houbeis constitute the sole modern PLAN fast-attack-craft class.11 
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Houbei within a Changing Naval Strategy
There is no question that the PLAN is evolving to meet expanding regional missions 
and that the Houbei class will play an important role. What is less clear is how China is 
evolving its strategy, doctrine, and operational concepts to meet new near- and far-seas 
requirements.12 The PLAN is transforming its force structure to make it more appropri-
ate for offensive operations beyond the traditional littoral tether. Gaps persist in the 
body of literature with respect to this transformation, but it is possible to assess the part 
that fast attack craft play. Similarly, since the recurring Chinese white papers do not 
move much beyond generalities, open-source material and PLAN operations and exer-
cises provide important evidence on key developments. Finally, the near- and far-seas 
concepts are not really formal “strategies” in the Western sense—indeed, there does not 
appear to be any Chinese naval or maritime strategy comparable to U.S. versions.13 Still, 
it is instructive to use near/far-seas concepts in a strategic sense. 
It is important to note that with an expectation of increasing far-seas missions for larger 
PLAN combatants, fast attack craft will, logically, need to be relevant well outside coastal 
waters. The far-seas concept endorsed since the mid-2000s, for instance, clearly requires 
a PLAN that will operate with increasing reach and with offensive capabilities.14 The 
Center for Naval Analyses assesses that Beijing’s intent to extend its strategic depth for 
active defense is an “expansion of the armed forces’ geographic and functional security 
interests.”15 PLAN development trends in support of far-seas missions include long-
range standoff weapons and extended overseas deployments—including the requisite 
sustainment, such as at-sea logistics and overseas bases.16 As PLAN major combatants 
move out of the near seas, then, smaller combatants like the Houbei can be expected to 
fill the gap in the near seas. 
The Houbei missions fit within the recent PLAN emphasis on expanding near-seas mis-
sions beyond sea denial (which, of course, is inherently defensive) to sea control. The 
PLAN has naturally focused on sea control for a Taiwan contingency, but recent exercises 
and deployments involving fast attack craft seem to demonstrate a shift to sea-control 
missions in the larger near-seas region. Indeed, RAND assessed in 2009 that PLAN mod-
ernization is “specifically designed to allow the PLAN to move over this period from sea 
denial to sea control capabilities in a regional conflict.”17 Many respected China watchers 
have reached similar conclusions, describing these developments as distinctly offensive 
in nature.18
Houbei’s Potential for Offensive Roles and Missions
If the fast attack craft is to be relevant to sea control missions, it must have inherently 
offensive capabilities—and it does.
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At first blush, the craft may seem to have only defensive weapons, but it is the Houbei’s 
collective offensive punch that has the most potential for sea control, as opposed to de-
nial. Houbei fits into “green-water active defense,” but some forget that this role involves 
offensive missions in certain circumstances.19 The PLAN clearly designed the Houbei to 
act as an element of a larger combat system or linked network. For example, its largely 
passive electromagnetic and electro-optical sensors provide only localized, line-of-sight 
targeting, preserving the ship’s ability to operate undetected but seriously limiting its 
ability to identify and track targets.20 The Houbei’s surface-search radar cannot pro-
vide over-the-horizon targeting (OTHT), and stealthy ships by their nature rarely use 
active sensors in any case. Houbei’s extensive data-link connectivity, however, supports 
long-range coordination with aircraft, submarines, and other warships.21 All this points 
toward a craft optimized to receive over-the-horizon targeting within a larger combat 
network.22 Many sources cite China’s growing open-ocean OTHT capability, mak-
ing coordinated antiship Houbei operations more possible.23 In 2011, a RAND analyst 
concluded that “China’s greatly improved detection, tracking, targeting, and long-range 
missile systems will soon pose a very real threat to US carrier groups operating to the 
west of Guam.”24 Offensive missions in the far reaches of all three near seas, however, will 
require the numbers necessary to make the Houbei a viable offensive arm of the PLAN. 
If so, the logical implication is that it will be unavailable for coastal-defense missions.
Eight long-range YJ-83 (C803, 135 nm range) antiship cruise missiles provide the 
Houbei’s offensive punch.25 A study by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
highlighted the YJ-83 and follow-on antiship cruise-missile threat: “Future anti-ship 
cruise missiles are expected to continue to utilize advanced seeker capabilities includ-
ing the expanded use of millimeter wave seekers and the possible use of coherent radar 
seekers that allow enhanced countermeasure discrimination.”26 Just a single YJ-83 would 
be a serious potential threat to a U.S. carrier or expeditionary strike group, but Chinese 
naval tacticians do not envision single-missile strikes against adversary capital ships.27 
Hence, seen as a larger combat system, externally cued Houbeis become much more 
than coastal-defense craft. 
Houbei’s “semistealth,” speed and volume antiship-cruise-missile fires also make it a po-
tentially lethal element within a stratagem of offensive surprise. The importance of the 
Chinese concept of the “assassin’s mace” is well known, but many analysts still associate 
PLAN near-seas capabilities within an antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) paradigm—
that is, largely defensive in nature. Alongside an increasing fleet of long-range anti-
ship cruise-missile platforms, the Houbei class provides a distinctly offensive potential 
capability within the active-defense strategy.28 A recent RAND assessment points out 
that Chinese writings stress preemptive attacks on key U.S. power-projection capabili-
ties—including aircraft carriers—prior to or quickly following formal declaration of 
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hostilities. This stratagem is designed to disrupt the deployment of forces to the region, 
place Washington in a passive position, and deliver a psychological shock to the United 
States and its allies.29 RAND goes farther, to state that an aircraft carrier with escort, if 
surprised, would be particularly vulnerable to a saturation missile attack. Chinese de-
scriptions of Houbei fast attack craft consistently stress covert, long-range attacks taking 
advantage of stealth, surprise, and standoff ranges. 
A final factor that supports the idea of the offensive nature of the Houbei class is the 
fact that new Chinese coastal-defense cruise-missile (CDCM) capabilities are lessening 
the need for coastal-defense craft, freeing up the Houbei for missions farther out in 
the near seas—though, again, they cannot replicate the roles or missions of offshore-
patrol vessels. The YJ-62 CDCM is becoming the coastal-defense workhorse. With its 
reported 160 nm range, it provides China with significant long-range coastal defense, 
well beyond the 20 nm range of the dated YJ-8/C801 antiship cruise missile found on 
older coastal-defense craft.30 Jane’s asserts that as many as 120 of these new systems 
had been deployed opposite Taiwan by 2012.31 With improved OTHT and target-
discrimination sensors and techniques—such as over-the-horizon backscatter and 
surface-wave radars—the need for an antiship cruise missile or more guided-missile 
craft for coastal defense is arguably minimized (though offshore-patrol vessels are cer-
tainly still required).32 The logical implication is that the PLAN will continue to let the 
number of coastal-defense hulls drop as the YJ-62 and follow-on coastal-defense cruise 
missiles and networked intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems 
solidify coverage over the Chinese littoral.
Differing Expert Views
As of 2009, however, ONI did not seem to view the Houbei as an offensive fast attack 
craft, describing it instead as a “coastal defense and near-littoral” patrol craft.33 This 
author argues, however, that the Houbei’s role is potentially much greater than patrol. 
First, China did not design it for long-endurance patrols. The Houbei is no offshore-
patrol vessel; minimal fuel capacity, a small crew, marginal “hotel services,” largely pas-
sive sensors, and a lack of embarked small craft make it incompatible with patrol duties. 
The U.S. Naval War College’s Andrew Erickson seems to agree, asserting that Houbeis 
are integral to Chinese offensive concepts of operations, whether targeting Taiwanese 
navy surface units in a cross-strait conflict or U.S. carrier strike groups with multiaxis, 
saturation antiship cruise-missile attacks.34 Nan Li, also of the Naval War College, argues 
that the most likely role of the Houbei is “active defense of China’s ‘near seas,’ represent-
ing the country’s attempts to gain greater sea control further from its landmass.”35 If the 
Houbei has an offensive role as argued, the A2/AD terminology commonly applied to 
the PLAN may not be fully satisfactory here.36
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The PLAN could also use Houbeis for missions other than surface warfare. For example, 
some analysts argue that the Houbei could carry missiles other than antiship cruise 
missiles, possibly antisubmarine missiles or torpedoes. While the Houbei has no anti-
submarine sensors, within a linked fleet it could act simply as a “shooter,” just as it can 
in coordinated surface attacks. Antisubmarine missiles fired from a low-signature, fast 
surface craft provide the advantages of surprising enemy submarines, not giving away 
the location of escorting Chinese submarines, and limiting enemy response, in that, as 
analysts assert, the Houbei would be a hard target for torpedo attack.37 Finally, some 
argue that the PLAN could modify the Houbei for land attack cruise missiles, as the mis-
sile housing can apparently accommodate C601 and similar weapons of the type.38 These 
possibilities remain speculative, though, as no evidence clearly indicates that the PLAN 
will deploy missiles other than an antiship type on Houbei.
PLAN Houbei Exercise Employment
The greater openness of recent PLAN exercises provides illuminating examples of 
Houbei employment. Indeed, China has expanded its transparency in recent decades, 
as manifested by more openness in official discussions on defense and a noteworthy 
emphasis on new capabilities.39 Some argue that this transparency is purposeful, that 
it “functions as a crucial means of conventional deterrence,” clearly aimed at Washing-
ton.40 But even beyond denial and deception, especially in light of Beijing’s deliberate 
embellishment of military capabilities, there is the inherent risk of flawed inferences and 
findings from PLAN exercises. 
Recent exercises demonstrate that the PLAN is gradually accomplishing “near-seas active 
defense” missions, with naval units deploying farther out to provide a defensive barrier, 
but a barrier with an offensive aspect. The PLAN increasingly integrates fast attack craft 
in large-scale, joint exercises and operations. For instance, exercise accounts since 2009 
emphasize multiaxis, nighttime Houbei missile attacks. Dr. Erickson found that during 
June–July 2010 joint “anticarrier” East China Sea exercises, Houbeis played an important 
role with live antiship cruise-missile fires.41 
Chinese accounts of these exercises and of their training focus also provide important 
insights into fast-attack-craft roles and missions. An official PLAN description of Hou-
bei training included the following details: 
The flotilla has initially formed up more than ten new tactics including coordinated 
combat operations along with observation and communication stations and early warn-
ing aircraft. . . . Since last year, the flotilla has completed missions including a four-vessel 
formation in day/night continuous sailing across fleet boundaries, and formation vol-
ley launch of missiles in a complex electromagnetic environment. Not long ago, in an 
opposing-forces training exercise with a formation of the new missile attack craft guided 
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by information from a light force in an attack on an enemy formation, a maritime strike 
force composed of a number of new vessels succeeded in a long-range, beyond-line-of-
sight attack, hitting their targets precisely.42  
This account obviously indicates coordinated, salvo, antiship cruise-missile strikes 
with external cueing, but it also suggests several secondary missions, such as ISR. Of-
ficial PLAN media coverage describes Houbei missions as including “maritime defense 
penetration” and “long-range missile attacks,” in coordination with submarines, surface 
units, and aircraft.43 Other PLAN accounts give the fast attack craft a supporting role 
in amphibious operations in the South and East China Seas and in combat operations 
outside “territorial waters.”44 These descriptions indicate missions well beyond coastal 
defense. One point of evidence against longer-range Houbei operations, however, is 
that to date PLAN joint exercises involving the Houbei have fallen within roughly two 
hundred nautical miles of shore bases.
The PLAN Houbei Imperative 
One reason the PLAN developed the Houbei fast attack craft was to counter regional 
surface fleets. Taipei is obviously Beijing’s foremost concern. The majority of Houbeis 
are homeported within easy range of the Taiwan Strait, in the East and South Sea Fleets. 
They are ideal for fast response in a crisis or for saturation antiship cruise-missile attacks 
against Taiwanese combatants in preparation for an amphibious move against the is-
land.45 Taiwan has sixty-one fast attack guided-missile craft, but the eighteen Kuang-Hua 
VIs, with four Hsiung Feng-2 antiship missiles, make up its force of modern fast attack 
craft.46 They represent a capable, if small, sea-denial complement to other Taiwanese sur-
face combatants and CDCMs, but they remain quantitatively and qualitatively inferior 
to the Houbeis.47 Taipei must appreciate this, as its developmental nine-hundred-ton, 
stealthy, catamaran-hull, guided-missile “near-shore frigate,” armed with eight Hsiung 
Feng-3 antiship cruise missiles (with 160 nm range and supersonic speed), is designed 
both to counter the Houbei threat and provide a more capable sea-denial fleet.48 
The fleets of other regional states with contiguous waters are also important factors in 
Beijing’s calculations. Vietnam in 2003 purchased from Russia ten Molniya (modernized 
Tarantul export-variant) fast attack craft, each armed with eight SS-N-25 Switchblade 
missiles.49 Alongside the four Gepard-class frigates, this represents a capable Vietnamese 
navy surface threat, both classes having over twice the Houbei’s range and displace-
ment. The even more robust navies of South Korea and Japan are far more capable than 
Vietnam’s of sea control in home waters. While the Philippine navy cannot field even a 
marginal sea-denial force, Manila, like other U.S. allies, expects American support for 
defense against Chinese aggression. The Houbei can operate near all these waters and 
could provide an offensive punch against pro-U.S. Asian navies in a crisis—surely an 
8 china maritime studies
aspect of Houbei’s raison d’être. Yet the PLAN almost certainly acquired the Houbei 
primarily with the USN in mind.
While a detailed assessment of the employment of massed Houbeis against U.S. strike 
groups is beyond the scope of this chapter, the previous discussion should suggest the 
potential threat. One has only to imagine a Taiwan defense scenario with U.S. strike 
groups closing on the region to appreciate the possibilities: stealth and forty-knot-plus 
speed allow the positioning of coordinated, dispersed “wolf packs” hundreds of miles off 
the Chinese coast, hundreds of miles apart, linked with ISR, attack aircraft, and sub-
marines, presenting American warships with multiple-axis fusillades of antiship cruise 
missiles.50 
Houbei Class Weaknesses
While an intimidating craft, designed to be a “thorough-bred ship-killer,” the Houbei 
class is not “ten feet tall.”51 Taiwan’s military keeps a close eye on Chinese naval develop-
ments and describes Houbei’s limitations in the same way most analysts do: “short range 
at high speed, dependence on target data provided by an external command and control 
network, and reduced stealth at high speed from the stern water plume.”52
The Houbei’s range is indeed a serious limiting factor with respect to its concept of 
operations and deserves special attention. On the basis of all available information, four 
hundred nautical miles is a good rough estimate of the extreme of the hull’s unrefu-
eled range at operational speeds.53 At economical speeds, range increases to as much as 
a thousand nautical miles in good sea conditions, but other factors typically make such 
speeds impractical. Hence, unrefueled, Houbei is relegated to relatively brief missions 
within the near seas. 
Yet two factors mitigate the effects of Houbei’s short legs: the 135 nm range of the C803 
(and follow-on antiship cruise missiles), combined with the Houbei’s own range, and 
the potential use of offshore islands or tenders for logistical support can both extend its 
operational reach.54 The operative term here is “potential”—a detailed review of current 
literature reveals a dearth of information on Houbei logistics or operations beyond a few 
hundred nautical miles. While references to Houbei refueling and berthing at offshore 
islands and South China Sea outposts exist, the PLAN does not appear to possess a next-
generation class of replenishment vessels for smaller combatants.55 The PLAN would 
surely task its larger replenishment vessels with out-of-area operations supporting 
large combatants, making them less available for fast attack craft. An assessment of the 
existing PLAN inventory suggests that any of the Dazhi, Dalang II, and Dajiang classes 
of submarine tenders / support ships could serve as fast-attack-craft tenders, but this is 
speculative.56 The 2010 Chinese defense white paper does stress, however, that sea-based 
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logistics are a priority, that the PLAN is “working to further improve its surface support 
capabilities.”57 It is also possible that Chinese naval leaders would simply accept the risk 
and leave Houbeis to their own devices after a coordinated antiship cruise-missile attack. 
In fact, some analysts assert that these inexpensive craft ($30 million each) are deemed 
expendable.58 
Other commonly cited weaknesses are worth addressing as well. One is the limiting 
factor of the small crew on extended operations. Endurance is reduced because watch 
rotations are impossible with a crew of only twelve; human limitations likely prevent 
missions beyond roughly twenty-four hours. “Creative manning” could help alleviate 
this situation, but other factors, such as sea state and operations tempo, exacerbate the 
human factor and make it perhaps as important a limitation as the craft’s unrefueled 
range.59 Another weakness is reliance on air cover to guarantee freedom to maneuver, 
especially in a contest with a more capable navy. Houbeis have only limited air defenses 
of their own—a close-in weapon system and man-portable air-defense missiles—
leaving them vulnerable outside the protection of larger combatants or shore-based 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).60 Still, recent PLAN exercises with Luzhou and Luyang 
II DDGs and Jankai II FFGs—all with advanced, longer-range SAMs—and land-based 
Su-30MK2/J-11 series aircraft suggest that sufficient air cover might well support the 
employment of Houbei at its maximum range. The PLAN also seems intent on opti-
mizing for area air defense follow-on Chinese warships, such as the recently revealed 
next-generation air-defense destroyer and the refurbished aircraft carrier Liaoning (the 
ex-Russian Varyag). The Houbei’s HN-900 data-link antenna reportedly links it with 
larger Chinese surface combatants, supporting the idea that Houbei could participate in 
coordinated operations under PLAN air/SAM cover.61 
The Future PLAN Fast-Attack-Craft Force
Geography and contingency planning likely demand a larger PLAN fast-attack-craft 
force for the coming decades. The vast expanses of China’s near seas, for instance, may 
require fast attack craft in numbers sufficient for crises in more than a single near-seas 
region at once. Because saturation antiship-cruise-missile attacks require multiple 
Houbeis, even eighty craft seem insufficient to the task. Maintenance, short range, and 
crew rest limit how many the PLAN can effectively field at once. While estimates of 
future orders of battle vary, most analysts assert that Houbei production will continue 
apace. China is also building two Houbeis for Pakistan, an indicator both that the hull is 
a proven design and that production will continue.62 Jane’s asserts that the PLAN will ac-
quire as many as a hundred, to equip three flotillas, one for each fleet.63 The South China 
Sea, however, could well prove to be the hub for Houbei operations. As James Holmes of 
the Naval War College asserts, “The South China Sea represents the most likely maritime 
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theater for Beijing to deploy armed force, including combined-arms attacks designed to 
saturate and overpower U.S. task groups’ defenses, to realize its geopolitical and strategic 
aims.”64 
Economically, China can easily support the expansion and modernization of the Houbei 
force and begin the development of follow-on craft. Chinese journals speculate that fu-
ture, larger versions of a Houbei-type craft will have a flight deck / hangar and helicopter 
and may serve as a command-and-control and ISR platform.65 Beijing’s defense budget 
continues to grow at roughly 12 percent annually, supporting acquisition, research, and 
development (and most analysts assert that the budget figures are understated).66 Cer-
tainly, as China charts its path to global power status, its navy will expand, including the 
fast-attack-craft force. 
A lesser, but still important, factor is the effectiveness of Chinese quality control in war-
ship manufacture and maintenance, not only to ensure a ready naval force at present but 
to provide sustained fleet numbers over decades. The struggles that the United States 
is now facing with this issue demonstrate the priority and funds that fleet maintenance 
must have to ensure full vessel service lives. China began to modernize its shipyards in 
the 1990s and Beijing is building at a frenetic pace—the Type 071 Yuzhao-class amphibi-
ous dock transport, for instance, was built in only six months.67 Rapid production with 
relatively new technologies can be a recipe for lifetime hull and machinery problems 
affecting readiness and class longevity. Further, aluminum hulls or superstructures (like 
Houbei’s) carry their own slate of corrosion problems. Indeed, since the PLAN would 
not make Chinese manufacturing and maintenance problems publicly known, it is pos-
sible that there is more of a problem than is widely presumed.
Finally, the PLAN still is not yet fully competent in sea control. Fast-attack-craft integra-
tion in more complex operations is still nascent and dependent on nearby shore-based 
or island support. The PLAN is still developing naval strategy, doctrine, and operational 
concepts, as well as an officer corps skilled in operational art. Still, PLAN leaders admit 
that these shortcomings exist and seem to be focusing efforts on addressing them, espe-
cially with an aggressive training regimen.68
Implications 
At the theater-strategic level, the PLAN fast-attack-craft evolution is part of the larger 
PLAN shift to an offensive-oriented, regional, sea-control navy. This shift has implica-
tions for the United States and treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific (Australia, Japan, Korea, 
the Philippines, and Thailand), all increasingly concerned not just with China’s military 
rise but also with its recent aggressive maritime behavior. Conflicting South and East 
China Seas territorial claims could easily lead to clashes involving the PLAN. Official 
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U.S. assessments warn that “the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nev-
ertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices 
on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.”69 These 
allies may have to choose among options of expanding their own navies, strengthening 
anti-China defensive alliances/coalitions, accommodating the rise of a potentially bellig-
erent China, or a combination thereof. Regional defense agreements also carry signifi-
cant obligations for Washington, should China assert itself more aggressively in coming 
years. Some American analysts conclude that if the United States and its allies continue 
to balance the expanding PLAN, another costly arms race may result.70 As the Houbei 
class reaches its apex in coming years and the PLAN builds a follow-on fast attack craft, 
the PLAN transformation path will become clearer. 
The PLAN fast-attack-craft evolution holds more specific operational and tactical 
ramifications for the U.S. Navy. The Houbei’s size and partial stealth mean that the 
USN may never locate with long-range sensors the firing platform in a YJ-83 antiship-
cruise-missile launch prior to or after the fact, making prosecution by surface-launched 
Harpoon difficult at best. Even if located after launch, a Houbei’s speed could quickly 
put it outside the Harpoon engagement envelope. Air-launched Harpoons or aerial 
cueing may be solutions, but operating friendly aircraft or unmanned aerial systems 
within range of China’s growing fourth-generation naval air defenses raises the risks to 
these platforms.71 Hellfire-armed MH-60R helicopters would be similarly vulnerable. 
Houbei prosecution via submarine seems unlikely, as discussed. Recent U.S. government 
assessments of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) suggest that it too will not be up to the 
task of Houbei hunter-killer missions in high-threat waters.72 The most desirable tactic 
is probably class-wide preemptive mining or in-port destruction, but short of a general 
war, this is hard to imagine. More subtle means might involve targeting the battle net-
work that makes the Houbei a viable threat or denying the PLAN the ISR that is vital to 
locating adversary warships. 
Another option is to rethink the long-standing argument for a high-low-mix fleet force 
structure. Since the PLAN fast-attack-craft force is a fleet-scale problem, premised on 
distributed operations of small, single-mission warships, response in kind may well be 
a viable option. Indeed, the USN originally envisioned the LCS as a “Streetfighter” to 
take on warships in the littorals (it has since morphed to a much larger, multimission 
hull). The concept of preserving combat power via distributed, dispersed operations in 
the face of a similar threat, espoused by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Capt. Wayne 
Hughes, seems to make sense.73 Hughes argues that the inherent survivability and 
combat power achieved through a dispersed fleet of smaller, single-mission ships could 
preclude the need for larger warships to deal with multiaxis salvos alone. By extension, 
he would view the current LCS and larger capital ships as potentially too valuable to mix 
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it up in high-threat waters. Another advantage that numerous, dispersed, smaller warships 
bring is wide-area surveillance—critical for locating low-signature craft like the Houbei. 
There are obvious operational drawbacks to deploying many small combatants far afield, 
but the USN has mastered them before. Nevertheless, the Navy is clearly committed to the 
LCS, despite official government reports that recommend smaller, single-mission hulls.74 
Other considerations would be important for prosecuting the Houbei threat. First, if 
one assumes that USN units cannot locate the Houbei before launch, the Aegis system 
will have to be up to the task of fleet air and missile defense. Ostensibly, carrier air 
wings would augment Aegis, but current air-wing aircraft mix, training, and operations 
are weighted heavily toward strike; their proficiency in eliminating massed, multiaxis 
antiship-cruise-missile salvos should not be assumed. As James Holmes points out, 
“U.S. commanders can expect a 360-degree threat environment” of dispersed, massed, 
multifaceted attacks.75 This scenario is no easy one for the carrier strike group. Further, 
small, agile targets like the Houbei amid a cluttered near-seas environment will demand 
next-generation precision and discriminating terminal guidance for friendly maritime 
standoff weapons. Harpoon’s obsolescence in both range and target discrimination is 
a stark current USN standoff weakness that demands a near-term remedy.76 Wide-area 
target identification is another requirement that seems to need improvement. Stealthy 
unmanned aerial vehicles may offer promising solutions, but an overreliance on tech-
nological solutions has proved illusory in the past. In fairness, naval and air theorists 
are currently working on, under the “AirSea Battle” rubric, joint U.S. Navy / Air Force 
approaches to dealing with PLAN A2/AD threats, but the work remains conceptual for 
now.77 
This chapter has argued that the PLAN Houbei fast-attack-craft force will play an of-
fensive role within the near seas in a Chinese navy shifting from sea-denial to sea-control 
capabilities. While gaps in the evidence exist, Chinese doctrine and operational concepts, 
accounts of PLAN exercises and operations, and numerous expert studies provide suf-
ficient information to make a balanced assessment. The PLAN seems to aspire to a near-
seas sea-control navy within the next decade, and fast attack craft will arguably represent 
an important element within a linked fleet designed to bring the fight to navies in both 
green and blue water. Prudence demands that naval strategists avoid discounting the of-
fensive potential of PLAN fast attack craft in the near seas and that tacticians account for 
these craft long before missile endgame. 
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Beijing’s impressive program of submarine force modernization suggests an expen-sive wager on that force’s enduring ability to accomplish vital near-seas missions in 
foreseeable military contingencies. Since the mid-1990s, China has launched or acquired 
more than thirty-five submarines, constituting five new classes of vessels; has essentially 
retired what had been its most numerous class of diesel-electric submarines (SSs); and 
has carved out of solid rock at Yalong Bay, on Hainan Island, an entirely new submarine 
base for new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs).
This chapter will attempt to assess how China may intend to employ those new subma-
rines. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are admittedly speculative, but they are 
based on facts and are internally reinforcing and coherent; also, they integrate well with 
what is known about other aspects of China’s antiaccess and area-denial forces.1 
Current Mission: Taiwan and the Near Seas
Beijing is quite open about what constitutes its vital interests, stating that “China’s 
number-one core interest is to maintain its fundamental system and state security; next 
is state sovereignty and territorial integrity; and third is the continued stable develop-
ment of the economy and society.”2 In this oft-stated formulation, “territorial integrity,” 
insofar as it applies to naval affairs, clearly centers on Taiwan, notwithstanding China’s 
recent aggressive behavior into the East and South China Seas. This primacy of interest 
is recognized clearly in the West, as reflected on the first page of the Annual Report to 
Congress for 2010 of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which notes that much of 
China’s military modernization is consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for 
Taiwan Strait contingencies.
Much, perhaps nearly all, of the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
has clear utility in scenarios involving military coercion of Taiwan. The Second Artil-
lery Corps’s short-range ballistic missiles are a prime example; they offer Beijing a large 
inventory of precision-guided munitions that can with little or no warning cripple or 
William S. Murray
Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness
Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 T
W
O
18 china maritime studies
destroy Taipei’s air force and navy. The newest People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
surface shipbuilding and weapons developments also seem tailored for a Taiwan scenar-
io; so too, I will argue, is China’s nonstrategic submarine force. But all these segments of 
the PLA likely have, in addition to whatever missions they are assigned against Taiwan’s 
forces, a near-seas mission to deter U.S. Navy intervention, and, if that deterrence fails, 
to destroy reliably strike forces operating within a carrier air wing’s range of Taiwan.3 
History and reflexive mirror-imaging would suggest that PLAN submarines can best 
accomplish such a wartime mission by employing torpedoes against opposing surface 
warships. The 1971 sinking of the Indian corvette Khukri by the Pakistani Daphne-class 
diesel-electric submarine Hangor, the 1981 sinking of the Argentine cruiser General 
Belgrano by the SSN HMS Conqueror, and the March 2009 destruction of the South 
Korean navy corvette Cheonan by a single heavyweight torpedo fired from a North Ko-
rean midget submarine all attest to the deadly potential of this form of warfare. Further, 
nearly all warships sunk by submarine in World Wars I and II were victims of torpedoes.
Yet there are strong reasons to question why the PLAN submarine force would choose 
this mode as its primary means of antisurface warfare. For one, shooting a torpedo 
(which by maritime standards is a short-range weapon) requires the submarine to oper-
ate within lethal range of its adversary’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapons and 
sensors. For another, mastering the key tasks necessary for successful open-ocean tor-
pedo attacks against a capable adversary requires visible, rigorous, and extensive at-sea 
practice, preferably in the areas in which battles would be fought. Certainly shore-based 
trainers and computer simulation can assist in developing the necessary skills, but for 
conventional naval war-fighting proficiency there is no substitute for rigorous training 
at sea. China’s submariners probably remain weak in this area, despite recent attempts to 
correct this deficiency. 
A 2009 Office of Naval Intelligence report stated that the PLAN submarine force was 
“placing greater emphasis on long range surface and submarine patrols, which allow ex-
panded opportunities to practice the technical and tactical skills that will be required in 
modern wartime operating environments.”4 The report also notes, “When compared to 
the historical levels of the past two decades, the number of submarine patrols has more 
than tripled.”5 However, the tripling of a very low number produces a number that is still 
low, implying that only a small percentage of China’s submariners benefit from deploy-
ments in which they might encounter a future adversary.6 The overall force’s ability to 
find and destroy warships in the open ocean with torpedoes remains an open question. 
Furthermore, owing to their slow speed and limited endurance, diesel submarines 
(which account for over 90 percent of the PLAN’s submarine order of battle) are 
relatively ill suited to open-ocean, torpedo-based antisurface warfare (ASUW) such as 
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might be required in conflict over Taiwan in the near seas.7 Despite much speculation 
to the contrary, air-independent propulsion (AIP) does not significantly alter this stark 
fact, because AIP does not address the fundamental constraint on the conventionally 
powered submarine in the open ocean—its relatively low speed while submerged. Faster, 
quiet, nuclear-powered attack submarines certainly could provide much greater tactical 
flexibility and offset some of these disadvantages. Yet China’s handful of noisy first- and 
second-generation SSNs would not long survive in the deep waters of the near seas 
against a capable adversary. Nor, for the same reasons, could Chinese SSNs be expected 
to perform a meaningful wartime role in more remote settings, such as the Indian 
Ocean, where their lack of stealth would make them vulnerable.
These factors all suggest that China cannot rely on torpedoes as the primary means by 
which to wring maximum combat effectiveness from any of its submarines. Yet China 
has invested heavily in its submarine force and doubtless expects to be able to use its 
submarines effectively, especially in a Taiwan conflict. It is therefore likely that the PLAN 
has committed itself to ASUW by antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). 
Antisurface Warfare via Antiship Cruise Missiles
The evidence for this important shift is somewhat circumstantial but accords fully with 
the technology available to China; with the ASUW mission expected of PLAN tactical 
submarines; with the mode of ASUW adopted by the PLA surface navy, air forces, and 
Second Artillery Corps; with important historical examples; and with the relatively low 
amount of at-sea training conducted by Beijing’s submarines. For example, regarding 
the availability of long-range antiship cruise missiles, China in 2007 took delivery of the 
last of eight Kilo 636M diesel-electric submarines purchased in 2002 armed with (aside 
from modern wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes) the Russian SS-N-27B ASCM.8 
This missile can deliver a 440-pound warhead to a range of 120–160 nautical miles 
(nm), with a terminal phase consisting of a Mach 2.9 “zig-zag flight path.”9
Additionally, in 2010 DoD reported that “the Song SS, Yuan SS, and Shang SSN will be 
capable of launching the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile completes develop-
ment and testing” and that these three classes of attack submarines, along with the Kilo 
class, will be “capable of firing advanced ASCMs.”10 One can logically surmise that the 
CH-SS-NX-13 antiship cruise missile will represent a significant threat to surface naval 
forces. Until further performance data regarding it are available, observers can only 
speculate about how advanced the missile will be, but there is little reason to believe it 
will not constitute a considerable improvement over the approximately twenty-nautical-
mile-range submarine-launched subsonic C-801 ASCM the Song currently carries.
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China’s commitment to advanced naval cruise missiles is already clear in its surface 
fleet. Nearly every PLAN surface combatant carries ninety-seven-nautical-mile-range, 
subsonic YJ-83 antiship cruise missiles—typically eight but up to sixteen. The Luyang 
II destroyers are exceptions, carrying eight 151-nautical-mile-range YJ-62s;11 so also 
are the four Sovremenny-class destroyers China purchased from Russia, each with eight 
120-nautical-mile-range supersonic SS-N-22 antiship cruise missiles. This ASCM reli-
ance is reflected especially strongly in the PLAN’s sixty-odd Houbei-class fast attack, 
wave-piercing catamarans, each of which can carry eight YJ-83s.12
Other PLA branches have also wagered heavily on ASCMs. This is indicated by the 
display of land-based, mobile YJ-62 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) during the 1 
October 2009 National Day parade in Beijing.13 The PLA Air Force and PLAN aviation 
have also invested in high-performance ASCMs; many images have appeared on the In-
ternet of B-6 bombers and smaller aircraft carrying ASCMs, including, as of early 2013, 
the supersonic YJ-12.14
China’s emphasis on cruise missiles launched from surface ships, aircraft, and subma-
rines has a notable Soviet/Russian precedent. The Soviets built Sovremenny- and Slava-
class cruisers and deployed both Blackjack and Backfire bombers as means of delivering 
advanced antiship cruise missiles against their most likely opponents. They also built 
specialized submarines of the Echo II, Charlie I and II, and Oscar classes—all of which 
carried large numbers of increasingly advanced ASCMs—to compound the missile 
threat that NATO surface ships faced. The PLA has long equipped its surface ships with 
early-generation antiship cruise missiles. What is different now is that all of China’s sur-
face combatants, many of its aircraft, and all its modern attack submarines are already 
able, or in the near future will be, to carry and shoot advanced, long-range, lethal cruise 
missiles. This is a significant change. 
The Need for Targeting Data
Nearly all tactical methods of accurately firing long-range ASCMs by any vessel or 
aircraft rely on remote targeting.15 Determining the requirements for a surveillance and 
reconnaissance complex adequate to this task and assessing whether China already pos-
sesses one or is on path to do so soon are addressed in this volume by Andrew Erickson. 
For present purposes, it seems reasonable to assume that China has assessed what is 
necessary and is investing aggressively to satisfy those requirements. The PLA’s over-the-
horizon (OTH) radar development and ever-improving constellation of reconnaissance 
satellites are strong indicators of this;16 the same is true of the fielding by the Second Ar-
tillery Corps of the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM). An American vice admiral 
related in January 2011 that China likely has sufficient satellite and non-space-based in-
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to support DF-21D employment.17 
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The targeting data necessary for a DF-21D engagement could also be provided to other 
entities, including aircraft, ships, and submarines carrying long-range antiship cruise 
missiles. As for submarine shooters, there are many ways of delivering such targeting in-
formation to patrolling units, including via satellite and by radio transmission, whether 
high- or midfrequency or, especially, very low frequency (VLF). The great advantage of 
VLF signals is their ability to penetrate water to tactically useful depths. This means that 
a receiving submarine does not have to extend an antenna above the ocean’s surface (and 
hence raise its risk of being detected by radar) to receive missile targeting data and firing 
orders, as it would if receiving satellite or high-frequency transmissions (which cannot 
penetrate water). Instead, the VLF radio signal can be received on a buoyant or even fully 
submerged wire antenna, while the submarine itself remains fully underwater.18 There is 
some evidence China has developed a submarine antenna for this purpose. Many of the 
most recent Yuan and Song submarines have what appear to be “bell mouth” openings 
at the top, aft ends of their sails from which wire antennas could be streamed.19 Through 
such an antenna VLF radio waves could convey to the submarine the latitude and lon-
gitude of the target, the salvo size and composition of the attack, and the desired time 
of arrival of the missiles. Onboard computers could then determine the launch times 
and missile flight paths necessary to satisfy the orders.20 The submarine crew would have 
only to enter those data into the missiles through the ship’s fire-control system and then 
fire them. In essence, PLAN submarines would be underwater analogs to the Second Ar-
tillery’s ballistic-missile TELs. They could deploy in a crisis and hide quietly for extended 
periods until provided with targeting information and ordered to launch.
This mode, or concept of operation, has a number of benefits. It would require relatively 
modest submarine crew proficiency and therefore minimal at-sea training. Much of the 
process could be practiced ashore in computer-assisted training facilities, even alongside 
a pier. All of this is consistent with computer-based training facilities and scenarios dem-
onstrated to Westerners at Qingdao Submarine Academy and with the levels of PLAN 
submarine at-sea training that have been observed. It would also accommodate a rigid 
and centralized command and control of submarines, something that would probably be 
attractive to senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. It also appears consistent 
with an otherwise inexplicable event of September 2010. 
Another New Class of Submarine Launched 
In September 2010, Wuhan shipyard of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corpora-
tion (CSIC) launched a new class of submarine. Internet photos show that this vessel 
incorporates characteristics of the Yuan, Kilo, and Golf classes of diesel submarines. It 
is probably the largest conventionally powered submarine in existence. Perhaps its most 
distinguishing feature is its large, even enormous, sail, approximately twice as long and 
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wide as that on the Yuan class. Such a departure from existing norms of submarine 
structure must have a compelling basis in intended function. 
It is possible that this new vessel is simply a replacement for the solitary, fifty-year-old 
Golf conventionally powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSB) that the PLAN has used 
to test and develop JL-1 and JL-2 missiles.21 Yet the Golf emerged apparently shipshape 
from a Lüshun dry dock in July 2009 and received in January 2011 an effusive official 
commendation for its successes in conducting missile tests. A CCTV-1 focus of that 
month depicted the ship in good repair and suggests that it is fully capable of continu-
ing its missile-testing role.22 A Google Earth image dated 29 March 2011 shows the Golf 
tied up across a pier from two Yuan SSs and near two Jin SSBNs at Xiaopingdao. So, the 
Golf appears to have been fully operational as late as 2011. Even if the Golf were soon to 
be decommissioned, the PLAN could test the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) with either of its two Jin SSBNs rather than build an entirely new vessel. It is 
therefore likely that the new submarine was built not as a replacement for the Golf or as 
a JL-2 testing platform but for some other role.
Possible insight into that role can be gleaned from a series of detailed drawings of this 
submarine in the November 2010 issue of the Chinese magazine Modern Ships.23 This 
magazine is published by CSIC, which built the mysterious submarine.24 Two images (in 
a full-color foldout insert) depict ten vertical-launch missile-tube hatches, sized appro-
priately for cruise missiles, in the aft end of the sail. These images show that the vessel 
also has six horizontal torpedo tubes, arranged in a two-over-four configuration like 
that of the Kilo and Yuan classes. Conceivably, then, this new submarine could launch in 
quick succession sixteen ASCMs (six from the torpedo tubes and ten from the vertical 
tubes in the sail) at a solitary target, perhaps at great range.25 In fact, the author of the 
Modern Ships article observes that “in the course of high-intensity naval combat or to 
attack enemy land targets, medium-range missiles shot from torpedo tubes cannot meet 
requirements” and that “the challenge of making vertical launch tubes [for submarines] 
is not too difficult, but the benefits of this technology for increasing [submarine] com-
bat capability are considerable.” The article adds, “Vertical tubes allow for a large salvo 
shot in a short amount of time . . . affording adversary enemy air defenses no possibility 
to respond.”26 This would be the first submarine in the PLA inventory to have vertical-
launch tubes for antiship cruise missiles (or eventually even land-attack cruise missiles).
Still, questions regarding this submarine’s configuration and roles remain. A 13 May 
2011 Internet photo of the submarine in dry dock revealed a large bulge extending 
below the keel directly underneath the sail.27 Soviet (and presumably also Chinese) Golf-
class SSBs had similar bulges to accommodate the thirty-nine-foot ballistic missiles that 
the twenty-one-foot-diameter boats carried in their sails. This new keel bulge strongly 
suggests China’s newest diesel submarine could or will carry one or more SLBMs. But 
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another photo, posted two weeks later, appears to show twenty hatches along the aft, top 
portion of the sail, on the port side, roughly consistent with artist’s renderings published 
in Modern Ships six months earlier.28 If this vessel does turn out to have ten or more 
vertical-launch tubes in its sail, then it stands to reason that China will build more of 
these or similar submarines and thereby make possible very large salvos of advanced 
ASCMs. 
It also seems logical that this new submarine would benefit from air-independent pro-
pulsion. With AIP it could patrol slowly and quietly for a number of weeks (as compared 
to a handful of days otherwise) without loud, position-revealing battery-charging evolu-
tions, all the while waiting for a launch order to be delivered via VLF radio broadcast. 
The submarine’s substantial girth and length provide adequate volume for storage of the 
reagents necessary to support AIP, as well as the space for enhanced quieting measures 
for other machinery. It is unknown whether China’s new submarine has AIP; however, 
credible reports relate that in March 2011 Islamabad was negotiating with Beijing for the 
construction of six AIP-equipped submarines, and in 2013 the Department of Defense 
stated that the Yuan class has AIP. So too could this new submarine.29 
The overall implication is that the PLA decided some years ago to pursue a concept of 
operations in which it would deter or destroy hostile surface naval combatants operating 
in the near seas with large numbers of advanced ASCMs launched from land, aircraft, 
and surface ships.30 China’s submarine force is now also embracing this mode of opera-
tion, though Western navies’ submarines have not. The PLAN conventional submarine 
force, however, is focused on and optimized for a Taiwan contingency and other near-
seas missions and hence can pursue a mode of ASUW substantially different from that 
of most major navies. Equipping the PLAN’s conventional attack-submarine force with 
advanced ASCMs, if supported by robust OTH targeting systems, thus directly supports 
China’s near-seas core interests. 
Future Mission: Defend Sea Lines of Communication? 
It is generally thought that an emerging and probable future mission for the PLAN is 
to defend China’s sea-lanes against a range of challenges. The lower end of threats to 
Chinese maritime commerce is perhaps represented by Somali piracy; since 2008, Bei-
jing has deployed two surface combatants and a replenishment ship continuously to the 
waters near the Horn of Africa as a countermeasure. Yet in the future the PLAN may be 
called on to guarantee the safe transit of commercial shipping through the Indian Ocean 
and East Asian waters against the efforts of a modern navy. This mission would require it 
to protect merchant vessels and surface warships from a diverse array of military threats 
across the breadth of the Indian Ocean’s deep waters, including modern SSNs.
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Currently, however, there is little indication that Beijing is preparing for a deepwater 
ASW mission in any meaningful way. For example, the hull-mounted, medium-
frequency sonars of PLAN surface ships are ill suited to open-ocean ASW; only the most 
modern Chinese destroyers and frigates appear to be capable of deploying towed-array 
sonars;31 PLAN aviation’s inventory of ASW helicopters is anemic; and only in 2011 did 
there emerge convincing evidence of even a nascent fixed-wing maritime-patrol-aircraft 
program.32 Perhaps most significantly, there are only two second-generation (but still 
relatively loud, acoustically) Shang-class SSNs in the Chinese fleet, and China’s four re-
maining first-generation SSNs are probably the noisiest nuclear submarines still in com-
mission anywhere in the world.33 All this means that China’s current SSNs are almost 
certainly incapable of performing effective ASW against their much quieter potential ad-
versaries. The PLAN’s diesel submarines cannot conduct effective wide-area ASW either, 
hampered by their slow speeds and limited endurance. Equally important, China does 
not possess foreign bases from which it could operate or maintain ASW forces, such as a 
large fleet of maritime patrol aircraft it could someday develop. It seems likely, then, that 
the lack of effective expeditionary ASW forces (among other things) will tend to prevent 
China from conducting high-tempo naval warfare in far seas for quite some time. 
Rationally Weak ASW 
Still, one can logically wonder why China’s ASW remains underdeveloped. This is espe-
cially perplexing given that the PLA would almost certainly have to expect to confront 
submarines during military operations in the near seas, especially in a Taiwan scenario. 
It also seems strange in view of the difficulty of other military challenges China appears 
to have mastered. Conceivably, Chinese analysts have determined that ASW is simply too 
hard and too expensive, but this seems unlikely and at odds with the aforementioned 
recent evidence of expanded ASW efforts. A more plausible explanation for the ASW 
shortfall could be that the PLA has rationally concluded that it is simply not necessary 
to find and destroy submarines opposing Chinese military operations against Taiwan 
or Taipei’s potential supporters. China’s planners seem to have determined instead that 
in any of the three plausible operational scenarios involving Taiwan—bombardment, 
blockade, and invasion—it would be better to avoid and distract, rather than confront 
and defeat, opposing submarines. 
Scenario One: Bombardment 
There is little that opposing submarines could do to disrupt or defeat a Chinese air force 
or Second Artillery Corps ballistic-missile bombardment of Taiwan. Submarines could 
launch Tomahawk or similar land-attack cruise missiles against airfields or locations as-
sessed as vital for the PLA’s short-range ballistic-missile operations, but many of China’s 
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air-defense systems, such as the SA-20s obtained from Russia, are designed specifically to 
shoot down such land-attack weapons. It would be strange too if the number of targets 
in China did not greatly outnumber the cruise missiles that could be brought by subma-
rine to within firing range.34 Absent large numbers of submarine-launched missiles that 
can reliably penetrate Chinese air defenses and a supporting targeting system that can 
detect fleeting mobile targets and rapidly relay the data underwater, submarines would 
appear to be essentially irrelevant to mitigating or preventing a Chinese bombardment 
of Taiwan.35 Consequently, China does not require, and has not developed, robust ASW 
to support a bombardment. 
Scenario Two: Cruise-Missile Blockade
Precision strikes conducted by the Second Artillery Corps followed up with bombing 
attacks by PLA air forces have the potential to destroy outright or deny Taiwan the use 
of its air force and much of its navy.36 Any Taiwan naval vessels that survived such a 
bombardment and safely got to sea to oppose a blockade would be subject to antiship-
cruise-missile attacks from Beijing’s submarines, major surface combatants, and dozens 
of high-speed Houbei-class YJ-83-carrying, wave-piercing catamarans. These latter ves-
sels, which are optimized for destroying the Taiwan navy and then enforcing a blockade 
against Taiwan, are by virtue of their high speed, shallow draft, and small size essentially 
invulnerable to submarines.37 
Beijing’s ASCM-carrying surface combatants, in contrast, are potentially quite vulner-
able. However, if PLA submarines are shifting from torpedo-based to ASCM-based 
ASUW, they would no longer have to lurk near blockaded ports but instead could 
disperse widely in the shallow, noisy waters to the west and north of Taiwan. Here 
their mission would be to remain within ASCM range (some two hundred kilometers 
in the case of the SS-N-27B carried by the Kilo class, for example) of blockaded ports 
and silently wait for targeting orders to arrive. This mode of blockade by cruise missile 
would greatly increase the volumes of ocean that would have to be searched for PLAN 
submarines and the necessary time it would take to localize and destroy them. The poor 
acoustic conditions of the shallow waters near Taiwan would afford short detection 
ranges against Chinese submarines, compounding a hunter’s challenges.
Another factor degrading the potential ASW performance of submarines is that some 
waters—this is true of much of the Strait of Taiwan—that are deep enough to permit 
some conventional submarine and surface-ship operations are simply too shallow for 
SSNs. Other waters that are sufficiently deep for SSNs are still shallow enough to force 
them to operate at lower speeds to be sure of their ability to avoid obstacles (including 
defensively laid Chinese mines).38 
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Short detection ranges and significantly reduced search speeds would greatly extend 
the time required for predatory submarines to accomplish a mission of PLAN attrition. 
Individual ASCM-carrying surface ships and submarines would be sunk, but only slowly. 
Despite tactical successes, dozens of PLAN warships and submarines could survive for 
extended periods, able to enforce a blockade by shooting long-range ASCMs against 
commercial and military ships from shallow waters (that are covered by their own 
shore-based aircraft, surface-to-air, and air-to-air defenses). The net result would be that 
opposing SSNs would be operationally ineffective, at least for a short-to-medium-length 
Chinese blockade against Taiwan. This would allow China to achieve a result similar to 
what it could obtain if it devoted significant effort to ASW, but at significantly less cost 
and effort. 
Scenario Three: Amphibious Assault 
As of early 2013, it is not clear that Beijing really views invasion as a viable means of 
coercing Taipei. Analysts generally agree that the PLAN amphibious force remains too 
small, and there is scant evidence to show that this shortfall is about to be addressed. If it 
were, however (and certainly, amphibious ships could be quickly built in large numbers 
in China’s many shipyards), it is unlikely that submarines, considered in isolation, would 
be an effective counterinvasion mechanism. 
The reasons stem from the limited numbers of weapons that submarines can carry, the 
short ranges at which they could expect to detect and identify amphibious targets, the 
shallow waters of the operating area (and the slow tactical speeds to which submarines 
would thereby be restricted), the large number of interfering secondary contacts China 
could be expected to send across the strait as part of the invasion force (essentially 
torpedo decoys), and the small number of submarines that could likely be devoted to 
counterinvasion operations at the expense of other missions (looking for antiship cruise 
missile–carrying PLAN submarines, escorting carrier strike groups, and so on). One 
could certainly expect aggressively operated submarines to destroy some Chinese am-
phibious ships, but anticipated attrition could probably be overcome in advance simply 
by increasing the size of the invading force. 
In sum, then, China appears to have multiple coercive options against Taiwan that 
sidestep altogether or limit significantly the effectiveness of any opposing submarines. 
This operational flexibility stems significantly from geography but is greatly enhanced by 
the PLA’s apparent reliance on advanced, long-range antiship cruise missiles and ballistic 
missiles. 
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Conclusion
Chinese military strategists appear to recognize that all quiet submarines, whether 
friendly or hostile, are unlikely to be operationally vulnerable to opposing forces. Bei-
jing’s ongoing investment in increasingly modern (and therefore progressively quiet) 
antiship-cruise-missile-firing diesel submarines reflects a determination to overwhelm 
and destroy surface ships operating within at least a hundred miles of the shallow waters 
of the near seas, including Taiwan. This distance is greatly extended and reinforced by 
the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile and by antiship cruise missiles launched from 
surface warships and such aircraft as new variants of the H-6 bomber. PLA reliance on 
large numbers of ASCMs as a means of deterring and defeating opposing surface naval 
forces represents a significant challenge for a potential adversary, and it suggests specifi-
cally that the U.S. Navy’s post–Cold War ability to conduct high-volume, uncontested, 
maritime strike operations from surface warships in the western Pacific has ended, at 
least temporarily. 
On the other hand, Beijing’s lack of modern ASW forces—such as maritime patrol 
aircraft, sub-hunting helicopters, low-frequency surface-ship sonars, and quiet nuclear 
attack submarines—suggests the PLAN will for some time continue to cede underwa-
ter mastery of the deep or distant ocean areas to the West. This may very well suggest a 
PLA calculated acceptance of losses to opposing SSNs in a Taiwan scenario and a lack 
of intent to conduct high-tech warfare, at least for the near term, in any distant sea. It 
would seem, therefore, to be in the military interest of the U.S. Navy to exploit its cur-
rent underwater advantages. A logical implication could be an expansion of the types 
and numbers of weapons that could be launched from submarines.
Notes 
1.  I thank Christopher Weuve, Gordon Willard, 
Lyle Goldstein, an anonymous reviewer, and 
other Naval War College colleagues for their 
insights and other valued contributions to this 
paper. 
2.  Orville Schell, quoting State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo, in “China: Defending Its Core Interest 
in the World,” Asia Sentinel, 9 April 2010, www 
.asiasentinel.com/. See also Michael D. Swaine, 
“China’s Assertive Behavior: Part One: On ‘Core 
Interests,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 
(2011), available at media.hoover.org/. 
3.  A carrier air wing’s effective range appears to 
be somewhere between two hundred and four 
hundred nautical miles. See Angelyn Jewell et 
al. USS Nimitz and Carrier Airwing Nine Surge 
Demonstration (Alexandria, Va.: Center for 
Naval Analyses, April 1998), p. 32, fig. 10. 
4.  U.S. Navy Dept., The People’s Liberation Army 
Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Character-
istics (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intel-
ligence, August 2009), p. 34.
5.  Ibid., p. 40. 
6.  Regarding the limited number of patrols, see 
Hans Kristensen, “Feb 03 Chinese Submarine 
Patrols Doubled in 2008,” Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists, 3 February 2009, www.fas.org/. 
Additionally, time spent training at sea in local 
waters, though not qualifying as “on patrol,” 
can provide substantial training in wartime 
missions. 
7.  Slow, diesel submarines firing torpedoes can, 
however, be highly effective in constrained 
waters, such as choke points or near harbor 
entrances through which their prey must pass. 
28 china maritime studies
8.  U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Devel-
opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2010, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 17 
August 2010), p. 48, available at www.defense 
.gov/.
9.  Carlo Kopp, Soviet/Russian Cruise Missiles, 
Technical Report APA-TR-2009-0805 (n.p.: Air 
Power Australia, updated April 2012), www 
.ausairpower.net/. See also, for example, Jane’s Naval 
Weapons Systems, s.v. “The Klub Family / Klub 
S Klub N / (91RE2; 91RE1; SS-N-27B [3M54TE; 
3M54E]; SS-N-30B [3M14TE; 3M14E]) / Klub 
K,” www.janes.com/, and Carlo Kopp, “Precision 
Guided Munitions in the Region,” Air Power 
Australia (August 2009), www.ausairpower.net/.
10.  U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Devel-
opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2010, pp. 3, 30.
11.  Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, s.v. “C-602 
(HN-1/-2/-3/YJ-62/X-600/DH-10/CJ-10/HN-
2000),” 1 June 2010, www.janes.com/.
12.  U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Devel-
opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2010, p. 3; Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, s.v. 
“C-801 (CSS-N-4 ‘Sardine’ / YJ-1/-8/-81) and 
C-802 (CSSC-8 ‘Saccade’ / YJ-2/-21/-22/-82/ 
-85), C-803 (YJ-3/-83/-88),” www.janes.com/.
13.  A TEL is essentially a truck that can carry and 
launch a missile. Targeting data for the missiles 
launched by TELs can be provided remotely 
from a central headquarters; from predeter-
mined data (for fixed, nonmobile targets) digi-
tally loaded into the missile before launch; or, in 
some short-range cases against mobile targets 
(such as ships), from information provided by a 
radar on or deployed with the TEL. 
14.  See “YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-ship Missile, Reply 
#7,” ChinaDefense.com, 18 January 2013. 
15.  Some aircraft, such as the PLA’s H-6D/HS-M 
Badgers, might have the organic radar and 
horizon height necessary to conduct their own 
targeting. The author is indebted to an anony-
mous reviewer for this caveat. 
16.  See, for example, Ian Easton and Mark A. Stokes, 
“China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satel-
lite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air 
and Naval Operations,” Project 2049 Institute 
(23 February 2011), project2049.net/. See also 
U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 
2009 (Washington, D.C.: 25 March 2009), p. 49, 
available at sino.defence.com. 
17.  See Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Anti-ship 
Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches Equivalent of 
‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC): Where It’s 
Going and What It Means,” Andrew S. Erickson: 
China Analysis from Original Sources (blog), 12 
July 2011, www.andrewerickson.com/, which 
quotes the 3 January 2011 replies of the Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Information 
Dominance (N2/N6), Vice Adm. David J. 
Dorsett, to questions about China’s ability to em-
ploy the missile with targeting data derived from 
satellites, OTH radars, and other sensors. 
18.  For a description of a buoyant wire antenna, see 
the brochure “Buoyant Wire Antenna System 
Submarine Communications,” Lockheed Martin, 
www.sippican.com/.
19.  The newest variants of the Yuan class seem to 
have replaced this bell mouth with an antenna, 
approximately eight feet long, that can be ro-
tated from a horizontal position along the after 
end of the top of the sail to a vertical position. 
Such an antenna could probably also receive 
VLF transmissions while the boat remains fully 
submerged. 
20.  This mode of operation is similar to how the 
U.S. SSBN force trained to execute the Strategic 
Integrated Operations Plan. 
21.  SLBMs can be loaded in two large-diameter 
missile tubes in the after end of the submarine’s 
enormous sail. 
22.  “PLA Navy Submarine Test-Fires Under-
water Missile in Distant Seas,” CCTV-1, 
31 January 2011, Open Source Center, 
CPP20110131338002. 
23.  Wu Hanyu, “Analysis of the Key Technologies 
for the Next-Generation Indigenous Submarine,” 
Modern Ships (November 2010), pp. 8–11. I am 
indebted to Dr. Lyle Goldstein for this transla-
tion and citation.
24.  Although not guaranteeing accuracy, this does 
increase the likelihood of the images’ being 
accurate.
25.  It is certainly possible that such tubes could also 
launch land-attack cruise missiles, but there is 
no credible evidence yet that China is develop-
ing a submarine-launched version of such a 
weapon, whereas there is abundant evidence for 
new antiship cruise missiles.
26.  Wu Hanyu, “Analysis of the Key Technologies 
for the Next-Generation Indigenous Submarine,” 
pp. 8–11. 
27.  See “New QING? Class SSB,” ChinaDefense 
.com, post 203, 13 May 2011. 
28.  See “New QING? Class SSB,” ChinaDefense 
.com, post 254, 27 May 2011. 
29.  For the negotiations, Jon Grevatt, “Pakistan and 
China Discuss Submarine Acquisition,” Jane’s 
Defence Industry, 15 March 2011. For AIP, U.S. 
china’s near seas combat capabilities 29
Defense Dept., Military and Security Develop-
ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2013 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 7 May 2013), p. 7, available at www 
.defense.gov/.
30.  This shift has been reported officially. See U.S. 
Navy Dept., People’s Liberation Army Navy, pp. 
18–28.
31.  See Christopher Carlson, “PLAN Acoustic 
Decoy and Towed Array Deployment Op-
tions,” Clash of Arms, 20 October 2012, www 
.clashofarms.com/. 
32.  See “Y-8GX6 (Y-8Q) ASW Aircraft (High New 
6),” ChinaDefense.com, reply 20, 16 November 
2011. 
33.  U.S. Navy Dept., People’s Liberation Army Navy, 
p. 22.
34.  The U.S. Navy fired over two hundred Toma-
hawks into Libya during Operation Odyssey 
Dawn. China would presumably present many 
times more targets for such missiles. See John 
Reed, “2,000 Tomahawks Fired in Anger,” 
Defensetech.org, 4 August 2011. 
35.  For a carefully considered alternative view, see 
Owen R. Coté, Jr., “Submarines in the Air Sea 
Battle” (paper presented at the 2010 Submarine 
Technology Symposium, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Md., 
11–13 May 2010), available at web.mit.edu/. 
36.  See William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s 
Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review 61, 
no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 13–38.
37.  The fifty-knot Houbei would likely run any 
torpedo to exhaustion. Its aluminum hull 
would probably not satisfy a torpedo warhead’s 
magnetic arming criteria, and its shallow draft 
would make a contact detonation very difficult 
if not impossible. See John Patch’s article in this 
collection. 
38.  This is because SSNs, which are approximately 
fifty feet tall from the bottom of their keels to 
the top of their sails, require vertical operating 
margins to avoid obstacles (such as merchant 
ships) on the surface and on the ocean floor. 

Since its establishment in 1966, the land-based missile force of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Second Artillery Force, has maintained six “basic battle 
corps” (Bases 51 to 56) at key locations along strategic directions extending outward 
from China’s inland and coastal areas.1 Three of these combat bases (Bases 51, 52, and 
53) are positioned in, respectively, northeast, south-central, and southeast China. These 
three bases have been responsible traditionally for nuclear missions against land targets 
of potential adversaries at points on or near the “First Island Chain”—that is, in the near 
seas.2 
Beginning in 1994, the Second Artillery Force added a conventional component to its 
force structure, and most of its conventional units have missions associated with land, 
and more recently maritime, targets in the near seas. Major milestones in conven-
tional force development include the equipping of at least seven Second Artillery Force 
or PLA brigades with short-range ballistic missiles and the forming of at least three 
ground-launched-cruise-missile brigades.3 More recently, the Second Artillery Force has 
equipped some of these units with theater ballistic missiles capable of targeting naval 
ships operating in China’s near seas and beyond.4 Also, a fourth combat base (Base 55), 
in central China, has equipped one of its brigades in Jiangxi Province with new conven-
tional land-attack, ground-launched cruise missiles appropriate for near-seas missions.5
Four of the six Second Artillery Force combat bases now direct seventeen or eighteen 
known deployed brigades responsible for missions in or immediately beyond the near 
seas. In effect, two-thirds of the overall Second Artillery Force unit structure is focused 
on missions associated with the near seas.6 Other brigades positioned in central or 
northwestern China are responsible for strategic nuclear deterrence and nuclear coun-
terattack missions or operational/tactical missions employing conventional or nuclear 
weapons against regional powers. These deployed brigades can be clustered into four 
force components.
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First, a long-standing theater nuclear force of at least four brigades is equipped with in-
termediate-range ballistic missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles armed with single 
nuclear warheads.7 These units are subordinate to Base 51 or 52. An additional, Base 53, 
brigade can be an element of this component, depending on whether it is responsible 
for a secondary task of holding at risk targets in the near seas in addition to its primary 
missions against India. A sixth (Base 52) nuclear brigade is a candidate for near-term 
conversion to a conventional variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles (see 
figure 1).8
A conventional tactical-missile force of at least seven operational brigades is positioned 
opposite Taiwan and equipped with short-range ballistic missiles.9 Five of these brigades 
are commanded by Base 52. Two others are apparently being reassigned from the ground 
forces to the Second Artillery Force’s Base 52.10 This component can include an eighth 
brigade, given uncertainty about whether one Base 52 unit is equipped with a new mis-
sile system of either short or medium range.11 See figure 2.
The Second Artillery Force reportedly has formed at least two missiles brigades 
equipped with conventional ground-launched cruise missiles positioned in southern 
China.12 Base 53’s 821st Brigade is being equipped with ground-launched cruise mis-
siles; it is garrisoned in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Base 55 is also 
apparently forming a new brigade, the 824th, in Jiangxi Province, reportedly equipped 
Figure 1. Theater Nuclear Force
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with ground-launched cruise missiles.13 Fragmentary reports indicate Base 53 may form 
a second ground-launched cruise-missile brigade in Yunnan Province, in southwestern 
China.14 See figure 3.
Finally, the Second Artillery Force has formed at least one operational brigade posi-
tioned in eastern China and equipped with new-type, land-based, conventional theater 
ballistic missiles capable of targeting naval ships operating within or beyond the First 
Island Chain.15 The Second Artillery Force is equipping units in eastern China with 
conventional medium-range ballistic missiles capable of attacking land targets, to 
include airfields. Base 51’s 822nd Brigade is reportedly equipped with new medium-
range DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles and DF-21C medium-range ballistic mis-
siles.16 Base 53 is also forming a new unit, the 825th Brigade, in Guangdong Province 
at Qingyuan, apparently equipped with either of these systems or newer DF-16 
ballistic missiles.17 Base 52’s 811th Brigade is a candidate to convert its medium-range 
ballistic-missiles inventory from older nuclear to newer conventional CSS-5 variants.18 
See figure 4.
The rough, order-of-magnitude inventory assigned to these four components comprises 
1,300–1,800 ballistic or cruise missiles and 300–350 associated transportable or mobile 
launchers.19 Fourteen different delivery-system variants are represented in this inven-
tory—four equipped with single nuclear warheads and ten with conventional unitary 
Figure 2. Conventional Short-Range-Ballistic-Missile Force
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Figure 3. Ground-Launched-Cruise-Missile Force
Figure 4. Conventional MRBM Force
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warheads or optimized submunitions. Thirteen variants are designed to attack land 
targets, with one newer system variant, the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile, designed 
to attack naval targets at sea. Each of the four combat bases is equipped with a mix of 
nuclear and conventional missiles. However, their operational brigades are equipped 
exclusively with either nuclear or conventional missiles.
Military Capabilities
In crisis or wartime, Second Artillery Force assets with missions in the near seas provide 
the PLA and senior leaders with formidable military capabilities, whether in terms of 
their effectiveness in achieving operational objectives, technical performance character-
istics, or ability to contribute to broader political objectives. 
Theater Nuclear Force Capabilities
China’s theater nuclear arsenal enables Beijing to hold at risk civilian or military targets 
throughout the near-seas areas with nuclear weapons. These missile systems were as-
signed to Second Artillery Force units in the 1970s or 1980s (CSS-2s) and in the 1990s 
(nuclear CSS-5s).20 Potential enemy targets in the near seas would likely be located in 
South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.21 
Liquid-fueled, single-stage CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (DF-3s and 
extended-range DF-3As) are capable of delivering single two-to-three-megaton nuclear 
warheads to land destinations 2,500 to 2,800 kilometers (km) away with accuracy at the 
level of a one-to-three-thousand-meter circular error probable (CEP), depending on the 
variant.22 Their flight trajectories would be navigated by inertial strap-down guidance, 
and their prelaunch survivability would be limited by lengthy launch procedures and 
the presence of large contingents of ground-support vehicles. Nonetheless, CSS-2s are 
likely to fly depressed trajectories, complicating the problem of enemy ballistic-missile 
defenses systems that are simultaneously engaging other ballistic missiles with higher 
reentry angles.
Solid-propelled, two-stage, road-mobile CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles (DF-
21s) and extended-range DF-21As are capable of delivering single five-to-six-hundred-
kiloton nuclear warheads to land destinations 1,700 to 2,700 km away with an accuracy 
of one to four hundred meters CEP, depending again on the variant.23 Nuclear CSS-5s 
would navigate in flight by inertial gyroscope guidance, aided by onboard computers. 
The system’s use of solid-propellant rocket motors probably would enable it to achieve 
rapid acceleration and high initial speed, thereby reducing its time in the boost phase of 
flight and thus making it more difficult to shoot down during that period.24
China’s possession of theater-range nuclear delivery systems provides it a tool for deter-
ring nuclear threat or attack. Given the range of these weapons relative to the distances 
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to key U.S. allies in the near-seas area, Beijing can also rely on those weapons to intimi-
date these allies in a crisis or war, thereby weakening the credibility of extended deter-
rence on which those allies may rely—according to Second Artillery commentators 
(see below).25 In a 1999 article, Maj. Gen. Lu Haozhong, then president of the Second 
Artillery Force’s Command Institute, asserted that “‘attacking strategy’ and ‘attacking 
alliances’ are an important part of nuclear deterrence.”26 Second Artillery Force thinking 
on how to attack alliances via deterrence emphasizes tailoring deterrence to the “target,” 
depending on whether alliance partners have differing attitudes toward a war.27 That is, 
as one former Second Artillery deputy commander has asserted, if attitudes differ, Chi-
nese deterrence should focus on the dominant country, the one that has the “hard-line 
attitude.” When attitudes in an alliance are the same, “deterrence should be directed first 
at those countries whose foundation of social and political support is relatively weak.” 
China’s inventory of theater nuclear missiles can play an important role in counter-
ing enemy nuclear threats or attacks in near-seas contingencies. They provide potential 
nuclear options with more credibility than the use of longer-range intercontinental 
or submarine-launched ballistic missiles against strategic homeland targets of foreign 
nuclear powers. Should nuclear deterrence fail, these weapons enable China to inflict 
damage against area targets in the near-seas region, to include population, government, 
and industrial centers, as well as against soft military targets—including forward U.S. 
bases and staging areas.
Finally, this theater nuclear force affords China options for implementing the equivalent 
of American nuclear “flexible deterrent options” (FDOs).28 The Second Artillery Force 
intends its nuclear forces to be an active part of China’s regional military strategy rather 
than a passive backdrop to the nation’s development of conventional missile forces with 
antiaccess and area-denial capabilities. The Second Artillery Force views nuclear-force 
deterrence as an integral factor in conventional missile strike campaigns. This doctrine 
assumes Chinese missile operations will take place under nuclear deterrence or threat 
conditions—that is, conventional operations “will necessarily involve the Second Artil-
lery Force nuclear missile unit’s deterrence activities.”29 
In a conventional strike campaign, the Second Artillery Force intends to apply the “law 
of steadily increasing the strength of nuclear deterrence to prepare for the transition” 
to unlikely but possible nuclear counterattack operations.30 From the Second Artillery 
Force’s perspective, nuclear missile and warhead units should be the “basic deterrence 
forces” used to deter nuclear threats or attacks and to contribute to the waging of China’s 
political and diplomatic struggles during a conventional missile strike campaign. See the 
table.
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Conventional Tactical Missiles
China’s tactical missile arsenal of 1,050 to 1,150 CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic 
missiles has been assigned to Second Artillery Force units at different stages since 1993, 
with most CSS-6 and CSS-7 missiles being distributed to deployed units from 1999 
through 2005.31 On the basis of these units’ current disposition and these missiles’ as-
sessed ranges, the weapons are capable of attacking targets throughout Taiwan. 
The Second Artillery Force is currently equipped with three different solid-propelled, 
road-mobile, one- or two-stage CSS-6 short-range ballistic-missile variants.32 The origi-
nal CSS-6 is capable of delivering a unitary high-explosive (HE) or armor-piercing war-
head or incendiary submunitions to a land destination six hundred kilometers away with 
System Type and 
Designator
Mission Target Estimated Range Payload
DF-3 IRBM nuclear land 2,500 km 2–3 mt nuclear
DF-3A IRBM nuclear land 2,800 km 2–3 mt nuclear
DF-21 MRBM nuclear land 1,700 km 500–600 kt nuclear
DF-21A MRBM nuclear land 2,800 km 500–600 kt nuclear
DF-15 SRBM conventional land 600 km HE, armor-piercing, 
incendiary
Extended-Range 
DF-15 SRBM
conventional land 950 km HE, enhanced-blast, 
runway-penetrator
DF-15 MaRV 
SRBM
conventional land 950 km multiple unitary 
warheads and 
submunitions
DF-11 SRBM conventional land 350 km HE, FAE
DF-11A SRBM conventional land 350–530 km multiple unitary 
warheads and 
submunitions
DF-11B SRBM conventional land unknown unknown
New SR/MRBM conventional land 800–1,200 km enhanced-blast and 
runway-penetrator
CJ-10 GLCM conventional land 1,500+ km HE (blast)
DF-21C MRBM conventional land 1,700 km HE, armor, FAE, and 
electromagnetic 
pulse(?)
DF-21D MRBM conventional naval 1,500–2,000 km antiship
Second Artillery Force Missile Systems and Their Basic Characteristics
Notes: Chinese-assigned designators.
GLCM = ground-launched cruise missile 
IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile 
kt = kiloton 
MaRV = maneuverable reentry vehicle 
mt = megaton 
SRBM = short-range ballistic missile
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an accuracy of three to six hundred meters CEP. An extended-range CSS-6 variant can 
deliver a unitary HE and enhanced-blast warhead or runway-penetrator submunition 
to a land destination 950 kilometers away with an accuracy of thirty-five to fifty meters 
CEP. A further CSS-6 variant has the same range as an extended-range CSS-6 variant but 
would deliver a terminally guided submunition that would maneuver to a land target 
using sensors, thereby increasing its accuracy to a ten-to-thirty-meter CEP and enhanc-
ing its chances of defeating terminal-phase defenses. The first CSS-6 short-range ballistic 
missile relied on digital and computer-aided inertial guidance, whereas later variants 
turned to Global Positioning System (GPS), indigenous satellite navigation, or terminal 
radar, adding fins for in-flight navigation.
The Second Artillery Force is equipped with two versions of the solid-propelled, road-
mobile, single-stage CSS-7 short-range ballistic missile, the DF-11 and DF-11A.33 A 
third, the DF-11B, may exist, but the evidence is less clear than for the first two. The 
original CSS-7 missile can deliver a unitary HE or fuel-air explosive (FAE) warhead 
to a land target 350 km away with an accuracy of five to six hundred meters CEP. The 
improved DF-11A can deliver a unitary warhead or submunitions to a land target 350 to 
530 km away with an accuracy of less than two hundred meters CEP. The original CSS-
7’s guidance is similar to that of a CSS-6; however, the DF-11A uses combined inertial 
and satellite (GPS or indigenous) navigation.
According to recent announcements by the government in Taiwan, China has tested 
and begun deploying a new solid-propelled, road-mobile ballistic missile with assessed 
ranges of eight hundred to a thousand and a thousand to 1,200 kilometers.34 It alleg-
edly would be capable of damaging runways or delivering enhanced-blast submunitions 
against a target. The eight-hundred-to-one-thousand-kilometer-range version of this 
missile would be capable of hitting targets in the central mountains of Taiwan near east-
coast bases, whereas the thousand-to-1,200-kilometer version would have an antiaccess 
role, according to Tsai Der-Sheng, director of the Taiwan National Security Bureau. 
Some Taiwan commentators opine that it would be more difficult for Taiwan’s PAC-3 
(Patriot) units to intercept this longer-range missile than China’s other, short-range 
ballistic missiles, since it would achieve a higher altitude and therefore a higher reentry 
velocity.35 
Conventional Land-Attack Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles
Over the last five years, China has enhanced its near-seas ballistic-missile options by es-
tablishing the world’s largest inventory of extended-range, ground-launched cruise mis-
siles.36 The Second Artillery Force’s cruise-missile brigades are equipped with between 
two hundred and five hundred Changjian 10 (CJ-10) ground-launched cruise missiles, 
according to the Department of Defense’s report Military and Security Developments 
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Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010.37 These cruise missiles are capable of 
delivering unitary HE warheads out to a range of 1,500 to two thousand kilometers, with 
an accuracy of ten meters CEP.38 This missile relies for guidance on a combination of 
inertial navigation, GPS, and terrain comparison.39 CJ-10 missiles can strike from any 
direction and in a low-altitude trajectory, presenting a challenge for the defender. The 
CJ-10 would be launched from a three-canister, road-mobile launcher.
Conventional Theater Ballistic Missiles
As stated in the 2010 Defense Department report, “the PLA is acquiring conventional 
MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] to increase the range at which it can con-
duct precision strikes against land targets and naval targets, including aircraft carriers, 
operating far from China’s shore out to the first island chain.”40 Over the last six years, 
the Second Artillery Force has gradually equipped operational brigades with three solid-
propelled, road-mobile, two-stage, ballistic-missile variants of the CSS-5 MRBM. China 
is developing these missiles and other measures to deter or counter intervention by third 
parties, including the United States, in any cross-strait crisis.41 
Positioning these missiles in eastern China provides Beijing with military options for 
striking regional air bases, logistics facilities, and other infrastructure in the near-seas 
area. The combination of CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missiles and conventional 
theater ballistic missiles puts at risk all U.S. air bases in South Korea (Osan, Kunsan) and 
Japan (Kadena, Misawa, and Yokota), as well as alternate staging locations in the area. 
China’s antiship ballistic missiles could also threaten U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups, 
potentially forcing them to operate at longer ranges from the Chinese coast.42 
The Second Artillery Force’s conventional, road-mobile, theater ballistic missile most 
likely to be used against enemy air bases would the DF-21C. This MRBM reportedly 
can deliver unitary HE warheads or various submunitions (armor-penetrating, FAE, 
and possibly electromagnetic-pulse) to land targets roughly 1,700 km away with a CEP 
of less than fifty meters.43 At least one unit, the 822nd Brigade, at Laiwu, in Shandong 
Province, reportedly is equipped with DF-21Cs. Nongovernmental Western experts have 
also identified a few other Second Artillery Force brigades as potential candidates for 
DF-21Cs; however, some are also candidates for DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles or 
even DF-16s.
China’s first-generation, road-mobile DF-21D antiship ballistic missile reportedly would 
rely on overhead and over-the-horizon sensors to locate and track moving ships, as well 
as for midcourse and terminal guidance to maneuver a warhead toward an aircraft car-
rier.44 It reportedly can deliver a warhead to a naval target as far out as at least 1,650 km. 
China’s English-language Global Times recently claimed the nation’s first antiship bal-
listic missile was “deployed with the army.”45 In December 2010, Adm. Robert Willard, 
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then Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, stated in an interview with a Japanese media 
outlet that the antiship ballistic missile had reached “initial operational capability.”46
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau director recently declared that China has developed 
and deployed a new ballistic-missile system with short- and medium-range flight capa-
bilities. A third DF-21 conventional variant, the DF-21B, may eventually be deployed in 
eastern China. However, the only reports of its existence allege that it is deployed in the 
northwest.47 
Missions and Scenarios
Most Second Artillery Force planning over the last fifteen years has focused on employ-
ing missiles for deterrent, coercive, or war-fighting purposes in a conflict with Taiwan. 
However, recent friction over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the presence of U.S. naval assets variously in the Yellow Sea 
and the Sea of Japan raise questions regarding how land-based missiles can be used in 
those scenarios. 
Taiwan Strait Crisis or Conflict Scenarios
The Second Artillery Force’s conventional missiles clearly have missions directly relevant 
to Taiwan Strait scenarios. Two types of missile operations can be employed in crises: 
missile “deterrence” and the threat or use of missiles in a “surgical strike.” The PLA 
defines “deterrence fire support” as the use of firepower assets, including conventional 
missiles, in activities designed to “instill fear in our adversary by a show of force or 
by demonstrating our resolve and readiness to use our fire support forces” in a “war 
of nerves between the enemy and us.”48 The goal of instilling fear is to “coerce” the 
adversary into refraining from taking hostile actions or into abandoning its military 
objectives. Actions the PLA would consider include a show of force—drawing pointed 
attention to the “physical existence of fire support”—or execution of “a small portion” of 
fire-support operations, short of full-scale fire-support attacks.49
The Second Artillery Force was used on two separate occasions in 1995 and 1996, in 
show-of-force launches near Taiwan during the run-up to its first presidential election. 
Such deterrent operations could be initiated again, if cross-strait frictions were renewed. 
The PLA concept of threatening or using conventional missiles or other firepower assets 
during local wars in a “surgical strike” as a form of “strategic deterrence” could be ap-
plied in a Taiwan Strait contingency.50 The PLA in its writings points to selective strikes 
against Taiwan as potential responses to “provocative activities” or “threats” by Taiwan 
or as a form of firepower support for combat operations designed to seize the offshore 
islands.51
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PLA and Second Artillery Force campaign-level doctrine has identified specific wartime 
missions for the latter relevant to a Taiwan contingency—to include preparatory or 
direct “fire support” to joint PLA operations and an “independent conventional missile 
strike campaign” by Second Artillery Force units against key enemy strategic or cam-
paign targets. In a joint PLA campaign, initial operations by other services usually are 
intended to seize air, sea, ground, and information superiority on the battlefield as a 
necessary precondition for follow-on operations against specific operational objectives.52 
The PLA and the Second Artillery Force have identified specific fire-support missions 
and targets for Second Artillery Force operations in support of a wide range of cam-
paigns by the other three PLA services.53
Also, an independent conventional Second Artillery Force campaign could be orga-
nized to perform a selective “warning strike” against some sensitive target in Taiwan.54 
Potential targets of a selective warning strike include important civilian industrial and 
nuclear power bases, as well as urban targets, such as political and economic centers. In 
a war with Taiwan, the Second Artillery Force would also be assigned responsibility for 
contributing to PLA efforts to deter or counter foreign military intervention, to include 
American military action to help Taiwan defend itself. 
According to the Second Artillery Force’s definitive campaign-level doctrinal docu-
ment, antiship ballistic missiles could be used in five ways against carrier strike groups 
(CSGs): “firepower harassment strikes” involving direct attack on carrier battle groups; 
intimidation salvos in front of a CSG, as “a warning shot”; a combination of PLA Navy 
interception of a CSG and intimidation salvos; the use of penetrating submunitions and 
concentrated firepower assault to destroy carrier-borne planes or control towers (masts 
and antennas) and to damage other critical and vulnerable positions; and a disabling 
electromagnetic attack on a CSG’s command-and-control system, including antiradia-
tion or electromagnetic-pulse submunitions against Aegis radars.55
Second Artillery Force operations against U.S. air bases could include a combination 
attack, wherein ballistic-missile attacks would deliver unitary warheads that crater run-
ways and thus fix aircraft in place for destruction (if unsheltered) by follow-on cluster 
munitions.56 Cruise missiles can destroy aircraft shelters and damage fuel and mainte-
nance facilities. According to a recent assessment, the Second Artillery Force’s current 
conventional missile inventory is sufficient to close down the five U.S. air bases that are 
less than 1,100 km from Chinese territory of the six bases in East Asia (Guam being the 
sixth).57 
Other Scenarios in the Northern and Southern Near Seas 
There is considerably less evidence of a role for the Second Artillery Force in operations 
designed to defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity at other points on the 
42 china maritime studies
maritime periphery. China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors over the South China 
Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have been lesser contingencies for the PLA com-
pared to the Taiwan scenario over the last fifteen years. 
Nonetheless, ongoing efforts by the Second Artillery Force to form new missile units, 
position them in southeast China, and equip them with new ballistic- or cruise-missile 
systems are increasing its ability to range major portions of the South China Sea with 
conventional missile firepower. Additionally, the Second Artillery Force’s formation of 
new units in central and northeast China and its reequipment of existing nuclear units 
with conventional theater ballistic missiles enhance its ability to engage maritime targets 
in the Yellow Sea or the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu area of the East China Sea, as well as 
land targets in northeast Asia.58 Recent fragmentary comments by PLA officials and Chi-
nese experts suggest that the PLA and the Second Artillery Force are likely to incorporate 
conventional missiles into China’s courses of action in the northern and southern near 
seas in the years ahead.
It is important to look back briefly at one of the more obscure reasons why China 
developed conventional missiles in the 1980s and early 1990s. When China first con-
sidered using mobile, solid-fueled missiles to carry conventional warheads, it report-
edly initiated a program to develop and field a two-stage, mobile DF-25 missile with a 
maximum range of 1,700 km. The purpose of the DF-25 would reportedly have been to 
defend the Spratly/Nansha Islands in the South China Sea.59 The thinking at the time 
was that a conventionally tipped ballistic missile, if accurate enough, could provide 
quick fire support over long distances to PLAN operations in the Spratlys. China did not 
possess aircraft carriers or air-refueling capabilities at the time; the DF-25 was viewed as 
compensating for China’s inferiority in the air balance. In the late 1980s, Beijing report-
edly even ordered an acceleration of the DF-25 program to serve as a stopgap measure 
until China fielded sea-based naval air and air-refueling capabilities.60 In the 1990s, the 
PLA apparently kept alive plans to recapture islands in the Spratly group via amphibious 
operations, with the DF-25 held in reserve, as a last resort. 
We are beginning to see fragmentary signs of assessment by some Chinese officials and 
experts of the merits of conventional Second Artillery Force missiles in any PLA force 
package assembled to defend peripheral sea interests in areas other than Taiwan. Com-
menting on recent press articles about how the Second Artillery Force was establishing 
new missile bases in southeast China, Shanghai-based military expert Ni Lexiong said 
in August 2010 that the development “was a hint that the missile force would play a role 
in defending Beijing’s core interest in the South China Sea.”61 During the same month, 
a Shanghai-based expert on sea power, Mao Yao, argued that one of the first steps China 
should take in response to tensions with the United States over the South China Sea was 
to “improve long-range strike systems,” including CJ-10 cruise missiles and space-based 
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reconnaissance satellites, “to create a situation in which space power and land power 
suppress sea power.”62 
A few months earlier, PLA expert Liu Jiangping had sketched out a potential role for 
Second Artillery Force units in “countermeasures” to protect national security and core 
interests in response to indications of American and South Korean joint exercises in the 
Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan and to official U.S. commentary on China’s South China Sea 
claims. According to Liu, the Second Artillery Force could coordinate with PLA Navy 
operations in the South China Sea or with ground, naval, or air force operations in the 
Yellow Sea.63 Depending on the timing of a threat and changes in its severity, “the Sec-
ond Artillery is the quickest in support,” compared to other PLA services, and “its missile 
guidance data can be reloaded in a few minutes.” Liu’s emphasis on the Second Artillery 
Force’s ability to respond quickly with fire support is the same rationale that was report-
edly used to justify a conventional DF-25 role in defending the Nanshas in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
These fragmentary indications are not matched by any major increase in indicators that 
China is carving out a greater Second Artillery Force role in plans for these peripheral 
sea areas. Nonetheless, the PLA and Second Artillery Force are likely to consider an 
increased role for the latter in these plans over time. This role is likely to possess the fol-
lowing characteristics.
Small-Scale Operations. A limited expenditure of conventional missile firepower, limited 
especially in comparison to the requirements of supporting an amphibious landing on 
Taiwan and follow-on maneuver. In some cases, the Second Artillery Force’s role can 
be restricted to shows of force or selective warning strikes—especially against smaller 
militaries.
Independent Second Artillery Force Campaigns. Deterrent fire support and surgical 
strikes in crises in peripheral sea areas, which can be independent operations parallel to 
any PLA joint or service campaigns.64 The same logic would apply to selective warning 
strikes by Second Artillery Force units on sensitive targets in wartime. 
Support to Other PLA Services. The Second Artillery Force can support joint or indi-
vidual PLA service operations to achieve air, ground, naval, and information superi-
ority. On the basis of a review of the PLA National Defense University’s 2006 Science 
of Campaigns, the following campaigns can be implemented in peripheral sea area 
operations other than Taiwan: joint blockade, landing, or anti-air-raid campaigns; PLA 
Navy “sea-force group”; sea-lane interdiction; offense against coral island reefs; sea-line 
guarding; naval base defense campaigns; and PLA Air Force air offensive or air defense 
campaigns.65 
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Concluding Thought: New Ways of Warfare?
Are Second Artillery Force capabilities, such as DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles, en-
abling new ways of warfare in the near seas and beyond? The answer is clearly yes, in the 
sense that when the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile achieves full operational capabil-
ity, an antiship-ballistic-missile capability will have been successfully fielded for the first 
time by a country’s armed forces. Earlier efforts by the Soviet Union and the United 
States to develop such capability did not yield a deployed weapon system and were 
halted by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 
However, the use of land-based offensive missiles against ships has precedents. Land-
based cruise missiles were launched at ships in previous wars, to include two Iraqi 
Silkworms from a land site in Kuwait against the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) in Feb-
ruary 1991, during the first Gulf War.66 Land-based ballistic missiles have also been fired 
over water against land targets: Libya fired Soviet-supplied Scud-B short-range ballistic 
missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa in 1986.67 
Nonetheless, China’s evolving land-based missile force, missions, and capabilities for 
the near seas pose important challenges for American and allied defense postures and 
military capabilities, at all levels of warfare. Operationally, the Second Artillery Force’s 
expanding and modernizing capability against potential land and maritime targets in 
the near seas reinforces the insightful observation of Wayne Hughes that the offense, 
defense, and “staying power” of a ship or force all need to be evaluated together in esti-
mating combat power in a new tactical era characterized by missile warfare.68 
The Second Artillery Force has established a sophisticated operational strategy to ensure 
that its deployed units survive in combat. This strategy relies on “maneuvering opera-
tions” between fixed operational and support positions as the chief pattern for opera-
tional deployment and on “mobile operations” as the main combat mode. In combat, 
Second Artillery Force operational units will rely on a satellite warning system to exploit 
gaps in enemy reconnaissance; operate at night and in adverse weather or low-light 
conditions; maintain a quick operating tempo when preparing to launch or redeploying 
postlaunch; and utilize multiple field operating areas and widely dispersed positions. 
Tactically, enhancements to land-based missiles are creating opportunities for China 
to combine several different tactics and technical capabilities in more effective attacks 
against defended targets. Operational counter-countermeasures to ballistic-missile or air 
defenses are likely, in addition to various technical penetration aids frequently discussed 
by Chinese analysts assessing China’s ability to defeat missile defenses. 
To look forward, American and allied missile and air-defense operators and systems 
are likely to have to cope with many forms of structured attacks, such as timed arriv-
als and salvo launches; wide-azimuth attacks; shaped trajectories; mixed unitary and 
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submunition payloads; coordinated ballistic- and cruise-missile launches; antiradiation 
homing missiles; electronic attack measures by other PLA services to enable Second 
Artillery Force missiles to penetrate defenses; PLA special-operations actions against 
ground-based missile-defense radars, command vehicles, and crews; and, eventually, 
multiple missiles launched against moving targets, including ships. Enemy forces and 
ships operating in the area, local installations or infrastructures, and critical network 
nodes are very likely to be hit. This vulnerability to China’s land-based missile power 
reinforces for its potential adversaries the importance of developing and operating forces 
and systems able to absorb damage and continue fighting. 
Finally, the continued existence of a theater-nuclear-force component of China’s missile 
posture for the near seas and the integral role of nuclear FDOs in the Second Artillery 
Force’s conventional missile campaign doctrine raise important questions regarding 
the cost and risk Beijing would be willing to incur in prosecuting military operations 
at various points in the near seas. Definitive Second Artillery Force doctrine calls for 
nuclear deterrence activities (signaling, etc.) in parallel with conventional missile cam-
paigns. The extent to which senior Chinese civilian leaders are aware of or endorse the 
nuclear dimension of Second Artillery Force conventional missile campaign planning is 
unknown. 
In any event, actual implementation by the Second Artillery Force of these nuclear FDOs 
could create conditions for escalation of a conventional war, even if they are designed 
merely to “check” enemy nuclear intimidation without resorting to first use of nuclear 
weapons. China’s adversaries could misinterpret nuclear-deterrent actions as the genera-
tion of nuclear forces to a state of combat readiness and take corresponding counter-
measures. These Second Artillery Force concepts highlight the unintentional risks and 
costs possibly associated with countering China’s antiaccess and area-denial strategy in 
the western Pacific. 
Enemy operations against land-based Chinese missile forces probably would occur as 
the Second Artillery Force’s nuclear deterrence activities were going forward. Indica-
tions of Chinese nuclear activities would telegraph to adversaries the risks associated 
with counter–missile forces operations against Second Artillery Force units in mainland 
China. Should these indications result in enemy restraint in targeting missile units, 
Second Artillery Force units would operate in conditions of virtual sanctuary, thereby 
enhancing China’s leverage. Conversely, however, if its enemies “fight through” China’s 
nuclear deterrence, follow-on Second Artillery Force operations would be complicated. 
China would be confronted with a choice between escalating its mode of nuclear signal-
ing and confining its missile operations to conventional means of war.
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In order to defend the security of the national territory, marine 
territories and the waters within the First Island Chain, this 
proactive defense strategy does not mean that our navy only stays 
within the First Island Chain. 
REAR ADM. ZHANG ZHAOZHANG, APRIL 2009
The aim of this chapter is to examine recent developments in China’s ability to use the key constituents of aerospace power—aircraft and conventional missiles—to 
achieve strategic objectives in the near seas.1 The chapter will discuss aerospace power 
in the context of China’s maritime defense strategy, including its historical founda-
tions; analyze China’s current doctrine for use of aerospace power in the near seas; and 
consider recent advances in Chinese aircraft and conventional missile capabilities as they 
pertain to this doctrine. This chapter does not address all aspects of China’s aerospace 
capabilities that are necessary for dominance in the near seas. Instead, it analyzes some 
of the more visible and higher-profile aspects of China’s growing capabilities necessary 
for defending China’s expanding maritime strategic depth. 
Aerospace Power and Coastal Defense 
Aerospace power has been fundamental for defending the near seas of the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC) since its founding.2 While air and naval operations did not play 
significant roles in the Chinese Civil War, immediately thereafter the victorious forces 
were threatened by hostile air and naval forces from the maritime sphere. In 1949 the 
regime was ill equipped to defend its eleven thousand miles of coastline and more than 
six thousand islands against attack and harassment from Nationalist Chinese air and 
naval forces, let alone protect the PRC against the aircraft carriers of the powerful U.S. 
Seventh Fleet. Even before the founding of the People’s Republic, its future leaders recog-
nized the need for strong naval and air forces.3 This need soon became apparent, when 
in June 1949 the Kuomintang (KMT) government on Taiwan declared a blockade of 
coastal mainland ports and KMT naval and air forces began attacking coastal shipping 
and ports, as well as laying mines in river estuaries.4 
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Over the course of the 1950s the PLA experienced mixed success in protecting China’s 
coastline. In 1949, communist forces captured Hainan Island, the second-largest KMT-
held island; most of the smaller offshore islands fell in the early 1950s. The People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA) was successful too in stopping KMT raids on the mainland and on 
merchant and fishing fleets. However, KMT forces stubbornly held Jinmen and Matsu, as 
well as a few additional islands, such as Taiping (Itu Aba) in the South China Sea, and in 
this period the PLA was never a serious threat to invade Taiwan. Throughout the 1950s, 
PLA naval and air forces were impotent against powerful U.S. elements operating in Chi-
na’s near seas, as evidenced by the Seventh Fleet’s role in resupplying Jinmen in 1954–55 
and in evacuating KMT troops and civilians from the Dachen Islands in 1955, as well as 
in escorting KMT vessels resupplying Nationalist-held offshore islands in 1958.5 
Despite a clear need to defend China’s near seas, resource constraints meant that coastal 
defense represented the extent of the operational capabilities of the PLA’s sea and air 
forces. The overall focus of the PLA Navy (PLAN) on coastal-defense versus longer-
range operations is evidenced by the deployment of thirteen coastal-defense artillery 
regiments in 1951, the primary focus of naval aviation on air- and ground-based defense 
of fleet bases, and the disbanding of the PLAN marines in 1957, only three years after the 
force was established.6 While PLAN aviation and aircraft of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 
flew several hundred sorties during campaigns of the 1950s, they were primarily relegat-
ed to coastal air defense, under strict rules of engagement. On a positive note, the 1950s 
ended with the KMT air force no longer operating at will over Fujian and Guangdong 
Provinces, thanks to a permanent presence of PLAAF and PLAN aviation along China’s 
eastern and southern coastlines.7 Overall, though, while China’s air forces demonstrated 
the capacity to defend the nation’s airspace against KMT aircraft, they could do little 
to counter American air and naval operations in the near seas, as demonstrated by the 
Seventh Fleet’s operations in and around the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s and the free-
wheeling nature of U.S. Navy and Air Force air support to United Nations forces during 
the Korean War.8
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s PLA air forces continued to emphasize coastal air 
defense and possessed little ability to exert influence in China’s near seas. The KMT air 
force on Taiwan continued to fly reconnaissance aircraft over the mainland; several of 
these were shot down, and PLAN fighters based on Hainan shot down a small number 
of U.S. Navy and Air Force fighters that strayed too close to Chinese airspace during the 
Vietnam War.9 Nevertheless, some combat operations by the PLA in the 1970s called on 
China’s air forces to push beyond the coastal-defense paradigm. In 1974, PLAN fighter 
aircraft flew thirty-eight sorties in support of operations to seize the Paracel Islands from 
South Vietnam, a mission that to this day represents the longest-distance opposed land-
ing operation executed by the PLA. Further, in the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, 
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PLAN aircraft flew 751 sorties in support of fleet units operating off Vietnam’s coast (no 
information is available regarding the types of missions flown).10 
Development of the Near Seas Defense Strategy
The need for China’s air forces to push their operations farther out over water gained ur-
gency in the 1980s as China’s naval strategy changed under the leadership of a dynamic 
new PLAN commander. Building on developments of the 1970s, in 1982, Adm. Liu 
Huaqing directed the Naval Research Institute to develop a regional naval strategy, which 
would become known as “Near Seas Defense” (or, more commonly, “offshore defense”), 
that would move the PLAN beyond the coastal-defense paradigm.11 Like all PLAN com-
manders prior to 1996, Admiral Liu had been originally an army officer; however, in a 
military often dominated by the “great infantry” concept, he was more than just an in-
fantryman serving in a naval billet. Liu proved to be an aggressive and forward-thinking 
maritime strategist, and by developing the strategy of Near Seas Defense and pushing for 
continued modernization, he laid many of the intellectual and technical foundations of 
the PLAN of the early twenty-first century.12 
While Near Seas Defense is defined a variety of ways and is often generically associ-
ated with operations within China’s two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic 
zone, Admiral Liu himself defined Near Seas Defense as operations within and out-
side the “First Island Chain,” running from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines. Liu 
defined Near Seas Defense as a regional strategy specific to China’s maritime claims and 
interests; he did not advocate replicating American or Soviet global naval capabilities. 
Instead, he made comparisons to the 1980s-era naval strategies of Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.13 
It is noteworthy that Liu’s articulation of offshore defense is far closer to what Alfred 
Thayer Mahan advocated for the United States than most realize. U.S. Naval War College 
scholars James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara state, “Close study will reveal that Mahan 
never counseled naval war for its own sake. Far from espousing an open-ended Ameri-
can naval buildup, he urged the U.S. Navy to assume the strategic defensive in vital 
waters, chiefly the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, expanses that would provide 
America its ‘gateway to the Pacific’ once the Panama Canal opened.”14
Just as Mahan argued that the control of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico was 
essential to promoting American development and defending maritime commerce and 
that the Caribbean Sea was the strategic key to America’s maritime frontiers on the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Liu held out the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas as 
troves of resources and protective screens for China’s own development.15 Where Mahan 
viewed such key geographic points as Cuba and Jamaica as essential for controlling 
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access to the Caribbean and thus the soon-to-be-completed Panama Canal, offshore 
defense is concerned with the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea because of their 
location along strategic sea-lanes linking China to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well 
as their overall importance in protecting the South China Sea, which Liu designated 
“the southern gate of our motherland.”16 Additionally, while Liu wrote about Taiwan in 
regard to the need to reunify it with the homeland, subsequent Chinese strategists have 
discussed Taiwan much as Mahan discussed islands like Cuba, Jamaica, and Hawaii and 
their importance to the United States as keys to controlling maritime communications 
and protecting maritime interests, or, if in the hands of foreign power, as barriers threat-
ening trade and development.17 
However, for all his strategic vision, Admiral Liu developed China’s naval strategy in a 
time far removed from that of Mahan, and he had to contend with something Mahan 
did not—the dominance of airpower in the maritime battle space. When the strategy of 
Near Seas Defense was first put in place in 1986, the PLAN’s lack of credible air defense 
for its surface ships and the obsolescence and short range of the fighter aircraft equip-
ping both the PLAAF and PLAN meant that little could be done to protect China’s near 
seas against a serious opponent.18 Beyond that, a lack of long-range precision-strike 
(LRPS) capability on the parts of the PLAN and PLAAF, as well as China’s missile force, 
the Second Artillery Force, meant that the PLA could do little in terms of offensive 
operations against an enemy’s air and naval forces during a conflict on the maritime 
periphery. 
As the 1980s gave way to the 1990s, however, the need for the PLAN to be able to execute 
a near-seas defensive strategy became crystal clear. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
eliminated a large-scale threat that the Central Military Commission even in 1985 had 
correctly recognized was diminishing. Operation Desert Storm and subsequent U.S.-led 
operations against Iraq and in the Balkans throughout the 1990s demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of LRPS technology. It became clear to PRC leaders that an enemy equipped 
with LRPS weaponry could launch it against China’s densely populated and economi-
cally vibrant coastal provinces from air- and sea-based platforms outside the range of 
China’s defenses. Further, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, during which the United 
States deployed two aircraft carrier groups in the vicinity of Taiwan as a show of support 
against PRC missile drills intended to intimidate the island during its first democratic 
elections, served as a harsh lesson to China’s leaders regarding its vulnerability to an 
enemy with a first-class military.19 
A Counterstrike Doctrine for Near-Seas Defense
In terms of potential conflicts in China’s near seas, a Taiwan contingency is the foremost 
issue on the minds of many strategists on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. While China 
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has developed the capability to conduct robust firepower strikes and blockades against 
Taiwan, at this time the PLA does not possess the ability to invade it. Therefore, in a time 
of crisis, China’s overall goal is to deter Taiwan from moving toward a formal declara-
tion of independence while possessing the capability to punish Taiwan severely should 
it do so anyway and to prevent the United States from intervening on its behalf, by 
threatening U.S. forces and bases throughout the western Pacific.20 However, by focus-
ing on the development of multimission platforms and weapons that could execute 
large-scale coercive and punishment operations against Taiwan, the PLA as a whole is 
quietly evolving into a balanced and flexible force capable of conducting missions across 
the spectrum of military operations, including such nonwar operations as the ongoing 
counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden and the use of PLAN and PLAAF assets 
to evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011. Additionally, the counterstrike capabili-
ties the PLA is developing to deter or defeat American intervention in a Taiwan scenario 
are just as applicable for countering U.S. intervention in other contingencies in China’s 
near seas. Late 2010 statements by high-level American officials regarding U.S. interests 
in the South and East China Seas and inflammatory Chinese rhetoric over the possible 
participation of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) in exercises in the 
Yellow Sea highlight potential areas of tension between Beijing and Washington in the 
western Pacific.21 
The operational conceptual element of this emerging counterstrike doctrine is known as 
“noncontact warfare.” While sometimes incorrectly characterized as a “Sun Tzu–esque” 
method of winning without fighting, noncontact warfare is in fact nothing more than 
the employment of long-range precision-strike systems from outside an enemy’s defend-
ed zone against key nodes throughout the strategic and operational depths of an enemy’s 
“system” (see below).22 Science of Military Strategy (2005) discusses at length the need to 
conduct nonlinear standoff attacks against key points and centers of gravity across the 
breadth and depth of an enemy’s system. Primary targets include command-and-control 
systems and logistics facilities. In fact, Science of Military Strategy argues that an enemy’s 
primary combat forces should be attacked only after the destruction of information and 
logistics capabilities, because the combat capabilities of the main operational forces will 
thus be significantly weakened. The goal is not the wholesale destruction of an enemy 
but the paralysis of its combat forces by robbing them of essential information and 
supplies. Analogies are drawn to the destruction of a body’s brain and central nervous 
system.23 
For American planners, the relevant aspect in this line of thought is that in a conflict be-
tween the United States and China in East Asia, the first American targets the PLA would 
go after might not be carrier strike groups or the runways and parking aprons at Kadena 
Air Base on Okinawa. Instead, the PLA might single out the replenishment vessels that 
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supply the strike groups at sea, as well as land-based logistics and command-and-control 
targets. A December 2005 article in the PLAN newspaper 人民海军 (People’s Navy) 
discusses the need for constant at-sea replenishment as one of the primary weaknesses 
of U.S. carrier strike groups.24 With regard to broader counterstrike operations, the air 
bases that receive the most attention from the PLA in the early stages of a conflict are 
likely to be those where the United States bases airborne tankers and command-and-
control aircraft and similarly high-value assets. 
It is noteworthy that the PLA’s counterstrike doctrine is not particularly new. Airpower 
theorists have been claiming since the 1920s that strategic strikes against key targets 
can paralyze an enemy’s war effort. In fact, the best articulation of how the PLA defines 
its counterstrike doctrine can be found not in any book or article in Chinese but in an 
article entitled “The Enemy as a System,” by Col. John Warden of the U.S. Air Force (now 
retired) in the Spring 1995 edition of Airpower Journal. Warden, one of the architects 
of the U.S.-led coalition air campaign in Desert Storm, represents potential enemies as 
a five-ring model, the rings representing, from the inside out, “Leadership,” “Organic 
Essentials” (such as electricity), “Key Infrastructure,” “Population,” and “Fielded Forces.” 
In terms similar to those used now by the Chinese, Warden describes a properly executed 
air campaign as one of nonlinear attacks against key targets to induce strategic and 
operational paralysis, thereby making engagement of an enemy’s military forces either 
unnecessary or the result of which at least virtually a foregone conclusion.25 Not surpris-
ingly, Warden’s views on airpower are known to the Chinese. Noted PLAAF general and 
military commentator Liu Yazhou calls Warden the “[Giulio] Douhet of our time,” while 
the five-ring model receives prominent mention in the 2002 book Air Raid and Anti–Air 
Raid in the 21st Century.26 
The notion of forcing strategic and operational paralysis on an enemy through long-
range precision air and missile strikes is controversial, to say the least, and the issue will 
not be debated in these pages. For now it is sufficient to say that the PLA has developed 
and is refining a counterstrike doctrine based on classic airpower theory and applied 
with a growing array of precision-strike weapons. Operationally, this doctrine flows 
from the strategic framework articulated in Science of Military Strategy. Further, Air Raid 
and Anti–Air Raid calls for organizing counterstrike forces under the command of a 
“Counterattack Operations Group.” The forces assigned to or at least coordinated by this 
group include the fighter and attack aviation of the PLAAF and PLAN, conventional 
ballistic- and cruise-missile units, attack helicopters, surface ships, submarines, and spe-
cial operations forces.27 Key targets include command-and-control systems, logistics, air 
bases, aircraft carriers, and missile launchers. For aerospace forces, Air Raid and Anti–Air 
Raid, the 2004 Study on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory, and the 2006 Science of Cam-
paigns detail missile and air counterattack operations against command-and-control 
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systems, air bases, air defenses, and logistics facilities, with an emphasis on large, fixed 
targets. Command-and-control systems are specifically called out as important targets 
for missile and air strikes, by virtue of their functions as nerve centers and force multi-
pliers. When coordinated strikes are not possible owing to enemy aircraft carriers and air 
forces operating out of range of the PLA’s own air forces, as the book Science of Second 
Artillery Campaigns highlights, long-range conventional missiles in strikes against enemy 
bases and carrier groups are important.28 
The Modernization of the PLA’s Counterstrike Air and Missile Forces
To defend China’s near seas and execute the PLA’s ambitious counterstrike doctrine, the 
PLA has over the past two decades invested a great deal in modernizing the counterstrike 
capabilities of the PLAN, the PLAAF, and the Second Artillery Force. The result has been 
the fielding of an impressive array of short- and medium-range conventional ballistic 
missiles and of ground- and air-launched cruise missiles; a variety of precision-guided 
land-attack munitions and the combat aircraft necessary to employ them; and highly ca-
pable antiship cruise missiles that can be fired from surface ships, submarines, maritime 
strike aircraft, and shore-based launchers. As part of this modernization program, the 
Second Artillery Force is also in the process of fielding the DF-21D (based on the CSS-5 
airframe), a medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to target U.S. aircraft 
carriers at sea.29 While across the board the PLA is not as capable as the U.S. military, the 
PLA’s concentration on the development of specific counterstrike capabilities enables it 
to develop pockets of excellence in such areas as conventional ballistic missiles, subma-
rines, antiship cruise missiles, and electronic warfare. This allows it to threaten opposing 
forces in the western Pacific with a high-risk calculus in times of tension or war, particu-
larly as those forces approach China’s near seas.30 
For counterstrike aviation forces in the PLAN, the past decade has seen PLAN aviation 
transition from an air force primarily concerned with coastal air defense to a modern 
offensive maritime strike force. In the 1990s the PLAN took delivery of a small number 
of early models of the J-8II interceptor and JH-7 maritime strike aircraft; today, through 
acquisition of new blocks of these airframes and upgrades to older systems, the PLAN 
fields five regiments of the JH-7/JH-7A and two regiments of the J-8II. The PLAN also 
operates one regiment of Russian-built Su-30MK2 Flanker multirole maritime strike 
fighters; since late 2010 it has taken delivery of the indigenous, fourth-generation J-11B 
Flanker and J-10 interceptors.31 The JH-7/JH-7A is the PLAN’s workhorse maritime 
strike fighter and has evolved into a highly capable two-seat maritime strike fighter able 
to employ the YJ-83K antiship cruise missile and advanced electronic warfare systems. 
Complementing the JH-7/JH-7A units, the single Su-30MK2 regiment can employ 
antiship and antiradiation variants of the Russian-made Kh-31.32 The J-8II, while based 
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on an older-generation design, has radar and avionics upgrades that enable it now 
to employ modern beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles; its range can be extended 
through refueling from the PLAN’s small inventory of H-6 tanker aircraft.33 The J-11B 
and J-10 combine with the Su-30MK2s to provide the PLAN with the ability to extend 
air defenses to PLAN task groups beyond China’s coastal waters. 
Complementing the PLAN’s inventory of fighters and strike fighters are two regiments 
of H-6 maritime strike bombers, based on the 1950s-era Soviet Tu-16 but upgraded to 
employ modern antiship cruise missiles. There is also a single regiment of J-7E short-
range interceptors.34 While not a global expeditionary force, PLAN strike aviation is a 
modern regional one, capable of covering from its bases on the Chinese mainland the 
near-seas defense areas defined by Liu Huaqing as extending beyond the First Island 
Chain.35 
The Second Artillery Force is arguably the primary arm of the PLA tasked with coun-
terstrike operations in China’s near seas. The 2008 white paper on China’s national 
defense states, “The conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is charged 
mainly with the task of conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against 
key strategic and operational targets of the enemy.”36 According to the U.S. Department 
of Defense, as of late 2009 the Second Artillery had deployed over a thousand CSS-6 
(six-hundred-kilometer range) and CSS-7 short-range (three hundred kilometers [km]) 
ballistic missiles within reach of Taiwan, including a growing number with precision-
strike capability. Additionally, the Second Artillery reportedly possesses up to a hundred 
CSS-5 medium-range (1,750 km) ballistic missiles—their numbers are increasing—as 
well as up to five hundred DH-10 ground-launched cruise missiles (1,500 km). While 
the shorter-range ballistic missiles can hit only a limited target set beyond Taiwan, the 
growing numbers of conventionally armed and precision-strike-capable CSS-5s and 
DH-10s demonstrate the PLA’s desire to be able to extend its counterstrike options 
throughout China’s near seas.37 In addition to conventional precision strikes against 
land targets, the Second Artillery, owing to the development of the DF-21D, now has a 
maritime mission against U.S. carrier strike groups. This system, under development for 
several years, is now operational, according to Adm. Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. 
Pacific Command.38 In fact, a role for the Second Artillery in maritime strike operations 
was documented in the PLA’s counterstrike doctrine about a decade ago: Air Raid and 
Anti–Air Raid discusses the use of ballistic missiles in “surprise attacks at sea.”39 Study 
on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory states that land-based missile and naval forces should 
integrate high- and low-altitude missile attacks against aircraft carriers at sea and calls 
for attacking aircraft carriers in port.40
In addition to PLAN aviation and the Second Artillery, the PLAAF also plays an impor-
tant role in counterstrike operations in the near seas. Over the past decade the PLAAF 
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has grown from a force primarily concerned with short-range air defense of its home-
land to one capable of extending China’s air-defense envelope out over the water and in-
creasingly able to conduct long-range precision-strike missions.41 A growing portion of 
the PLAAF comprises modern fighter aircraft, such as the imported Su-27 Flanker and 
indigenous fighters like the J-11B Flanker, the J-10, and upgraded variants of the J-8II. 
Additionally, the PLAAF employs the multirole Su-30MKK Flanker imported from Rus-
sia, as well as several regiments of the JH-7A strike fighters, equipped with the KD-88 
land-attack cruise missile.42 Aside from its growing inventory of fighters and strike fight-
ers capable of extended operations over China’s near seas, the PLAAF is upgrading its 
inventory of H-6 bombers to employ the YJ-63 and DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles. A 
significant element of this effort is the development of the H-6K, a new extended-range 
variant of the H-6 that, with the long-range DH-10, can threaten American bases, such 
as Guam, in the “Second Island Chain.”43 As the PLAAF’s inventory of long-range air-
craft armed with long-range standoff missiles grows, its capacity to expand the counter-
strike envelope of China’s Near Seas Defense strategy will grow as well. 
Carrier Aviation
Another key element of China’s maritime aerospace power trajectory is the PLAN’s 
aircraft carrier program. In August 2012 the PLAN commissioned, as Liaoning, the re-
furbished Cold War–era, Russian, Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier at Dalian shipyard. The 
ship’s air group is taking shape. The PLAN’s developmental carrier fighter is a domesti-
cally produced, carrier-capable variant of the Russian-designed Su-27 Flanker known 
as the J-15.44 The first deck landing of the J-15 on Liaoning took place in late November 
2012.  The J-15 is likely to have avionics, radar, and weapons capabilities similar to the 
land-based J-11B.
Liaoning is equipped with a ski-jump launch mechanism, and there is a strong possibil-
ity that at least the first domestically produced Chinese carrier will be likewise equipped. 
Accordingly, the PLAN is procuring and developing rotary-wing airborne early warning 
(AEW) platforms. According to Russian press and Internet reporting, China is taking 
delivery of up to nine Ka-31 AEW helicopters, while online photographs indicate China 
has fielded a prototype AEW variant of the Z-8 medium-lift helicopter.45 At this point it 
is unknown which will be chosen as the primary AEW helicopter for the PLAN’s aircraft 
carrier force. It is possible the PLAN sees an indigenous platform based on the Z-8 as a 
long-term solution, with Ka-31s imported from Russia serving as gap fillers. 
It is unlikely China is developing aircraft carriers with the intent of employing them 
against U.S. Navy carrier strike groups in the Central Pacific in a twenty-first-century 
rehash of the battle of the Philippine Sea. However, this does not mean the PLAN’s 
future aircraft carrier force poses no potential problem for U.S. forces in a conflict in 
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and around China’s near seas. In a regional conflict, land-based strike aircraft such as the 
JH-7A, H-6, J-11B, or Su-30MKK/MK2, as well as conventional ballistic and cruise mis-
siles, could be called on for offensive strikes, negating the need for the carrier’s air group 
to provide U.S.-style offensive force projection. In this case, a carrier and its air group 
would complement land-based aircraft, extending situational awareness and air defense. 
PLA doctrine clearly indicates that providing air cover to landing operations in such 
areas as the South China Sea is one of the primary wartime missions of PLAN aircraft 
carriers. Both the 2000 and 2006 editions of Science of Campaigns discuss the impor-
tance of carriers in providing air cover to amphibious invasions against islands and reefs 
beyond the range of land-based aircraft.46 The PLA textbook Winning High-Tech Local 
Wars: Must Reading for Military Officers states that one or two aircraft carrier groups 
should protect amphibious forces engaged in long-distance landing operations and that 
they should be stationed 100–150 nautical miles from the shore to provide air support to 
landing forces.47 
Further, although future PLAN carriers may not represent much in the way of offensive 
strike potential against U.S. carrier groups in a conflict, they could still play a key role in 
bringing combat power to bear against U.S. forces. While Adm. Liu Huaqing provided 
a specific geographic definition for Near Seas Defense, some PLAN officers now view 
the concept as an evolving one that extends farther out into the Pacific Ocean as the 
PLAN’s ability to operate its forces with “the requisite amount of support and security” 
increases.48 Simply put, Near Seas Defense is about more than operating within the First 
Island Chain. If China’s near seas are to be truly secure, the reach of the PLA’s aerospace 
forces must extend beyond the First Island Chain, to engage hostile forces as far out to 
sea as possible. While Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid in the 21st Century does not specifically 
envision aircraft carriers in a counterstrike role, it does call for fighter units to provide 
air cover to surface ships and for surface ships to attack enemy aircraft carriers.49 Given 
that even China’s most modern land-based fighter aircraft cannot provide persistent air 
cover beyond the First Island Chain, an aircraft carrier could be employed in support of 
counterstrike operations to provide air defense and antisubmarine protection to surface 
ships, to get the latter within weapons range of a U.S. carrier group.
Conclusion
As the PLA continues to modernize its forces and develop its counterstrike doctrine, its 
ability to expand its operations in support of China’s Near Seas Defense strategy will 
increase. A significant element of this growing counterstrike capability is represented 
by, collectively, the aerospace forces of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery. With an 
increasingly capable inventory of fighter and strike aircraft, conventional ballistic mis-
siles, ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, and eventually fully operational aircraft 
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carriers, the ability of the PLA’s aerospace forces to threaten U.S. naval and air forces and 
bases in the western and Central Pacific will continue to grow. However, in a military 
dominated by what some officers call the “great infantry” concept, the PLA is inhibited 
in its ability to integrate its counterstrike capabilities into a joint force that is greater 
than the sum of its parts. While the PLA’s ability to extend its strategic depth in the con-
duct of near-seas defensive operations is impressive and has grown significantly over the 
past decade, weaknesses and capabilities gaps still exist, and these will continue to limit 
the PLA’s capacity to defend China’s near seas. 
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Among the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) impressive achievements over the past two decades has been the modernization of its fleet of fighter aircraft. Combined 
with progress made in other areas, this has substantially increased China’s ability to 
challenge U.S. forces for control of the air over its littoral areas. This chapter will discuss 
some of the key components of this improvement, including aircraft, weapons, training, 
and support capabilities. 
But first, it is useful to put the changes in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF) in an appropriate context. To do so, think back fifty years and imagine an 
encounter in 1961 between typical Chinese and American fighter pilots. The PLAAF 
airman would probably have flown a J-6, a variant of the MiG-19, and the U.S. Air Force 
pilot an F-100. These two jets had broadly comparable performance and similar avionics 
and weapons. As regards their equipment, the two aviators would have been roughly on 
par with each other.
Now visualize a similar meeting thirty-five years later, in 1995. The American pilot 
would most likely have been flying an F-15, F-16, or F/A-18—a sophisticated “fourth 
generation” fighter featuring cutting-edge radar and avionics, as well as advanced “fire 
and forget” air-to-air missiles.1 The PLAAF pilot, on the other hand, most likely would 
still be flying a J-6, armed with a Chinese copy of a Soviet copy of a first-generation, 
short-range U.S. air-to-air missile. The American pilot would have enjoyed an over-
whelming qualitative advantage in aircraft, electronics, and weapons.2 
Advance twenty years to the present day. The United States would most likely be repre-
sented by the same F-15 equipped with somewhat updated versions of the same sensors, 
avionics, and missiles. The PLAAF, meanwhile, could meet it with a J-10 or J-11, both 
modern fighters comparable in performance to the fourth-generation American jets. 
The Chinese pilot would likewise have at his disposal weapons and other equipment that 
reflect rough parity with those found on the typical U.S. fighter.3
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Performance and Force Size
A second comparison is illustrated in figure 1, which depicts two key performance 
parameters of a fighter aircraft. Along the x axis is plotted weight-to-thrust (w/t) ratio—
the weight of the aircraft divided by the thrust of its engine(s), measured in kilograms 
per kilonewton (kg/kN). This ratio is important in determining the fighter’s ability to 
accelerate and climb. On the y axis is wing loading, which is the weight of the airplane 
divided by the size of its wing, measured in kilograms and square meters, respectively. 
Wing loading helps determine how well the fighter turns. Together, the two parameters 
reveal a great deal about an aircraft’s maneuverability in both the horizontal (bank and 
turn) and vertical (climb and dive) dimensions. A lower value is better for each factor, so 
the farther down and to the left an aircraft lies, the better.
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Air Force’s most advanced fighter, the F-22—seen in the figure’s 
lower left corner—is superior on both counts. Up in the top right are the F-16C and the 
F/A-18E/F, which trail the pack in these two regards. Clustered in the middle are five 
aircraft: the F-15C, F-15E, F-35, J-10, and J-11. These fighters are in more or less the 
same space on these two important performance characteristics. The “typical” modern 
Chinese fighter is as good in these areas as, or better than, the “typical” American jet.
Figure 2 shows how the size and composition of the PLAAF fighter fleet have changed 
since 1990. The first thing to note is the dramatic shrinkage in the number of China’s 
fighters. Between 1990 and 2010 almost 3,500 obsolete aircraft—70 percent of the 
Figure 1. Characteristics of Chinese and U.S. Fighters
Sources: IHS Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft: In Service (2012), www.ihs.com/, and author estimates.
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force—were retired, mostly after 1995. As a comparison, the U.S. Air Force’s fleet of 
fighter-bombers dropped from a Cold War level of 3,620 in 1990 to 2,650 in 2010—a lit-
tle over 25 percent. That the PLAAF was willing to shed so many of its aircraft indicates 
the scope of its modernization efforts as much as does its acquisition of modern aircraft. 
Over roughly the same period, the PLAAF’s fighter fleet has undergone a remarkable 
modernization. As the chart shows, in 2000 only 2 percent of PLAAF fighters were 
“modern,” “fourth generation” aircraft, comparable to the American F-15 and its con-
temporaries. Little more than a decade later, almost one in three of China’s fighters can 
be considered modern. In fact, only the United States and Russia own more fourth- 
generation fighters than does the PLAAF; China has more modern fighters than Britain 
and France combined. Also, in 2011 China joined the United States and Russia as the 
only countries to fly a stealth aircraft, with the J-20.
The Operational Geography of the Near Seas
How China’s air-combat capabilities over the near seas look depends on just how “near” 
those seas might be. Taiwan’s proximity to the mainland, for example, works to the 
PLAAF’s advantage. Its fighters could comfortably reach Taiwan from bases several hun-
dred miles inland, increasing the number of bases (and therefore aircraft) that could be 
Figure 2. Size and Composition of the PLAAF Fighter Force, 1990–2010
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: 1990–91, 1995–96, 
2000–2001, 2005–2006, 2011).
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involved and requiring that attacks on those bases have to penetrate deeper into Chinese 
territory, thereby being exposed to more of China’s air-defense network. Other potential 
operating areas, however, are farther afield from the mainland. Even the South China 
Sea—scene of multiple confrontations between China and other claimants to those 
waters—is far enough away to pose challenges to PLAAF operations today. 
Figure 3 illustrates these differences. The PLAAF fighter base closest to Taiwan is 
Zhangzhou, which is about 215 nautical miles from Taipei. The PLAAF base at  
Nanchang Xiangtang is roughly 260 nautical miles inland but still only about 360  
from Taipei.4 
Figure 3. Operational Distances: Taiwan versus South China Sea
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In contingencies farther south, distances would be longer. Hainan Island is the Chinese 
territory closest to the Spratly Islands; the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) avia-
tion base there, at Sanya, is 625 nautical miles from Mischief Reef in the Spratlys. On the 
mainland, the PLAAF base at Guilin is about 230 nautical miles from the coast—roughly 
comparable to Nanchang Xiangtang’s location relative to the water—but 970 from Mis-
chief Reef. 
These greater distances mean, inter alia, longer missions, which consume fuel, cockpit 
hours, and maintenance resources at an accelerated pace. Absent a credible in-flight-
refueling capability, aircraft based at locations like Guilin would have to forward-deploy 
to be able to reach any fight taking place in or around the Spratlys. 
Other factors also reduce China’s ability to project combat airpower into the South 
China Sea. China’s arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and land-attack 
cruise missiles represents a serious and growing threat to Taiwan’s air bases and to U.S. 
forces operating out of Okinawa and other locations relatively close to the mainland. 
However, these missiles would be of less use farther south, where opposing airpower 
would be based at greater distances from China and U.S. fighters could be flying primar-
ily from aircraft carriers. 
Along with added aerial tanking capability, Chinese aircraft carriers could contribute 
significantly to the PLA’s combat capabilities in the South China Sea and beyond. The 
PLAN’s first carrier, Liaoning, has made several training voyages, and China began 
experimental flight operations from it in late 2012. It will provide the PLAN the oppor-
tunity to gain experience with the complexity of carrier operations while China builds 
its first indigenous flattops over the coming years. With a complement of J-15 fighters, 
Liaoning could offer an early capacity for projecting airpower deep into the South China 
Sea against the less capable navies of the local nations.
Training
China has modernized its doctrine and approach to training as it has its hardware. For 
example, China reportedly has created at least three “blue force” or “aggressor” squad-
rons to help make air-combat training more realistic.5 Consisting of a mix of J-11, J-10, 
and J-7 aircraft, the force is meant to emulate the performance of the F-15, F-16, and 
MiG-21 fighters, respectively, in training missions against other PLAAF pilots.6 The 
PLAAF’s training curriculum has also begun to emphasize flying over water, as well as 
flying at night, in weather, and in complex electronic-warfare environments. As one 
expert writes, “Compared to other air forces world-wide, the PLAAF would be consid-
ered professional and well trained. In terms of flight hours, safety standards, night-time 
flying, debriefing, and overall training subjects, the PLAAF is likely approaching NATO 
standards.”7 
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We should expect the PLAAF to continue along this path, producing well-trained 
aircrews capable of effectively utilizing their modern aircraft and weapons. Regarding 
platforms, we should anticipate a continuing evolution in which the new replaces the old 
and the newer augments the new. The PLAAF and the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) 
are already updating their newest aircraft, including the J-10, J-11, and JH-7. This is not 
surprising; the Chinese have incorporated a dazzling array of updates into their old J-6, 
J-7, J-8, and Q-5 aircraft, often modernizing them until very late in their operational 
careers. The PLAAF’s final modernized version of the J-7 (MiG-21), for example, was 
apparently in production until only a few years ago.8
To summarize, while the bulk of the dramatic changes in the PLAAF’s force structure 
may be over, we will likely continue to see improvements building on improvements 
fairly rapidly and for some time to come.
Key Capabilities and Limitations
For many years, the rigidly controlled, tightly scripted, and operationally primitive train-
ing received by PLAAF aircrews was seen as a crippling shortcoming that would have 
doomed them in combat against any competent adversary. As noted above, evidence 
suggests that this is changing. The PLAAF does, however, continue to confront opera-
tionally important challenges that could impede its performance in combat. 
Airpower begins on the ground, where sorties are planned, prepared, and launched. The 
U.S. Air Force and Navy have invested heavily in the ability to generate sorties efficiently 
and thus make the most of their available aircraft. There is, in contrast, little evidence 
in the open literature that the PLAAF has practiced generating large numbers of sorties 
rapidly, let alone doing it more than once in a day or for multiple days. It is likewise 
thought that the PLAAF may not have much practice in restoring air-base operations 
after being attacked. In a shooting war against a competent adversary, this shortfall could 
be very damaging. 
Once in the air, an American pilot would enjoy extensive support from airborne warning 
and control system (AWACS) aircraft, refueling tankers, and other enabling assets. China 
has long remained very limited in these areas, but this too appears to be changing. The 
PLAAF has begun deploying AWACS-type aircraft of its own along with other special-
ized electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. Ownership of the appropriate platforms, though, 
is only the first step to an operationally useful capacity. Flight crews and mission crews 
must be trained, and their capabilities must then be integrated with combat operations, 
a job that likewise demands substantial training. Like China’s nascent carrier-aviation 
arm, the PLAAF has miles to go before it becomes expert in its airborne-early-warning 
and electronic-warfare operations. It is, however, clearly on the road. 
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These limitations may be of less import in scenarios in which operational geography al-
lows the PLA to suppress its adversary’s airpower by pummeling its bases. If these attacks 
enable China to achieve freedom of action in the air early in a conflict, the PLAAF will 
be less challenged to operate at the frontier of its capabilities than if its pilots had to fight 
their way through robust, intact defenses. Relatedly, China’s plenitude of short-range 
ballistic missiles would be less useful in a contingency farther abroad, which would 
leave the PLAAF and PLAN aviation to do more of the heavy lifting in any counterair 
campaign.9
Respective Roles of the PLAAF and the PLANAF in the Near Seas
While PLAN aviation has been modernizing less aggressively than the PLAAF, its capa-
bilities are nonetheless improving. New maritime strike aircraft like the Su-30 and JH-7 
are bringing increasing levels of performance and sophistication to China’s naval air 
arm. Naval versions of the J-10 and J-11 are also being brought into the inventory and 
will probably eventually replace the PLAN’s old J-7 and J-8 fighters, although, as with 
the PLAAF, likely not on a one-for-one basis. The J-15 fighter will eventually come into 
service aboard China’s aircraft carrier. It will certainly be used extensively for training 
before going to sea operationally, and some J-15s could be assigned to shore-based units 
in the interim.
While Chinese military thinking extols the importance of fighting jointly, the PLA still 
has much to do to achieve this goal fully. In the near term, then, PLAN aviation will 
probably undertake most maritime strike operations, building the necessary packages 
from its own fleet of fighters and attack aircraft. It will deconflict, but not integrate, with 
PLAAF operations. The PLAAF, on the other hand, will loom larger in the overall fight 
for control of the air over both the land and littoral seas. The PLAAF would also prob-
ably be counted on for supporting capabilities like aerial refueling.
The Enabling Value of Air Superiority
Of little strategic value in and of itself, control of the air makes it possible to conduct a 
variety of other operations with fewer constraints. With air superiority, ground forces 
and surface naval forces may maneuver more freely, and air forces can employ platforms, 
weapons, and tactics that would not be survivable or effective in other circumstances. 
In the maritime domain, control of the air reduces the threat to surface forces—both 
directly, by limiting the sizes, kinds, and azimuths of possible attacks, and indirectly, by 
permitting maritime-patrol and airborne-early-warning aircraft to fly with greater free-
dom. This in turn allows naval forces, especially aircraft carriers, to focus their attention 
on operations other than self-defense, operations that could, of course, include helping 
win air superiority elsewhere. 
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For the last twenty years the U.S. military has had the luxury of instant and total air 
dominance in its combat operations. In the first Gulf War, Iraq’s inability to mount any 
offensive air missions, whether strike or reconnaissance, secured the buildup of forces 
for the “left hook” that swept through that nation. Iraq’s lack of intelligence data and the 
difficulty with which it moved its forces can both be credited to the total control of the 
air enjoyed by the coalition from the opening minutes of the war. 
The 1982 British campaign to retake the Falkland Islands from Argentina, meanwhile, il-
lustrates the implications of not controlling the air during a maritime operation. Fifteen 
of the thirty-three Royal Navy surface combatants and amphibious vessels committed 
to the fight were sunk or damaged. The British also lost ten Harrier fighters, almost 30 
percent of the aircraft employed.10 
As was the case for Argentina, China need not secure total control of the air to cause 
troubles for an adversary’s surface forces. In even contested airspace, important force-
multiplying assets—maritime-patrol, airborne-early-warning, and tanker aircraft, for 
example—would be forced to operate farther back, limiting their ability to locate and 
attack PLAN submarines, provide warning of incoming air attacks, or extend range and 
on-station time for American combat aircraft, respectively. This degradation of situ-
ational awareness and combat capacity would put Navy surface ships at increased risk of 
a surprise attack and reduce the amount of offensive combat power being generated. 
Denying U.S. forces control of the air or seizing superiority (even if temporary and 
geographically limited) itself would allow China to limit the freedom of action enjoyed by 
American surface forces and to threaten current naval concepts of operations. With their 
control of the air contested, U.S. warships would find themselves compelled to pay more 
attention to protecting themselves; this would leave fewer assets to project power ashore, 
which for the past two decades has been the U.S. Navy’s focus in regional warfare. 
China’s New Stealth Aircraft
The long-rumored PLAAF next-generation fighter was revealed to the world on the oc-
casion of its purported first flight in January 2011. The flight came as a surprise to many 
observers who had agreed with then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that China 
would “have no fifth-generation aircraft by 2020” and only “a handful” by 2025.11 
The J-20 seems to be a large airplane, and its appearance shows that substantial care was 
taken to shape the jet for low-observable (LO) characteristics. At this point, all per-
formance specifications are speculative, but the J-20 is thought to have two capacious 
internal weapons bays and possibly to be capable of “supercruising” flight—flying above 
Mach 1 without using its afterburners. In both regards, the aircraft would resemble the 
U.S. Air Force F-22; its larger size suggests, however, that it may have been designed with 
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either a larger internal payload or longer range than the F-22, or both. It may thus be a 
true multirole fighter, with a substantial strike capability.
Once in service, the J-20 would overmatch every other fighter plane deployed in East 
and Southeast Asia. As Kopp and Goon write, “With sufficiently good stealth perfor-
mance to defeat air defense radars in the L-band through Ku-band, the aircraft could 
easily penetrate all air defense systems currently deployed in Asia.”12
The J-20’s impact on the China–United States balance seems less certain. By the end of 
the current decade, all three U.S. tactical air forces—the Air Force, Navy, and Marine 
Corps—should be receiving F-35 fighters in some quantity. Along with the F-22, these F-
35s will give the United States an inventory of several hundred stealthy, fifth-generation 
fighters. We are a long way from knowing enough about the J-20’s performance and 
China’s plans for producing it, if indeed the design is meant to go into serial production. 
Will it be sufficiently stealthy to truly compete with the F-22 or F-35? How would the 
PLAAF integrate the J-20’s employment with its large numbers of nonstealthy air-
craft? How many J-20s will China eventually build? It will be years before we have clear 
answers to these and many other important questions about the new fighter. We can 
say, however, that if the J-20’s debut does little else, it serves as another testament to the 
increasing capability and sophistication of China’s aerospace industry.13
An operational stealth fighter would, as noted above, immediately become the most ad-
vanced aircraft deployed by any East Asian power. Air forces that today fly aircraft simi-
lar to China’s Flankers and J-10s—such as those of India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, 
and Taiwan—could find themselves for the first time a generation behind the PLAAF. 
However, India is working with Russia to develop its own stealth fighter, based on 
Sukhoi’s T-50/PAK FA design; Australia is committed to buying fourteen F-35s and may 
purchase up to a hundred; and Japan is considering the F-35 as a candidate to replace up 
to sixty-five obsolete F-4EJ fighters. Like the J-20, none of these jets will be operational 
until much later in the decade, but they could redress the technological balance between 
these countries and China.
The story is different for the air forces of Indonesia, Taiwan, and all the other militaries 
in China’s neighborhood. None have any likelihood of acquiring fifth-generation capa-
bilities anytime soon. When the J-20 enters service, as noted, it will instantly overmatch 
any fighter in these air forces’ inventories, likely adding to China’s military leverage in 
many of its neighborhood disputes. 
With regard to the United States, the J-20 will at the least confront the American military 
with, in effect, the dilemma that the U.S. Air Force has for twenty years been imposing 
on adversaries—how to defend against low-observable aircraft. This may prove, however, 
less dramatic than it sounds. The United States is currently flying its third generation of 
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LO combat aircraft (the F-35) and has been working with stealth technology since the 
1980s. This makes it possible that U.S. aircraft, especially the F-22 and F-35, will prove 
“stealthier than thou” compared with the J-20, permitting the United States to maintain 
a margin of advantage even against an indigenous Chinese stealth fighter. 
All those years of developing, testing, and operating LO aircraft should also have resulted 
in the most comprehensive understanding of how to defeat stealth. While there is little 
open discussion of the subject, ideas have emerged. Active electronically scanned array 
(AESA) radars are intended to track small targets like cruise missiles. The F-35’s AESA 
has, mounted on a test bed, reportedly succeeded in locating the F-22 and even in jam-
ming the latter’s radar. Sources have described the potential of low-frequency radars 
(that is, in the very high and ultrahigh frequency bands) in detecting fighter-sized LO 
targets.14 
To the extent that the J-20 turns out to be viable in a squabble versus the United States, 
it would add a dangerous new element to China’s capabilities in a near-seas contin-
gency. A stealthy strike fighter featuring good range and payload could help achieve air 
superiority over certain maritime areas or reduce the need for classical “air superiority” 
by being able to operate in airspace that is otherwise denied, just as the F-117 and B-2 
have done for the United States in its recent wars. Depending on the sizes and kinds of 
weapons that might be carried, the J-20 could be an effective surface-attack platform out 
to several hundred nautical miles at sea—farther, if aerial refueling were used to extend 
its “legs.”
Other Ongoing Developments
In terms of its impact on maritime considerations, a new Chinese aircraft of nearly as 
much interest as the J-20 is the J-15, a carrier-based fighter adapting—and according 
to Chinese sources, improving—the Russian Su-33 design. Intended to operate from a 
ski-jump-equipped ship, the J-15 reportedly made its first flight in August 2009; its first 
flight off a land-based ski jump took place in May 2010. Unlike the Su-33, which was 
conceived strictly as an air-to-air fighter, the J-15 may be intended as a multirole aircraft. 
Having performed its first carrier landings and takeoffs in late 2012, China has begun 
taking steps toward operational deployment. While a single, short-deck carrier would 
make very little difference in a conflict with the United States, the Liaoning/J-15 com-
bination would extend China’s reach into places like the South China Sea, where the 
nation’s tactical airpower is today somewhat range limited. In these areas, any credible 
carrier-air capability could overwhelm competitors like the Philippines and Vietnam, 
whose navies and air forces are small, ill equipped, and outdated.
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In recent years China has also displayed a dizzying array of unmanned aerial vehicles 
and models of them at air, defense, and trade shows; most seem not to have entered 
production. The unmanned aerial vehicles shown run the gamut from a copy of the 
Vietnam-era Firebee reconnaissance drone to the Xianglong high-altitude, long- 
endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicle, which bears a passing resemblance to the 
U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk.
China is fielding or developing a range of special-purpose “force multiplier” aircraft 
as well. For example, the PLAAF has long sought to acquire an airborne early-warning 
and control platform along the lines of the E-3 AWACS. A program to buy four A-50I 
aircraft—a Russian Il-76 airframe equipped with Israeli radar and mission equipment—
collapsed in 2000 when Israel succumbed to U.S. pressure and dropped out of the deal. 
After this disappointment China moved forward with its own program, also based on 
the Il-76 platform but with an indigenously developed mission suite. At least four of 
these KJ-2000 AWACS aircraft are in active service with the PLAAF, providing its first 
sophisticated airborne battle-management assets.15
Another area of interest to the PLAAF is aerial refueling, which is a necessary compe-
tence if China intends to extend the reach of its airpower more deeply into its neighbor-
ing seas and oceans. Today the PLAAF possesses a fairly rudimentary capability, owning 
about twenty-four H-6U tankers equipped with a “probe and drogue” refueling pod 
under each wing. Relatively few of China’s combat aircraft can be refueled in the air: 
some late-model J-8s have probes fitted, and a fixed probe can be installed on the J-10. 
The PLAAF’s Su-30s have retractable refueling probes, but their system is reportedly not 
compatible with the H-6U.16
In 2005, China ordered thirty-four newly built Il-76 Candid transports and four Il-78 
Midas tankers from Russia, but none have been delivered to date.17 Instead, Russia has 
begun delivering ten refurbished Il-76s.18 The PLAAF needs not only additional tank-
ers but also more strategic airlifters to realize any aspirations it might have for power-
projection capabilities. A new large transport aircraft, sometimes called the Y-20, is 
under development; it made its first f light in January 2013.19 
The PLAAF has also developed about a dozen specialized platforms based on the Y-8 
four-engine turboprop transport.20 This Gaoxin series includes another airborne early-
warning and control aircraft, a maritime surveillance variant, an airborne command 
post, and a number of platforms for various electronic-warfare functions, such as jam-
ming and signals intelligence.
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The Future
China’s airpower will continue to develop, increasing its capabilities across a wide range 
of contingencies, including ones in the near seas. What changes might we see in the 
coming years?
Patterns already in evidence will most likely continue in many areas. Newer jets will 
steadily replace older combat aircraft; the J-7 and Q-5 will gradually follow the J-6 into 
retirement, to be replaced by J-10s, J-11s, and JH-7s. Since newer aircraft will not replace 
older ones on a one-for-one basis, the PLAAF will continue to shrink. It is not clear what 
China’s leadership believes to be the “right size” for its modernized air force, but it is 
likely that the most dramatic reductions have already been made.
As new models replace old, they will be updated steadily. The PLAAF has never hesitated 
to modernize and improve its inventory, and there is no reason to expect that to change. 
Already the PLA has developed multiple variants of the basic Flanker airframe, deployed 
a J-10B upgrade to the J-10A, and fielded at least one improved version of the JH-7. 
At least two brand-new combat aircraft appear likely to become operational before the 
end of the decade. Both the J-15 and J-20 represent dramatic breakthroughs for Chinese 
airpower—Beijing’s first carrier-based fighter and its first stealthy jet, respectively. It 
will be interesting to see how many of each the PLA procures and how they come to be 
operated.21 
The PLA will likewise continue improving its airborne early-warning and EW capabili-
ties. More KJ-2000 AWACS will probably be built, and we should see additional exam-
ples of the Gaoxin group of EW aircraft. Unmanned aerial vehicles will play a big role in 
these missions as well.
More advanced weapons will continue to accumulate in PLA stockpiles. China already 
operates several modern air-to-air missiles, including the AA-12 and PL-12 medium-
range air-to-air weapons. As we look ahead, it has been reported that China is working 
on at least three new air-to-air missile designs: an extended-range ramjet-powered ver-
sion of the PL-12; a short-range active-radar-homing missile; and the PL-ASR, an  
infrared-seeking missile employing thrust-vector controls that would provide greater 
agility.22 The PLAAF may also be interested in very-long-range air-to-air missiles, often 
referred to as “AWACS killers,” for their presumed intended targets. The YJ-91—the 
Chinese adaptation of the Russian Kh-31 antiradiation missile—has been bruited as a 
candidate, as has the Russian Novator RS-172. Given China’s conviction that informa-
tion will play a predominant role in future combat, a weapon capable of attacking com-
mand, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms 
from extended ranges would seem to make sense. 
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Conclusion
It is hard not to be impressed with the progress made in recent years by the PLAAF. Not 
too long ago it was an unsophisticated congeries of ancient aircraft and weapons, its pi-
lots poorly trained and poorly supported. As late as the early 1990s it was likely too weak 
to have defended China’s home airspace effectively against even a modestly competent 
modern adversary. 
In the early to middle 1990s, as Chinese doctrine changed from focusing exclusively on 
territorial defense to contemplating limited power projection, the PLAAF found itself 
confronting a number of daunting learning curves that led from where it was to where it 
needed to be to fulfill its new missions. At least in terms of its major items of equipment, 
it has largely met these challenges and appears now at least to understand the ones that 
are left, even if it is not necessarily poised to overcome them immediately. 
The revolution in the PLAAF’s order of battle is over. It has made up the three decades 
separating the MiG-19 and the Su-27 in fifteen remarkable years, and it continues to 
progress. Whether the PLAAF can close the gaps that remain between its capabilities 
and those of the world’s most advanced air forces remains to be seen. Given how it has 
transformed itself over the last twenty years, however, one would be foolish to bet too 
heavily against it.
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The nature of Chinese activity in the near seas has changed drastically over the past five years, and this change will affect China’s command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) requirements, as well 
as the efficacy of the infrastructure that had been developed under the old model. What 
was once largely the province of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is now shared 
by the “five dragons” of China’s maritime law-enforcement agencies. However, this 
change seems to have occurred without an associated transfer of C4ISR systems from 
the military to these agencies. As a result, the maritime law-enforcement agencies either 
are left at the mercy of the PLA Navy for whatever information it chooses to provide or 
must develop their own capabilities to collect the same information. 
This chapter examines the tools that China—largely the PLA—has at sea and on shore 
to build a picture of activity in the near seas and how that picture is distributed to those 
who need it, both inside and outside the originating organization. 
C4ISR Functions in the Near Seas
Over the past few years, China has placed increased emphasis on advancing its interests 
in the near seas with an increasingly robust set of maritime law-enforcement agencies, 
as opposed to the PLA Navy. These agencies include the Maritime Safety Administration 
and a newly consolidated China Coast Guard under the State Oceanic Administration, 
which includes the former China Marine Surveillance, the Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries 
Law Enforcement Command, the older, more limited China Coast Guard, and the Gen-
eral Administration of Customs. A detailed review of each of these agencies’ functions 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, but their growing importance in the overall defense 
of China’s maritime rights and interests is illustrated by their inclusion in the 2010 
iteration of China’s defense white paper.1 China appears to be establishing a pattern of 
treating increasingly large portions of the near seas as its maritime territory and is thus 
using maritime law enforcement to administer it rather than solely depending on the 
PLA Navy to defend it. 
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Executing the missions China has assigned to its maritime forces in the near seas is no 
small task. Senior PLA officials often assert that China has a three-million-square- 
kilometer “territorial sea area.”2 Whether China means this to be territorial waters as 
defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the country’s exclu-
sive economic zone, or some other definition is unclear; Chinese officials have never 
explicitly stated where that extent reaches or what it means. But the sheer size is sugges-
tive. Three million square kilometers can encompass virtually the entire near-seas area, 
including the Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the entire area of the South 
China Sea encompassed by the “nine-dash line.” Regardless of the type of sovereignty 
or jurisdiction the Chinese claim in these waters, it is evident they need to be able to 
monitor activity in them and that they feel they are still short of that goal. Early in 2011, 
a senior official for one maritime law-enforcement agency stated that China’s maritime 
surveillance capability remained “weak,” given the large area of responsibility.3
The efforts of the PLA Navy and the various maritime law-enforcement agencies to en-
force China’s claims in the near seas have been well documented over the past two years. 
News reports have detailed China Marine Surveillance patrols in the South China Sea, to 
include run-ins with Vietnamese patrol ships. China Marine Surveillance documented 
a nearly fivefold increase in the number of foreign ships it monitored between 2008 and 
2010.4 The Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Command reportedly estab-
lished regular patrols to the disputed Senkaku (or Diaoyu) Islands in December 2010, 
following an intense controversy in which Japan briefly detained a Chinese fishing boat 
crew that had rammed a Japan Coast Guard ship.5 
In order for these agencies to accomplish the missions that they have apparently been 
given by the Chinese government, they have embarked on shipbuilding programs. 
Also, in late 2012 as many as eleven ships were transferred from the PLA Navy to China 
Marine Surveillance and the Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Com-
mand.6 But the mere addition of ships is not enough for these agencies to succeed in 
areas increasingly far from shore. They must build a picture of activity in the areas 
they are charged with patrolling, to provide their commanders with the information 
necessary to deploy their assets intelligently, and they must find a way to disseminate 
their orders and required situational awareness to the patrol ships responsible for car-
rying those orders out. They too, like the PLA Navy, need an increasingly sophisticated 
C4ISR system. 
This emphasis on the expanding role of the maritime law-enforcement agencies should 
not lead one to believe that the PLA Navy has ceded all missions in the near seas, how-
ever. There are still many missions that it is responsible for executing, either indepen-
dently or in coordination with maritime law enforcement. Besides routine training, the 
PLA Navy does its share to remind the region of Chinese claims to disputed waters. In 
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February 2010, the PLA Navy’s first amphibious dock landing ship, Kunlunshan, trained 
in the South China Sea and held a ceremony to leave “sovereignty monuments” at James 
Shoal, China’s southernmost territorial claim.7 James Shoal is nearly a thousand nauti-
cal miles from the nearest point on the Chinese mainland and represents the farthest 
reaches of the near seas. It is a true challenge to monitor maritime activities across such 
a vast area. In the next section we will examine the land- and sea-based tools the PLA 
Navy and the maritime law-enforcement agencies are developing to build a picture from 
their coastline to James Shoal. 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
The main purpose of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, systems 
in China’s near seas is to gather information about who is operating where. The PLA 
Navy must know in order to guard the country from attack, and the maritime law-
enforcement agencies must know in order to fulfill their myriad of functions, from the 
more mundane enforcement of pollution laws to the more ominous assertion of China’s 
maritime sovereignty claims. Many of the systems China’s maritime agencies use to keep 
track of the at-sea picture were originally developed for the PLA Navy’s core mission of 
coastal defense. 
Active Radar Systems
Conventional coastal radars are limited by the radar horizon, which varies depending 
on antenna height and target size but is around twenty nautical miles, as a good rule of 
thumb.8 Such a short range is inadequate for two reasons. First, it is hardly far enough 
to view activity much farther out than the twelve-nautical-mile limit, certainly not to 
the breadth of China’s near seas. Second, it would take several hundred such radars to 
cover China’s coastline, over 7,800 nautical miles long.9 However, there are several types 
of over-the-horizon radars (OTHRs) that China is using to increase the surveillance area 
significantly. These most notably include high-frequency surface-wave radars (HFSWRs) 
and sky-wave OTHRs.10
HFSWRs use the longer propagation of lower-frequency electromagnetic waves to detect 
targets much farther out than conventional radars can. As with many complex systems, 
exact performance depends on many factors, but a detection range on the order of a 
hundred nautical miles appears achievable.11 The height of a particular ship strongly 
influences the target-return strength, which has limited the usefulness of radar as a long-
range ship-tracking system.12 However, China appears to have been investigating this 
area closely. A study partly funded by the national 863 Program tested tracking of targets 
using a multiband system, and the results compared favorably with simultaneous track-
ing by the Automatic Identification System (discussed below).13 The experiment report 
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stated the multiband system was designed to detect targets to 150 kilometers, though its 
full range was not used in that particular trial.14
Sky-wave OTHRs are designed to track targets even farther from shore than HFSWRs. 
While little is known about China’s sky-wave OTHR, some characteristics can be in-
ferred from similar systems already in use. Both the United States and Australia currently 
operate sky-wave radars—the United States primarily for detection of drug-smuggling 
aircraft, and Australia for monitoring of air and sea activity by the Royal Australian 
Air Force.15 Sky-wave OTHR bounces signals off the ionosphere, achieving very long 
ranges, on the order of 1,600 nautical miles. Since the energy approaches the target from 
a nearly vertical angle, it is thought to be especially useful in detecting low-flying and 
even stealth aircraft. Its dependence on Doppler for target discrimination makes aircraft 
much easier targets for it than ships, and variations of the ionosphere greatly affect its 
performance.16 The description of China’s system in the 2011 report Military and Secu-
rity Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China appears to confirm these broad 
estimates, stating that China’s sky-wave system “allows [China] to carry out surveillance 
and reconnaissance over the western Pacific.”17 The extreme range of sky-wave systems 
and the fact that there are many other ISR options available for coastal areas suggest that 
this system is primarily designed for use in the outer edges of the near seas, even into the 
far seas.
While both the HFSWR and sky-wave have practical applications, they have serious draw-
backs as well. China may be looking at a hybrid surface/sky-wave radar to maximize the 
benefits of both and eliminate some of their problems. This system would use a sky-wave 
radar transmission—that is, it would bounce the signal off the ionosphere—but the receiv-
ing antenna would detect the returns via surface-wave propagation. This would theoreti-
cally produce extended ranges compared to an HFSWR, allow for surface and air target 
detection, and maintain some of the stealth detection capabilities of the sky-wave radar.18 
Passive Electronic Surveillance
In addition to shore-based active radars, China uses land-based electronic surveillance to 
aid in monitoring its coastal waters and airspace, though to what extent is unclear. At the 
2005 International Defence Exhibition China displayed information on a ground-based 
passive detection system similar to the Kolchuga system (originally Soviet, now Ukrai-
nian). The exhibition display claimed the system could triangulate electronic emissions 
from ships and aircraft to ranges between two hundred and three hundred kilometers.19
Self-Reporting Mechanisms
China also uses two types of self-reporting mechanisms to monitor ships in its claimed 
waters. The best known is the international standard Automatic Identification System 
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(AIS), which is required on most commercial vessels by the International Maritime Or-
ganization.20 The AIS transmits ships’ data, including position, course, and speed, on a 
VHF band; the data are available to any ship or shore station with the appropriate equip-
ment. This system not only helps commercial ships avoid collisions but enables port 
traffic management and gives maritime law-enforcement patrol ships and shore stations 
clear pictures of the ships around them. Saab installed China’s coastal monitoring system 
for AIS and in 2010 was awarded a contract by the Maritime Safety Administration to 
provide a similar network for major in-shore waterways.21 AIS is extremely useful for 
vessel monitoring, though it provides a relatively short-range (less than a hundred nauti-
cal miles) picture, owing to the limitations of VHF propagation. 
Some may argue that the second type of self-reporting system should properly be 
considered space based, but it has critical sea- and ground-based components. It is also 
a uniquely Chinese system and appears to be a critical method of tracking the Chinese 
fishing fleets, so this section would be incomplete without mention of it. This is the 
Beidou satellite navigation system, which some term the “Chinese GPS.” There is a 
critical difference in its operation, however. A traditional global positioning system uses 
signals from satellites to calculate positions on the earth. Beidou, however, is an active 
system; a user transmits information via satellite to a ground station, which calculates 
the position of the user and transmits it back. This active system allows for monitor-
ing of users’ locations and permits users to transmit other data to the ground station as 
well. This system has been put into place on over twenty thousand Chinese fishing boats, 
enabling their location to be constantly monitored by fisheries authorities.22 
Systems that self-report ship identifications and positions like AIS and Beidou have 
obvious advantages for enforcing domestic laws and managing international maritime 
traffic. They also help sort out a complex radar picture, allowing the PLA Navy and 
maritime law-enforcement agencies to concentrate patrol efforts on identifying radar 
contacts having no associated AIS or Beidou data. 
Tactical Assets
Besides the largely shore-based systems described above, the PLA Navy and each of 
the maritime law-enforcement organizations maintain tactical assets that patrol their 
respective areas of responsibility and represent the final options in any ISR network. If 
activity is unclear or there is a hole in ground-based monitoring systems, the only thing 
to do is to go out and take a look. Besides traditional surface-search radars, it can be 
assumed that many of the PLA Navy and maritime law-enforcement ships possess AIS 
systems that would help supplement the wide-area radar picture.
The PLA Navy is also beginning to develop some very sophisticated ship-based radars 
that provide much greater awareness than traditional air- and surface-search radars. 
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The Luyang II–class destroyers incorporate China’s first ship-based phased-array radars, 
similar to the U.S. Aegis AN/SPY-1 system.23 China’s destroyers of the Sovremenny and 
Luyang I and II classes deploy the Russian Mineral-ME system, which possesses both ac-
tive and passive detection systems, as well as an integrated data link for sharing targeting 
information.24
PLA Navy ships, in addition, would have passive electronic support measures (ESM), 
which can intercept and identify other ships’ radar signals. It is unclear from publicly 
available materials whether maritime law-enforcement ships have such systems, but they 
are less likely to; with thousands of commercial ships all using off-the-shelf radars, it 
is unlikely that an ESM system would be very useful. It makes more sense for the PLA 
Navy, which would have special interest in the more unusual signatures of foreign mili-
tary radars that could be operating in a given area.
In sum, China’s ground- and sea-based ISR capabilities fall into three primary areas. 
The first is ground-based radar, which, with new OTHRs, can provide an accurate 
picture of activity but not identifying information. The two self-reporting mechanisms 
discussed can provide detailed information on contacts, but AIS is limited by range, 
and Beidou is fitted only on Chinese vessels. Finally, the various patrol ships must help 
cover the remaining area, but they are limited by numbers. Thus, for the near seas, while 
ground- and sea-based ISR systems can provide persistent and accurate surveillance out 
to perhaps a hundred nautical miles from shore, the farther reaches must be monitored 
either by patrol ships or by air- and space-based assets, which are less constrained by the 
distances involved but also more intermittent in their coverage. 
Command, Control, Communication, and Computers
C4ISR does not stop with developing networks of sensors to gain awareness of areas 
of responsibility. C4ISR also includes the mechanisms for fusing such information, 
enabling command decisions, and disseminating those decisions to subordinate units. 
This portion of the C4ISR equation is usually less visible and less concrete than the ISR 
systems themselves, and thus it is often examined less thoroughly. 
Creating a Fused Picture
For the extensive ISR assets described in the previous section to be most effective, the 
information from all must be fused to present a cohesive picture. This would allow 
commanders in the various organizations to make informed decisions regarding the 
best use of their respective forces. This is not a trivial matter, particularly across multiple 
organizations. The most efficient use of China’s ISR assets would be to fuse information 
from every sensor into a single picture, and then to disseminate it to each agency, which 
could filter it to display the data required. However, this would be exceedingly complex 
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and would require a level of coordination and standardization among multiple agencies 
that does not exist at this time. It appears that some common data may be shared, but 
to what extent is unclear. Basic data such as those from a coastal radar network are the 
type most likely to be shared, while more specialized data, such as electronic surveillance 
or reporting from individual patrolling units, are probably kept within the originating 
agency unless there is a specific need to share. Each agency must therefore use its own 
assets to fill in gaps as it requires. 
Descriptions of how such data fusion occurs are difficult to come by, particularly for the 
PLA Navy. However, foreign observers have been allowed into some coordination centers 
of the maritime law-enforcement organizations. One of the best descriptions of such a 
facility comes from Professor Lyle Goldstein of the U.S. Naval War College, who visited 
the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration Rescue Coordination Center in 2007.25 He 
describes a modern ship-tracking facility that is supplemented by eleven radar stations 
and two other tracking stations.26 But even the primary Rescue Coordination Center, in 
one of China’s busiest ports, shows seams, gaps in information. For example, the Rescue 
Coordination Center could display the locations of its own assets, but it apparently did 
not have up-to-date information on where China Coast Guard ships were.27 
With a few such exceptions, little is known about exactly how and where data are fused 
among the various agencies. The author postulates that each major division of each or-
ganization likely has a data-fusion center to support the decisions of that division’s com-
mander. The PLA Navy, State Oceanic Administration, and the Fisheries Law Enforce-
ment Command each have three major organizational break points, described as North 
Sea, East Sea, and South Sea areas or fleets.28 These relatively large divisions would make 
sense for these agencies, whose responsibilities are spread throughout the near seas. 
In contrast, the China Coast Guard and Maritime Safety Administration, whose mis-
sions are concentrated closer to the coast, have a larger number of smaller areas of 
responsibility. Both agencies have flotillas or subordinate bureaus in each of the eleven 
coastal provinces; the Maritime Safety Administration also has bureaus in the port of 
Hong Kong, as well as in Heilongjiang and Hubei to manage major inland waterways.29 
The maritime pictures for each of these agencies would likely be more detailed in the 
near coastal areas, offering much less insight into activities in the farther reaches of the 
near seas.
Coordinating Activities
As China places more importance on its near-seas claims and the agencies that enforce 
them, cooperation between those agencies becomes more important. Besides promotion 
of economy of resources, there appear to be increasing areas in which several entities 
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have key interests. These common interests drove a recent consolidation of maritime 
agencies under a single agency to deal with frequent coordination problems.
The first hint of how limited cooperation was under the former system is the diversity 
of ministries that controlled the various maritime agencies. Prior to the spring of 2013, 
there was no common chain of command below the State Council level for any two 
of the major civilian maritime agencies. The State Oceanic Administration, Bureau of 
Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, Maritime Safety Administration, China 
Coast Guard, and the General Administration of Customs fell, respectively, under the 
Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transpor-
tation, the Ministry of Public Security, and the State Council.30 To include the PLA Navy, 
one had to go all the way to the Politburo to find a common decision-making body, as 
only that entity includes senior members of both the State Council and the Central 
Military Commission. 
At the 2013 National People’s Congress, many of these agencies were restructured so 
as to fall under the State Oceanic Administration as a new, consolidated China Coast 
Guard.31 Additionally there is, as noted, growing evidence that the PLA Navy, the new 
China Coast Guard, and the Maritime Safety Administration are beginning to share 
information and coordinate in specific areas. But the mechanisms for that cooperation 
likely had to be approved at the highest levels. Such a burdensome chain severely limits 
the flexibility of the maritime agencies in attempting to respond to emerging situations 
in a comprehensive manner. 
This wide separation of chains of command has obvious implications for the coordina-
tion of activities, but also it gives rise to uncoordinated decisions that seem innocuous 
but could result in significant hurdles down the road. Different organizations are apt to 
develop different ways of processing and exchanging information. For example, even if 
the Maritime Safety Administration were authorized to share its AIS data with the new 
China Coast Guard, if the latter’s networks were not able to accept and process those 
data, significant investments in both time and expense might be required. Similar chal-
lenges could occur in the realm of communications. Various ships and aircraft could 
presumably communicate on standard marine frequencies, but secure communications, 
data transfer, and participation in multipoint nets would not be possible unless prior 
coordination ensured compatibility of equipment and procedures.
Over the past several years, there have been signs that some improvement in coordi-
nation is beginning to take place. The 2010 iteration of China’s defense white paper 
mentioned for the first time the roles of the civilian maritime enforcement agencies 
and hinted at formal coordination between the PLA and civilian agencies when it stated 
in the same section that “all military area commands, as well as border and coastal 
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provinces, cities and counties, have commissions to coordinate border and coastal 
defenses within their respective jurisdictions.”32 The State Oceanic Administration ap-
peared to have a more formal relationship with the PLA Navy than the other maritime 
law-enforcement agencies, which may have contributed to its selection to lead the new 
China Coast Guard. In 2008, the deputy director of the State Oceanic Administration’s 
China Marine Surveillance organization announced it would become a “reserve unit” of 
the PLA Navy.33
In addition to the examples above, an incident clearly illustrates that the barriers be-
tween the various maritime agencies can be overcome for particular situations. When 
the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) was harassed in the South China Sea on 8 March 
2009, ships from three different organizations were on the scene. Two fishing trawlers 
conducted the most dangerous maneuvers, but ships from the State Oceanic Adminis-
tration, Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and the PLA Navy 
were all in the immediate vicinity.34 Such a coordinated action among three agencies had 
not been seen before and has not been seen again since, but it is illustrative of the type of 
action that can occur if the appropriate authorities are given. 
Implications for the Future
Over the coming years, C4ISR management will be a determining factor regarding 
whether China can effectively execute its maritime missions in the near seas. To execute 
those missions successfully, China must be able to build an accurate picture of activ-
ity and, when necessary, to coordinate actions between agencies both at sea and ashore. 
These are not easy tasks, given the vast expanse of the near seas and the disparate nature 
of the organizations potentially involved. 
The ground- and sea-based ISR assets described in this chapter highlight some of the 
very complex issues with building a fused picture over such a vast and diverse area. They 
hold certain significant advantages over air- and space-based systems, but on their own 
they cannot provide the complete picture. 
A chief advantage of ground- and sea-based systems over airborne and most space-based 
systems is persistence. Ground-based radar, electronic surveillance, and AIS stations can 
monitor their areas continuously, and they have access to large communication “pipes” 
that can get vast amounts of information to fusion centers quickly. Sea-based platforms 
provide a bridge between shore-based assets and the more mobile air and space assets. 
They can loiter for days at a time, and they provide information of arguably greater 
fidelity than can any other ISR platform.
The tyranny of distance continues to be the primary enemy to accurate information. 
Systems that, like OTH radars, can observe vast areas at extended ranges provide little 
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in the way of identification regarding the types of ships they are observing. Yet systems 
that provide more complete data, such as AIS or visual observation by patrol ships, are 
limited to the narrow slices of the near seas that they are able to observe at one time. 
The only system that appears to provide detailed information over a wide area—the 
Beidou—does so only for Chinese ships equipped with appropriate and working 
equipment and is therefore of limited use in identifying what the PLA Navy and mari-
time law-enforcement agencies are most interested in—foreign or illegal activity. 
With vast areas to enforce, coordination between agencies can only increase the ef-
ficiency of their efforts, which could set the stage for more contentious interactions 
with ships from regional countries or even the United States. Increasing awareness of 
foreign activities throughout China’s claimed waters and more efficient use of ever-
growing maritime-agency fleets will enable China to enforce its claims more stringent-
ly. Increased interaction with foreign ships farther from mainland China could spark 
at-sea incidents that result in unintended escalation of tensions at best and regional 
conflict at worst. 
At the end of the day, increased C4ISR capabilities throughout the near seas are a 
magnifying glass for China’s maritime policies. Where those interests are in harmony 
with those of other regional actors, China will bring welcome abilities to bear, but where 
those interests diverge, increasingly dangerous situations could arise.
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While the fishing trawlers appeared to be civil-
ian, examination of photos shows several char-
acteristics unusual compared to typical fishing 
vessels in the area: the trawlers are flying at least 
three Chinese flags, they appear freshly painted, 
and they have minimal equipment on deck.

China’s progressively more potent naval platforms, aircraft, and missiles are increas-ingly capable of holding U.S. Navy platforms and their supporting assets at risk 
in the near seas and their approaches. Central to maximizing Chinese ability to employ 
these systems—and hence to consolidating China’s aerospace combat capabilities over 
the near seas—are its emerging command, control, communications, computers, intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. These systems will enable 
the Chinese military to strengthen coordination, cueing, reconnaissance, communica-
tions, and data relay for maritime monitoring and targeting, as well as to coordinate 
Chinese platforms, systems, and personnel engaged in these roles. Particularly important 
will be effective utilization of ISR, the collection and processing of information concern-
ing potential military targets. Many platforms and systems can support such operations; 
this chapter focuses on those dedicated to such purposes, with the exception of un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters, both of which are growing in impor-
tance but on which data are more difficult to verify at this time.
The successful achievement of high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-
locating data and fusion, as well as of reliable indigenous satellite positioning, naviga-
tion, and timing (PNT), would facilitate holding enemy vessels at risk via devastating 
multiaxis strikes involving precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles launched from 
a variety of land-, sea-, undersea-, and air-based platforms in coordinated sequence. 
Emerging space-based C4ISR capabilities could thus greatly increase China’s capacity to 
assert its interests militarily in, over, and beneath the near seas. Beijing has a clear stra-
tegic rationale and corresponding set of programs to master the relevant components, 
particularly for “counterintervention” operations in and around its near seas. Doing so 
could finally enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to translate its traditional ap-
proach of achieving military superiority in specific times and areas, even in a context of 
overall inferiority (以劣胜优), into the maritime dimension.
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China has many ways to mitigate its limitations in C4ISR and target deconfliction for 
kinetic operations within the near seas and their immediate approaches, and potentially 
also for nonkinetic peacetime operations farther afield. Conducting high-intensity 
wartime operations in contested environments beyond the near seas, by contrast, would 
require major qualitative and quantitative improvements, particularly in aerospace, and 
impose corresponding vulnerabilities.
This chapter reviews dedicated Chinese air- and space-based ISR systems, examines 
one relevant operational scenario (tracking hostile surface ships in and around the near 
seas), considers China’s remaining limitations, and concludes by assessing strategic 
implications for China’s military and the U.S. Navy.
China’s C4ISR Foundation and Emphasis
The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop “an integrated C4ISR system” in the 
early 1990s.1 This was motivated by observations of U.S. prowess in Operation Desert 
Storm, the U.S. role in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 7 May 1999 Belgrade 
embassy bombing. The subsequent development of network-centric warfare added 
further impetus. In addition to the cumulative impact of these events, it was perhaps 
physical destruction and damage to sovereignty by the Belgrade bombing that most 
strongly reinforced Jiang Zemin’s visionary thinking concerning the future of warfare 
and catalyzed the support of other top leaders for decisive investment to realize this 
goal. Accordingly, in May 1999, China initiated the 995 Program (995 工程) to support 
megaprojects for the development of “assassin’s mace” weapons, which promised dispro-
portionate effectiveness vis-à-vis a top military power, such as the United States, despite 
China’s overall technological inferiority.2
Essential to the integration and employment of the assassin’s mace weapons thus devel-
oped since the late 1990s, Chinese C4ISR capabilities have improved markedly in paral-
lel. This has occurred as part of a larger effort at “informatization,” facilitated in part by 
development in civilian information technology and the telecommunications industry. 
As of China’s 2008 defense white paper, the PLA aspired to establish a foundation for 
informatization by 2010, achieve major progress by 2020, and realize informatization 
by 2050.3 In 2000, the PLA issued a manual, or outline (纲要), detailing the construc-
tion of “command automation systems,” or “military information systems that possess 
command and control, intelligence and reconnaissance, early warning and surveillance, 
communications, electronic countermeasures, and other operational and information 
support capabilities with computers as the core.”4 
Over the next decade, “the PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-based 
ISR technologies, and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to 
china’s near seas combat capabilities 89
consider the requirements and applications of C4ISR systems to be used by the PLA.”5 
Today, in Larry Wortzel’s assessment, “China’s military reconnaissance capability is 
probably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s, a location 
to about ten meters in accuracy, clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanosec-
onds, and velocity to within 0.2 meters per second.”6 The Central Military Commission 
(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redun-
dantly with alternate command posts, military region headquarters, and subordinate 
units operating up to, and in some cases beyond, the “First Island Chain.”7 While the 
PLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpart, 
which can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects, all the PLA Navy’s 
(PLAN’s) “major combat ships are networked and can share data. In the PLA Air Force, 
a majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an informa-
tion system managed by the PLA’s own airborne early-warning aircraft. For the ground 
forces, it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down to 
the regimental level.”8
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, as of 2012 “the PLA [was] focused on 
developing C4ISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intel-
ligence data, enhance battlefield awareness, and integrate and command military forces 
across the strategic, campaign, and tactical levels. A fully integrated C4ISR system, as 
envisioned by PLA leaders, would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefield 
conditions with a high level of agility and synchronization.”9
More broadly, developing a “high-resolution earth observation system,” to include an 
“airborne remote sensing system” and a “national satellite remote sensing (ground) 
network system,” is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in China’s Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan (2006–10) and the “Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-
ence and Technology Development” (2006–20).10 This priority guarantees top leadership 
support and tremendous institutional, financial, and human resources.
Near-real/real-time C4ISR is facilitated increasingly by China’s integrated Qu Dian (区电) 
military C4ISR system, which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate with 
forces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-high-
frequency communications and microwave systems, as well as related wireless networks 
and data links. These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and secure 
PLA voice/data communications provided by Fenghuo/Zhongxing/Shentong communi-
cations satellites. According to China’s 2010 defense white paper, “The total length of the 
national defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin, 
forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber commu-
nication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistance.”11 
This system may be the equivalent of the U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution 
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System; China has developed, and possibly deployed, a related Triservice Tactical 
Information Distributed Network (三军战术数据分发系统).12 These capabilities are 
currently structured to support near-seas operations. Extending high-intensity coverage 
much beyond the near seas, however, would be far more difficult in many respects.
Airborne ISR
Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically eas-
ier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirected 
to new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment. China’s fixed- and rotary-wing 
aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and com-
munications intelligence (COMINT); in wartime they would support air defense and 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Breakthroughs in the Beidou/Compass satellite system 
(discussed later) and high-speed data links, as demonstrated by China’s airborne early-
warning aircraft systems, are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress.13 Table 1 details 
major dedicated, manned, aerial C4ISR platforms. Sources for details on UAVs may be 
found in endnote 14 below.14
China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms. If developed 
successfully, they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity. While 
the role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited, fixed-wing ISR aircraft, as indicated in table 1, 
are numerous and diverse; hence they are covered in detail below.
To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation, China 
is attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities, in part by developing several 
variants of airborne early-warning (空中早期, AEW) aircraft. These include two major 
indigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts. 
Following cancellation of Israel’s Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in 
2000, China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft, a 
modified Ilyushin Il-76, from Russia. China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenous 
AWACS-type aircraft, based on the Russian A-50 airframe, to conduct surveillance, 
perform long-range air patrol, and thereby coordinate naval air operations. The KJ-2000 
has phased-array radar, data processing, Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishing 
friendly, hostile, and unknown tracks), C3I (command, control, communications, and 
intelligence systems), and data-link capability—all Chinese developed.15 According to 
Carlo Kopp, “this system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that used 
by the US Air Force’s E-3C AWACS.”16 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by the 
South Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included em-
ployment of one or more KJ-2000s.17 Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operational 
with the PLAAF’s 26th Air Division.18
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Table 1. Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms
Type Manufacturer Role Number 
in Service
Location First 
Delivery
fi xed 
wing
PLAAF Y8T / Gaoxin 4 Sha’anxi Aircraft 
Corporation
(SAC [Sha’anxi])
command 
post (C3I)
3 Nanjing 
Military Region 
(MR), 76th 
Air Regiment, 
26th Air Divi-
sion, Wuxi-
Shuofang?
2007
B-4052/737-300 Boeing, U.S. / 
Xi’an Aircraft 
Company 
Limited (XAC) 
modifi ed
command 
post (C3I)
2 ?
KJ-2000 (A-50 
Mainstay / 
Il-76MD)
Beriev, Russia / 
XAC-modifi ed
airborne 
early 
warning 
and control 
(AEW&C)
4–5 Nanjing MR, 
76th Air Regi-
ment, 26th Air 
Division, Wuxi-
Shuofang?
2004
Y-8W/KJ-200 SAC (Sha’anxi) AEW&C 4–5 Nanjing MR, 
76th Air Regi-
ment, 26th Air 
Division, Wuxi-
Shuofang?
2007
H-6B/HZ-6 XAC reconnais-
sance/ELINT
1+ ? 1979
H-5/HZ-5 Harbin Aircraft 
Manufacturing 
Corporation 
(HAMC)
ISR 7 ? 1966–82
Su-30MKK 
Flanker
Sukhoi, Russia reconnais-
sance/
surveil-
lance (SAR 
capability on 
one airframe 
demonstrat-
ed 2003)
73* ? 2000
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter / 
bomber 
(confi gura-
tion variant, 
e.g., with 
BM/KZ-900 
SIGINT pod)
83* ? 2004
Y-8H XAC reconnais-
sance/
surveillance
2? ?
Y-8CB / Gaoxin 1 
Karakoram Eagle
SAC (Sha’anxi) reconnais-
sance/
surveillance, 
COMINT
6 Nanjing MR, 
EW Flight 
Regiment, 10th 
Air Division, 
Nanjing-
Dajianchang?
2005–
2009
92 china maritime studies
Type Manufacturer Role Number 
in Service
Location First 
Delivery
J-8F/JZ-8FR Shenyang 
Aircraft 
Corporation
(SAC 
[Shenyang])
tactical 
reconnais-
sance/
surveillance
24 Shenyang 
MR, 3rd/4th 
Independent 
Fighter Recon-
naissance 
Regiment, 
30th Fighter 
Division, 
Shenyang 
Yuhuntun; 
and/or 78th 
Reconnais-
sance Regi-
ment, Suzhou; 
and/or 
Jinan MR, 1st 
Independent 
Fighter Recon-
naissance 
Regiment, 
31st Fighter 
Division, 
Wendeng?
?
J-8I/JZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-
sance/
surveillance
24 ?
J-8/JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnais-
sance/
surveillance
48 Guangzhou 
MR, 2nd 
Independent 
Fighter Recon-
naissance 
Regiment, 
42nd Fighter 
Division, Taihe; 
and Nanjing 
MR, 3rd 
Independent 
Fighter Recon-
naissance 
Regiment, 
29th Fighter 
Division, 
Suzhou? 
1976
Y-8G / Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sha’anxi) SIGINT 
and/or 
communica-
tions relay
10 Shenyang 
MR, 3rd/4th 
Independent 
Fighter Recon-
naissance 
Regiment, 
30th Fighter 
Division, 
Shenyang 
Yuhuntun; 
and/or Nanjing 
MR, 30th Air 
Regiment, 
10th Air Divi-
sion, Anqing 
North?
before 
2011
Table 1. (continued)
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Type Manufacturer Role Number 
in Service
Location First 
Delivery
Y-8EW / Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sha’anxi) dorsal 
satellite 
communica-
tions dome 
+ antennas; 
ELINT?
N/A At China 
Flight Test 
Establish-
ment, 
April 2011
Tu-154M/D 
Careless
Tupolev, Russia EW/ELINT/
SIGINT
4 102nd Air 
Regiment, 
34th Transpor-
tation Division, 
Beijing-
Nanyuan?
1998
HD-6 XAC EW 1+ ?
Y-8XZ/ECM, 
Gaoxin 7
SAC (Sha’anxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR, 
30th Air 
Regiment, 
10th Air Divi-
sion, Anqing 
North; and/
or Shenyang 
MR, 4th 
Independent 
Electronic War-
fare Regiment, 
Shenyang 
Yuhuntun; 
and/or Nanjing 
MR, 30th Elec-
tronic Warfare 
Regiment, 
10th Bomber 
Division, 
Nanjing 
Dajiaocang?
2007
PLAN Y-8J/W/WH, 
KJ-200,
Gaoxin 5
SAC (Sha’anxi) AEW&C 4–6 North Sea 
Fleet (NSF), 1st 
Independent 
Air Regiment, 
5th Fighter 
Aviation 
Division, 
Liaoyang?
1998
H-5/HZ-5 
(Il-28 Beagle)
HAMC ISR 7–24 NSF, 5th 
Bomber Avia-
tion Regiment, 
2nd Bomber 
Aviation 
Division?
1966–82
JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter/ 
bomber 
(confi gura-
tion variant, 
e.g., with 
BM/KZ-900 
SIGINT pod)
75* ? 2004
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Type Manufacturer Role Number 
in Service
Location First 
Delivery
JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter/ 
bomber 
(confi gura-
tion variant, 
e.g., with 
BM/KZ-900 
SIGINT pod)
50–65* ? 1998
Y-8JB/DZ, 
Gaoxin 2
SAC (Sha’anxi) SIGINT, 
reconnais-
sance/
surveillance, 
and/or
ELINT
5 NSF, 1st/3rd 
Independent 
Air Regiment, 
5th Fighter 
Aviation Divi-
sion, Liaoyang; 
1 in South 
Sea Fleet, 7th 
Independent 
Air Regiment, 
Sanya/
Yaxian?
2004
Sh-5 HAMC maritime 
patrol / 
surveillance
4 NSF, 3rd In-
dependent Air 
Regiment, 5th 
Fighter Avia-
tion Division, 
Tuandao?
1986
Y-8X SAC (Sha’anxi) maritime 
patrol / 
ASW
5 NSF, 1st Inde-
pendent Air 
Regiment, 5th 
Fighter Avia-
tion Division, 
Liaoyang?
1985
Y-8Q / 
Gaoxin 6
SAC (Sha’anxi) ASW 1–5 NSF, 1st Inde-
pendent Air 
Regiment, 5th 
Fighter Avia-
tion Division, 
Liaoyang?
rotary 
wing
PLAN Ka-31B Kamov, Russia AEW 8 ? ?
Zhi (Z)-8YJ/SA-
321 Super Frelon
Changhe Air-
craft Industries 
Group; 
French technol-
ogy, license 
production
AEW 2 ? ?
Notes: 
Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources.
Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8/Gaoxin variants—many of which overlap in function—as 
well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time, data in this table 
must be interpreted with particular caution.
* Many of these may not be ISR-focused/equipped.
Sources: “Chinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles,” Command Information Systems, China, IHS 
Jane’s, 23 December 2013, www.janes.com; Institute for International Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
2013 (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 286–95; “China: Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, 4 June 2013, www 
.janes.com/; “Air Force, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, 17 Septem-
ber 2013, www.janes.com/; “World Navies: China,” Jane’s World Navies, 4 October 2013, www.janes.com/; 
“XAC KJ-2000,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 8 July 2013, www.janes.com/; “SAC Y-8 (Special Mission 
Versions),” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 7 July 2013, www.janes.com/; “XAC H-6,” Jane’s All the World’s 
Aircraft, 8 July 2013, www.janes.com/; “Kamov Ka-31 Helix B,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 11 February 2013, 
www.janes.com/; Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper, Modern Chinese Warplanes: Combat Aircraft and Units 
of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston, Tex.: Harpia, 2012), pp. 83–87, 110–12, 219. And see 
Erickson, “China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” pp. 114–15, 117, 120.
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China’s Y-8 medium-range transport airframe, derived from Russia’s Antonov An-12 
Cub transport and produced under license by the Sha’anxi Aircraft Industry (Group) 
Corporation, is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants.19 They perform such missions as 
electronic intelligence (or ELINT—variant one; and possibly an eighth variant), SIGINT 
(variant two), SIGINT and/or communications relay (variant three), electronic warfare 
/ electronic countermeasures / C3I (variants four and seven), airborne early warning 
(variant five), and ASW (variant six).20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles.
China’s smaller KJ-200/Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol, electronic warfare, airborne-
early-warning and control aircraft, with its electronically steered, active, phased-array 
radar (similar in appearance to, but larger than, Sweden’s Ericsson Erieye active phased-
array radar), complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more 
economically.21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006, kill-
ing forty people and possibly setting back the program.22 But the program appears to be 
back on track, and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200’s technology is “two generations 
ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US.”23 On 12 March 2010, a 
PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near 
the Miyako Strait.24 Like the KJ-2000, the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the 
PLAAF’s 26th Air Division;25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s 
as well.26 
In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms, and the numerous and diverse Y-8 
Gaoxin variants detailed above, the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments 
with a wide range of other specialized aircraft. Relevant fixed-wing types include a 
number of H-6s, derivatives of Russia’s Tu-16 Badger, which also conduct reconnais-
sance and ELINT.27 As part of a late-2003 exercise, an Su-30MKK fighter used a new 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan.28 A portion of the PLAN 
and PLAAF’s JH-7A strike fighter / bombers, together with the older JH-7 variant still 
employed by the PLAN, are apparently outfitted with BM/KZ-900 SIGINT pods.29
Beyond the strictly military dimension, as China strengthens its maritime law-
enforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic 
Administration, their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace. On 5 March 
2009, a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve f ly-bys of USNS 
Victorious (T-AGOS 19), operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea, at an alti-
tude of four hundred feet, range five hundred yards; the following day, a Y-12 conduct-
ed eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23), operating in international waters 
in the South China Sea, at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a 
hundred and three hundred feet.30 
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Space-Based ISR
Space capabilities underpin China’s current naval and other military capabilities for the 
near seas. The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and 
high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen 
PLA capabilities. While still purchasing supplementary imagery, Beijing is combining 
foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce signifi-
cant advances in maritime C4ISR.
China has developed a full range of military, civilian, and dual-use satellites of various 
mission areas and sizes. While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span, 
these systems are improving rapidly.31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors 
to shooters and to support related network functions. China’s second data-relay satel-
lite, Tianlian-1-02/B, provides “near real-time transfer of data to ground stations from 
manned space capsules or orbiting satellites”;32 Tianlian-1-03, launched on 25 July 2012, 
further extends and strengthens this capacity.33 China’s ground stations and Yuanwang-
class space-event support ships add important telemetry, tracking, and command capac-
ity. China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but 
plans by 2030 to have established “network nodes” at the North Pole, at the South Pole, 
and in Brazil as part of a “Digital Earth Scientific Platform.”34 The Fenghuo-1 communi-
cations satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military opera-
tions.35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development; its satellites under 
five hundred kilograms now boast high performance, in addition to low weight. The 
9.3 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite, launched on 10 May 2012, receives signals from China’s 
shipborne Automatic Identification System.36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites 
is testing new technologies. Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a 
variety of services, including the PLAN. One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly 
combat-relevant “Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite 
Surveying and Mapping.”37
Maritime Surveillance Satellites
China’s reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO), multi- and hyper-
spectral, and radar, especially SAR. Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY), 
the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), Ziyuan (ZY), the Disaster Monitor-
ing Constellation (DMC), Haiyang (HY), Huanjing (HJ), and Yaogan (YG) satellites. 
Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft, which remain as 
orbital modules after their crews return to earth, and the Tiangong (TG) space-station 
module launched in 2011, as relevant to reconnaissance.38 Fengyun weather satellites 
provide visible, IR, and microwave imaging. Possible future launches include FY-2G and 
-2H in 2014, FY-3D/PM1 and FY-4 M in 2015, FY-3E/AM1 in 2017, FY-3F/PM2 in 2019, 
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FY-3G/AM3 in 2021, FY-3H/PM3 in 2023, and FY-4 O at an unspecified date. FY-2H 
and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary; all others have polar orbits. Three satellite 
series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring. The CBERS polar near-real-time 
electro-optical satellites, with 2.7-meter resolution, are used for military observation. 
CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons, with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX 
optical sensors, may be launched as early as 2013. Yaogan satellites are already so numer-
ous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section).
Ocean surveillance, a significant focus of Chinese satellite development, has been 
prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology 
Development Plan.39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observa-
tion satellites in 2002 (no longer operational), 2007, and 2011. Roughly a dozen further 
Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned, in three sets over the next decade, with 
HY-1E/F possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013, HY-2C in 2015, HY-1G/H in 
2016, HY-3B in 2017, HY-2D in 2018, and HY-1C/D, HY-2B, and HY-3A at unspecified 
dates.40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution. China’s Huanjing visible-, 
IR-, multispectral-, and SAR-imaging constellation is designed, once eight additional 
satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later, to form a com-
plete image of China every twelve hours.41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remote-
sensing satellites currently in orbit.
High-Resolution Reconnaissance, Possible ELINT Satellites: Yaogan 
China’s Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced, paired SAR and EO remote-sensing sat-
ellites, operating in near-polar, sun-synchronous orbits, “may provide multiwavelength, 
overlapping, continuous medium resolution, global imagery of military targets.”42 The 
series was reportedly “implemented” (实施) by China National Space Administration, 
though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the U.S. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.43 With its high-resolution (five-meter) 
L-band SAR, Yaogan-1 was China’s first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite. SAR Yaogans 
are optimized for monitoring “ocean dynamics, sea surface characteristics, and coastal 
zones” (海洋动力, 海表特征, 海岸带), as well as “observing sea-surface targets and 
shallow-water bathymetry” (海面目标, 浅海地形等观测).44 EO Yaogans, which appear 
to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)–2000 small-satellite 
“bus” (that is, standardized “backbone” platform on which the satellite is built), moni-
tor land and sea areas, including “coastal zones” (海岸带), with resolution as fine as a 
half-meter.45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability, Yaogans have attained a variety 
of orbits, some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution.46 A major Chi-
nese study on the nation’s remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are “very 
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Table 2. China’s Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-
al Code
Contractor Launch Date/
Time (UTC)
Launch Site
FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 
Engineering, Shanghai Academy 
of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)
2006.02.18
16:53:00
Xichang
FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 2008.12.23
00:54:00
Xichang
FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 2012.01.13
00:56
Xichang
FY-3A/
AM
32958 2008-026A SAST 2008.05.27
03:02
Taiyuan
FY-3B/PM 37214 2010-059A SAST 2010.11.04
18:37:00
Taiyuan
CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 2003.10.21
00:00:00
Taiyuan
CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 2007.09.19
03:26:00
Taiyuan
ZY-2B ? ? ? 2002.10.27 Taiyuan?
ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A ? 2004.11.06
03:10:00
Taiyuan
ZY-3 ? ? ? 2012.01.09
03:17:00
Taiyuan
DMC/
BJ1/
Tsinghua
28890 2005-043A ? 2005.10.27
06:52:00
Plesetsk 
(Russia)
HY-1B 31113 2007-010A ? 2007.04.11
03:27
Taiyuan
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Launch Vehicle Orbit; Perigee 
× Apogee (km); 
Inclination (°); 
Period (min.); 
Semimajor Axis 
(km)a
Mass (kg) Primary 
Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean 
Applications
CZ-3A geostationary;
35,784.7 ×
35,805.4; 1.6°;
1,436.2; 42,166
1,380 VISSR-2 ? sea temperature, 
color, meteorol-
ogy; images every 
30 min.
CZ-3A geostationary;
35,784.7 ×
35,807.4; 1.2°;
1,436.2; 42,167
1,390 VISSR-2;
visible and 
infrared high-
resolution cloud 
imagery
? sea temperature, 
meteorology; 
images every 
15 min.
CZ-3A geostationary;
35,774.1 ×
35,806.5; 1.3°;
1,435.9; 42,161
1,369.0 Stretched Visible 
and Infrared Spin 
Scan Radiometer
? sea temperature, 
meteorology; 
images every 
15 min.
CZ-4C polar; 
828.1 × 841.2;
98.6°; 101.5; 
7,205
2,295 MERSI ocean 
color, VIRR IR 
sensors; MWRI 
microwave 
radiometer
? sea color, 
temperature, 
wind speed, 
coastal zones, 
meteorology
CZ-4C polar; 
833.2 × 836.2;
98.8°; 101.5; 
7,205
2,299 VIRR, MERSI, 
MWRI; 11 
instruments 
capable of global, 
all-weather, 
multispectral, 
3-dimensional, 
quantitative Earth 
observations
? sea color, 
temperature, 
wind speed, 
coastal zones, 
meteorology
CZ-4B polar;
781.4 × 782.6;
98.2°; 100.3; 
7,152
1,600 CCD, infrared 
multispectral 
scanner (IRMSS), 
WFI
20 coastal zones
CZ-4B polar;
746.6 × 791.5;
98.3°; 100.1; 
7,140
1,500 CCD, WFI, HR 20 (CCD), 
2 (HR)
coastal zones
? polar ? HR, PAN-MS 2 (HR), 
5 (PAN-MS)
land, coastal 
zones
CZ-4B polar ? HR, PAN-MS 2 (HR), 
5 (PAN-MS)
coastal zones
? polar 2,630 HR, PAN-MS, 
CC DX2; 3 
high-resolution 
panchromatic 
cameras, IRMSS
2 cameras (front/
rear-facing): 
3.5 m (spectral). 
Ground-facing 
camera: 2.1 m 
(spectral). IRMSS: 
6.0 m (spectral).
coastal zones, 
high-resolution 
remote sensing, 
stereo mapping
Cosmos 
(Russian)
polar ? PAN-MS 32/4 coastal zones
CZ-2C polar;
787.4 × 811.2;
98.4°; 100.7; 
7,170
? COCTS, CZI;
ocean color, IR, 
temperature 
sensors
? sea color, sea 
temperature, 
coastal zones
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Satellite NORAD ID Internation-
al Code
Contractor Launch Date/
Time (UTC)
Launch Site
HY-2A 37781 2011-043A ? 2011.08.15 ?
HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A ? 2008.09.06
03:25:00
Taiyuan
HJ-1B ? ? ? 2008.09.06
03:25:00
Taiyuan
HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A ? 2012.11.18
22:53:00
Taiyuan
SZ-1 25956 1999-061A ? 1999.11.19
22:30:00
Jiuquan
SZ-2 26664 2001-001A ? 2001.01.09
01:00:00
Jiuquan
SZ-3 27397 2002-014A ? 2002.03.25
14:00:00
Jiuquan
SZ-4 27630 2002-061A ? 2002.12.29
16:40:00
Jiuquan
SZ-5 28043 2003-045A ? 2003.10.15
01:00:00
Jiuquan
SZ-6 28879 2005-040A ? 2005.10.12
01:00:00
Jiuquan
SZ-7 33386 2008-047A ? 2008.09.25
13:10:00
Jiuquan
SZ-8 37859 2011-063A ? 2011.10.31
21:58:00
Jiuquan
SZ-9 38461 2012-032A ? 2012.06.16
10:37:00
Jiuquan
SZ-10 39179 2013-029A
2013-029H 
(orbital 
module)
? 2013.06.11
09:38:00
Jiuquan
Table 2. (continued)
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Launch Vehicle Orbit; Perigee 
× Apogee (km); 
Inclination (°); 
Period (min.); 
Semimajor Axis 
(km)a
Mass (kg) Primary 
Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean 
Applications
? polar;
973.3 × 973.7;
99.4°; 104.4; 
7,344
? microwave radi-
ometer, altimeter, 
scatterometer
? ocean surveil-
lance: sea surface 
winds, wave 
height, and water 
temperatures
CZ-2C polar;
632.8 × 672.9;
97.8°; 97.6; 7,023
? CCD; optical, 
infrared cameras; 
SAR; hyperspec-
tral imager
30 sea color, 
red tide, veg-
etation, oil spills, 
coastal zones, sea 
temperature
CZ-2C polar ? CCD; optical, 
infrared 
cameras; SAR
30 sea color, coastal 
zones, sea 
temperature
CZ-2C polar    890 ? ? 1st radar satel-
lite in China’s 
environment & 
disaster monitor 
constellation, 
operating w/
HJ-1A/1B optical 
satellites
CZ-2F 195 × 315;
89.6; 42.6°;
0.00905
7,600.0 ? ? ?
CZ-2F 330 × 346;
91.3; 42.6°;
0.00119
? ? ? orbital module 
conducted 
zero-gravity 
experiments
CZ-2F 332 × 337;
91.2; 42.4°;
0.00037
? ? ? orbital module
CZ-2F 196 × 329;
89.8; 42.4°;
0.01001
? ? ? ?
CZ-2F ? ? ? ? ?
CZ-2F 342 × 350;
91.46; 42.4°;
0.00059
? ? ? orbital module 
conducted 
scientifi c research
CZ-2F 329 × 336;
91.2; 42.4°;
0
? ? ? ?
CZ-2F ? 8,080.0 ? ? ?
CZ-2F ? ? ? ? ?
CZ-2F ? 7,800.0 ? ? left orbital module
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useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring” 
(对于海洋动力环境和海洋监视监测十分有用).47
Yaogan-9; Yaogan-16A, B, and C; and Yaogan-17A, B, and C constellations may constitute a 
vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network. Flying in triangular 
formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations, each constellation apparently contains 
an electro-optical surveillance satellite, a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite, and 
possibly an electronic/signal intelligence satellite. Designed for location and tracking of 
foreign warships, the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval ves-
sels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy. . . . They are 
thought to be able to find and track large Western warships, providing accurate position-
ing data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems.48 
This is similar to the first and second generations of the U.S. Navy’s White Cloud Naval 
Ocean Surveillance System, which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their 
electronic emissions, identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and 
transmission patterns, and locating them using triangulation and time distance of ar-
rival.49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites, then, one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of 
ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely; two satellites together would locate 
emitting ships, albeit still imperfectly; and the inputs of a third satellite would locate 
emitting ships precisely. The ships’ locations would then be transmitted to the relevant 
parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex.50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently 
been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems, as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented 
into two pieces.51 See table 3.
China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites.52 China reportedly launched an 
ELINT satellite program, the 701 Program, in the late 1960s. Following a lengthy hiatus, 
during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne, China 
has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications, and Chinese 
experts have conducted considerable research in this area.53 As Mark Stokes and Ian 
Easton point out, China may have long launched “unidentified ELINT sensors attached 
to other satellite payloads, and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated 
systems.”54 China’s Shijian satellites, particularly the -6 series, launched in four pairs 
from 2004 to 2010, are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions.55 
Satellite NORAD ID Internation-
al Code
Contractor Launch Date/
Time (UTC)
Launch Site
TG-1 37820 2011-053A ? 2011.09.29
13:16:00 
Jiuquan
Table 2. (continued)
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These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of 
electronic signals received, as well as other geo-location techniques, to triangulate the 
position of U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time 
tracking and targeting.56
Supporting PNT: Beidou/Compass Satellites 
By offering reliable location signals, PNT facilitates command and control and also 
monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones. The PLA regards autono-
mous reliability in this area as vital. A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA 
analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption 
likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile 
salvo fired into the East China Sea 18.5 kilometers from Taiwan’s Keelung naval port in 
March 1996, as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be pro–Taiwan 
independence moves. “It was a great shame for the PLA . . . an unforgettable humiliation. 
That’s how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and 
positioning system, no matter how huge the cost. Beidou is a must for us. We learned it 
the hard way.” Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that China’s Beidou and Yuanwang 
systems guarantee that “there is no chance now for the U.S. to use its GPS to interfere in 
our operations at all.”57
Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by U.S. GPS and Russian GLONASS 
(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future, and having been denied 
access to the military mode of Europe’s nascent Galileo system, China is developing its 
own—Beidou/Compass (北斗卫星导航定位系统).58 The director of the China Satellite 
Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center, Yang Baofeng, terms it “the 
Launch Vehicle Orbit; Perigee 
× Apogee (km); 
Inclination (°); 
Period (min.); 
Semimajor Axis 
(km)a
Mass (kg) Primary 
Sensors
Resolution (m) Ocean 
Applications
CZ-2F ? 8,506.0 ? ? ?
Notes: 
Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources.
a. Data from “Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions,” ITPROSTAR, which are typically more detailed, are 
used by default, except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft, which ITPROSTAR does not include. For Shenzhou 
spacecraft, data are from “National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog,” NASA, nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/. 
Contrary to the general column heading, orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis, 
apoapsis, period, inclination, and eccentricity. 
Sources: He Mingxia et al.,“Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988–
2025),” pp. 91–103; “Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions,” ITPROSTAR, www.n2yo.com/; “National 
Space Science Data Center Master Catalog,” NASA, nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/; “Fengyun Series,” Jane’s Space 
Systems and Industry, 2 July 2012.
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Table 3. Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational: Notional Specifications
Yaogan # Military 
Designation
NORAD ID International 
Code
Contractor Launch Date/
Time (UTC)
2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2007.05.25
07:12:00
3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 2007.11.11
22:48:00
4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2008.12.01
04:42:00
5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH / CAST 508 Institute / 
Xi’an Institute of Optics and 
Precision Mechanics
2008.12.15
03:22:00
6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 2009.04.22
02:55:00
7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2009.12.09
08:42:00
8 JB-7-2? 36121 2009-072A SAST / Changchun Institute 
of Optics, Fine Mechanics and 
Physics (CIOMP)
2009.12.15
02:31:00
9A/B/C ? 36413,
36414/38303,
36415
2010-009A,
2010-009B/G,
2010-009C
DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2010.03.05
04:55:00
10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 2010.08.09
22:49:00
11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2010.09.22
02:42:00
12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH / CAST 508 Institute / 
Xi’an Institute of Optics and 
Precision Mechanics
2011.11.09
03:21:00
13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 2011.11.29
18:50:00
14 ? 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute /
CIOMP
2012.05.10
07:06:00
15 ? 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute /
CIOMP
2012.05.29
07:31:00
16A/B/C ? 39011,
39012,
39013
2012-066A,
2012-066B,
2012-066C
DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2012.11.25
04:06:00
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Note: Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources.
Sources: He Mingxia et al., “Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988–
2025)”; “Yaogan Series”; “Yaogan 9B,” “Yaogan 9B DEB.” Other data from “Real Time Satellite Tracking and 
Predictions,” and “National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog”; data and format from ITPROSTAR, 
which are typically more detailed, are used by default.
Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit: Perigee 
× Apogee (km), 
Inclination (°), 
SSO Time on 
Descending 
Node
Transmission 
Frequency 
(MHz)
Mass (kg) Type
Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 × 655,
97.8, 13:30
2,216.527 800? EO; HR, 
PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 × 629,
97.9, 06:00
2,212.809 2,700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 × 660,
97.9, 11:00
2,216.525 800? EO; HR, 
PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 × 495,
97.4, 10:30
2,220.5 2,700 L-band SAR
Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 × 513,
97.6, 10:00
? 2,000? L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 × 666,
97.8, 15:00
2,216.527 800? EO; HR, 
PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1,200 × 1,211, 
100.5, 09:30
2,266.3 1,040 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1,089 × 
1,106, 63.4;
(9B) 1,060 × 
1,076, 63.4;
(9C) 1,089 × 
1,107, 63.4
2,218 (9B) 1,000? (9A) EO; HR, PAN-MS/
SAR/ELINT?
Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 × 629,
97.8, 06:00
? 2,700 L-band SAR
Jiuquan CZ-2D 627.3 × 657.4, 
98.01, 09:00
2,216.527 800? EO; HR, 
PAN-MS
Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 × 498, 
97.41, 10:29
? 2,700 EO
Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 × 511,
97.11, 01:56
? 2,000? SAR
Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 × 479,
97.2, 14:14
? 2,700? EO
Taiyuan CZ-4C 1,201 × 1,206, 
100.1, 14:30
? 1,040 EO
Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1,080 × 
1,089, 63.38, 
106.93 min.;
(16B) 1,078 × 
1,090, 63.38, 
106.93 min.;
(16C) 1,032 × 
1,081, 63.38, 
106.33 min.
? 1,000? (16A) EO/SAR/ELINT?
106 china maritime studies
largest scale, most complex, most technically demanding, and most widely applicable 
space-based system in Chinese aerospace history.”59 Beidou/Compass provides PNT to 
an accuracy of ten meters, 0.2 meters per second, and ten nanoseconds, respectively;60 
it also offers “differential” and “integrity” services.61 Initially, unlike other PNT sys-
tems, which transmit signals directly, it transmitted signals indirectly, through a central 
ground station, although the PLA General Armament Department’s newspaper recently 
reported that “after providing passive navigation and locating service, Beidou became 
more and more like the GPS system.”62 It also boasts a unique short-message commu-
nications system.63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China 
numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes “an important measure to grab and 
retain favorable orbital position resources . . . for the purpose of ‘carving up the domain 
before other competitors do’” [也是 “占位” 的需要].64 
Twenty satellites have been launched thus far; sixteen remain operational. An initial 
two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000. Regional navigation and commu-
nications coverage, encompassing mainland China, neighboring countries (such as 
Pakistan, where it has been tested), and the near seas, was achieved in 2012;65 service 
commenced in early 2013. Starting in 2014, a second series will be launched.66 By 2020, 
a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit, twenty-seven inclined 
medium earth orbit, and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global 
coverage.67 IGSO satellites’ high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes. 
Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST. They weigh typically 2,300 kg at 
launch and 1,150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee 
motor. They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays. The initial satellites 
were based on the DFH-3 bus; this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and 
to the -3B variant from -M3 on. All satellites have been launched from Xichang, from its 
Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2/Compass-M3. See table 4.
The PLA is already using China’s PNT system extensively. During long-distance exer-
cises, Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate.68 The 
North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief, Lei Xiwei, has stated that in February 
2013 “Beidou provided positioning, security and protection” for the destroyer Qingdao 
and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise.69
Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets
An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the 
targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate, such as 
the Second Artillery. This critical linchpin, long limited by Beijing’s lack of relevant sen-
sor platforms, promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels 
on China’s maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise 
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Table 4. Beidou/Compass Satellites Currently Operational: Notional Specifications
Satellite NORAD 
ID
Interna-
tional
Code
Launch 
Date/ 
Time (UTC)
Launch 
Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-1C 27813 2003-
021A
2003.05.24
16:34:00
CZ-3A geostationary 
(GEO): 110.5°E
20 m 
positioning 
accuracy
operational
Beidou-2A/
Compass-
M1
31115 2007-
011A
2007.04.13
20:11:00
CZ-3A medium earth orbit 
(MEO) /
experimental:
perigee × apogee 
21,519 × 21,545 
km, inclination 55.3°, 
period 773.4 min.; by 
2010.03: 21,524.7 × 
21,553.5 km, 56.1°, 
period 773.4 min.
signal trans-
mit carrier 
frequencies: 
1,195.14–
1,219.14 
MHz, 
1,256.52–
1,280.52 
MHz, 
1,559.05–
1,563.15 
MHz, and 
1,587.69–
1,591.79 
MHz;
ground com-
munications 
w/1 master 
control sta-
tion, 2 upload 
stations, 30 
monitor 
stations
experimental: 
1st MEO 
satellite in 
series
Beidou-2C/
Compass-
G1
36287 2010-
001A
2010.01.16
16:12:00
CZ-3C GEO: 140°E; 
initial transfer orbit: 
perigee × apogee 
196 × 35,620 km, 
inclination 20.5°
? operational
Beidou-2D/
Compass-
G3
36590 2010-
024A
2010.06.02
15:53:00
CZ-3C GEO: 83.8°E; 
initial transfer orbit: 
perigee × apogee 
205 × 35,647 km, 
inclination 20.5°
? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass-
IGSO-1
36828 2010-
036A
2010.07.31
21:30:00
CZ-3A geosynchronous 
(GSO): perigee × 
apogee 35,674.5 
× 35,901.5 km, 
inclination 55.1°, 
period 1,435.8 min.; 
mean longitude of 
subsatellite ground 
point 118°E
? operational
Beidou-2E/
Compass-
G4
37210 2010-
057A
2010.10.31
16:26:00
CZ-3C GEO: 159.9°E ? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass-
IGSO-2
37256 2010-
068A
2010.12.17
20:20:00
CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 
apogee 35,714 
× 35,856 km, 
inclination 55.24°, 
period 1,436 min.; 
mean longitude of 
subsatellite ground 
point 118°E
? operational
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Satellite NORAD 
ID
Interna-
tional
Code
Launch 
Date/ 
Time (UTC)
Launch 
Vehicle
Orbit Capabilities Status
Beidou-2/
Compass-
IGSO-3
37384 2011-
013A
2011.04.09
20:47:00
CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 
apogee 35,721 
× 35,880 km, 
inclination 55.3°, 
period 1,435.9 min.; 
“fi gure 8” ground 
track centered over 
118°E
completed 
IGSO cover-
age with 
3 satellites 
in equally 
spaced planes; 
marked 
establishment 
of basic navi-
gation and 
positioning 
network
operational
Beidou-2/
Compass- 
IGSO-4
37763 2011-
038A
2011.07.26
21:44:00
CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 
apogee 35,706 × 
35,878 km, inclina-
tion 55.2°, period 
1,436.0 min.; “fi g-
ure 8” ground track 
with intersection 
node over 95°E
? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass-
IGSO-5
37948 2011-
073A
2011.12.01
21:07:00
CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 
apogee 35,704 
× 35,866 km, 
inclination 55.18°, 
period 1,436.02 
min.; “fi gure 8” 
ground track
Beidou 
system’s 
basic structure 
established; 
tests; trial 
service began 
2011.12.27
operational
Beidou-2/
Compass- 
G5
38091 2012-
008A
2012.02.24
16:12:00
CZ-3C GEO: 58.68°E ? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass-
M3
38250 2012-
018A
2012.04.29
20:50:00
CZ-3B MEO: perigee × 
apogee 21,460 × 
21,594 km, inclina-
tion 55.16°, period 
773.2 min.
? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass-
M4
38251 2012-
018B
2012.04.29
20:50:00
CZ-3B MEO: perigee × 
apogee 21,456 × 
21,601 km, inclina-
tion 55.11°, period 
773.21 min.
? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass-
M5
38774 2012-
050A
2012.09.18
19:50:00
CZ-3B/E MEO: perigee × 
apogee 21,462 × 
21,592 km, inclina-
tion 55°, period 
773.2 min., revs/
day: 1.9
? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass-
M6
38775 2012-
050B
2012.09.18
19:50:00
CZ-3B/E MEO: perigee × 
apogee 21,476 × 
21,573 km, inclina-
tion 55.1°, period 
773.1 min., revs/
day: 1.9
? operational
Beidou-2/
Compass- 
G6/G2R
38953 2012-
059A
2012.10.25
15:33:00
CZ-3C GEO: 80.1°E completed 
regional net-
work; service 
commenced
operational
Table 4. (continued)
Note: Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources.
Sources: “Beidou/Compass.” Other data from “Real Time Satellite Tracking,”and “National Space Science Data 
Center Master Catalog”; data and format from ITPROSTAR, which are typically more detailed, are used by 
default.
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and ballistic missiles, potentially in combination—a devastating multiaxis, saturation 
approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility, speed, range, 
and precise coordination. 
To achieve its near-seas operational objectives, the PLA must thus coordinate multiple 
sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communica-
tions and a common operational picture. Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability 
of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets. For instance, 
a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed 
roughly at the position of a CSG, as determined partly on the basis of satellite data. 
Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSG—by, for instance, supplying 
position updates.70 
The Beidou/Compass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision 
of Chinese ballistic missiles. China’s combination of land-based radars and satellites—
perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or 
microsatellites—might be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off 
China’s coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat.
Examination of the orbits, inclinations, and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic 
sense of their coverage.71 By 2009, China had approximately twenty-two imaging satel-
lites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG.72 This 
number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage, in terms of revisit times for 
specific ocean areas, but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan 
satellites of multiple types, and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of 
Gaofen satellites.73 In 2009, civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient 
satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites, plus additional 
military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian, plus additional mili-
tary) by 2020;74 these estimates may require adjustment, given recent launch numbers. 
Even before 2020, China’s emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets 
may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability. China’s low-cost launchers (e.g., the 
Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency. The develop-
ment of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (China’s fourth, scheduled to open in 
2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities. 
The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination
Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process. China 
would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose. Qu Dian would 
have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fu-
sion process, then transmit the result to commanders and shooters. Even with complete 
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coverage of relevant maritime zones, data transmission (i.e., from satellites to ground 
stations), imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area 
examined), and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays. 
Software and data management requirements will be complex. Command and control 
will likely pose particular challenges: the PLA will have to coordinate both among the 
many service elements that “own” various ISR sensor and ground station architectures 
and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use, and 
with the release authority (CMC, supreme command, or campaign command) for the 
weapons systems that would employ their inputs.75 Because of these ongoing challenges, 
the U.S. Department of Defense judges that “the PLA will need to overcome deficiencies 
in system integration and interservice coordination.”76
Examples of related difficulties have already emerged, as well as of some progress toward 
surmounting them. In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to 
date, China’s large-scale response to Sichuan’s 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake 
included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery 
and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft, as well as a UAV, to sur-
vey damage.77 Upon receiving these data, the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters 
“swiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops.”78 Chen Li, minister of water 
resources, said that “analyzing satellite and other aerial images” would allow officials 
to assess flooding risks stemming from “damaged reservoirs, hydropower plants, and 
dikes.”79 On 17 May the PLA, having reportedly detected “water rising to dangerous 
levels” in multiple Beichuan County lakes “using one of its most advanced satellites,” 
ordered evacuation of the area.80 China’s massive resource deployment still left the PLA 
and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese sat-
ellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity, as well as by problems with data 
transfer, management, processing, and integration.81 
Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008, the PLA’s response to the less-
challenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant “lessons learned.” For 
instance, the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing 
Science used “Beijing-1 microsatellite data, with moderate spatial resolution and large 
sensor ground width . . . to analyze the environment background for the earthquake.”82 
While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites, the large num-
ber of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since, 
together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture, 
suggests that its capabilities are now far greater. In January 2013, China Daily went so 
far as to claim that “China’s first high-resolution, stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan III,” 
launched on 9 January 2012, “meets international standards, ridding the country of its 
reliance on imports of satellite images.”83
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Despite this recent progress, China’s ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the 
present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAF’s efforts to assume control 
over them. Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applica-
tions are divided among more than a dozen government, university, and civil organiza-
tions.84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations; 
wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear.85 Even granting the ability to 
transition smoothly to military control in wartime—a significant assumption—China’s 
satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction.86 A new 
Space Force is rumored to be in development;87 for now, the PLAAF appears to be best 
placed to assume authority over space assets. 
Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets. Indeed, the General 
Armaments Department (GAD), the GSD, and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN, 
to some extent, may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF, and insti-
tutional rivalry may complicate matters.88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite opera-
tions yet lacks a combat role. The PLA already controls launch sites, the Second Artillery 
is heavily involved in missile programs, and various technical institutes are responsible 
for satellite development, so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within 
the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets 
(a process that took place earlier in the United States). Furthermore, there is not yet any 
clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory, 
doctrine, missions, or regulations, so what would govern the actions of whatever organi-
zation ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear.
Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges, given their distribution 
among the PLAAF, PLAN aviation, and even to some extent army aviation. Insufficient 
open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation 
work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios. As the PLAN 
assumes a robust deck-aviation mission, a critical question arises about the extent to 
which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like 
the KJ-2000. As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers, it is unclear how much 
their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture, since ISR aircraft are typically 
underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty 
launching via ski jump. This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixed-
wing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3. Even with three carriers in the fleet, PLAN 
aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force. How, and to what extent, it will 
integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty.
Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic 
processes, but there is insufficient lateral movement. Technological incompatibility re-
mains a challenge owing to decentralized development, and software problems are even 
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more significant than hardware problems. Institutional stovepiping remains a major 
barrier to integration and joint operations, neither of which has been achieved fully. 
The PLA’s joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not 
penetrate effectively to lower levels. Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant 
impediment; the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to 
remedy this but is proceeding only slowly. Training is not yet sufficiently joint, and there 
is no permanent joint training structure. The lack of a permanent joint organization 
at the military region level exacerbates these problems.89 Finally, PLA commanders are 
tempted—and PLA theoretical writings, at least, are succumbing to the temptation—to 
use technology and command automation to centralize operations further. Ironically, 
this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make 
decisions in real time, a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actu-
ally fought “local limited wars under informatized conditions”—an experience that 
China lacks entirely. These factors, not the technical parameters of satellites and other 
sensors, will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR 
system employment. The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan 
Military Region, which is a logical “joint reform test bed,” because it has all services 
represented, as well as a fleet headquarters, but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing 
and Guangzhou Military Regions, which are responsible for the East China Sea (includ-
ing Taiwan) and the South China Sea, respectively.90 
Geostrategic Implications
China’s air- and space-based surveillance platforms—together with their supporting 
infrastructure, human and otherwise—are improving rapidly but remain incomplete 
and are experiencing growing pains. As Larry Wortzel emphasizes, “The duration on sta-
tion of its AWACS aircraft is short, their range is limited, and not all of them are capable 
of aerial refueling. Most of the PLA’s combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked 
operations but can handle only a limited number of targets. In addition, not all of the 
weapons they carry can receive the networked combat data.”91 As a result, “neither the 
PLAAF, nor the rest of the PLA, can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take 
advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordi-
nated manner.”92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems, increasing-
ly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting 
so efficiently in U.S., allied, and friendly militaries that might operate close to China.
Institutional wrangling for control of China’s space assets continues. The sprawling, 
stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the 
satellite/C4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice, 
interlevel, and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data 
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fusion to support kinetic operations. While China may be able to employ a variety of 
strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory, it 
may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield, where information assurance 
is more elusive.
Despite these ongoing challenges, counterintervention affords China a strategic defen-
sive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than 
that of the United States. The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and 
challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines, 
high-power line-of-sight communications, advanced planning, and geographic and tem-
poral segregation. China’s emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing 
counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power 
on the nation’s maritime periphery. In the near seas, at least, China’s military awareness, 
coordination, and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously.
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In 2011, Liu Huaqing (刘华清), the “father” of the modern Chinese navy, passed away. 
As the former commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and one-time vice 
chairman of the Central Military Commission, Liu devised a strategy of “offshore 
defense” (近海防御) that not only laid the intellectual groundwork for the transforma-
tion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into a credible fighting force but also 
guided the Chinese Communist Party as it took to the sea.
Liu led the PLAN beyond China’s Cold War continentalist period, advocating “blue wa-
ter” capabilities beyond the “First Island Chain” (第一岛链). These capabilities were to 
complement the great-power status of a nation emerging from the “Century of Humili-
ation” and preparing for its “Century of Seapower.”1 Liu’s vision of China becoming an 
oceanic nation is in ascendancy. For instance, the work report of the Eighteenth Party 
Congress (drafted by Xi Jinping, now the general secretary) called for the party to “build 
China into a maritime power”;2 similarly, PLAN commander Wu Shengli (吴胜利) now 
proclaims that “China is an ‘oceanic nation.’”3 
The PRC clearly seeks major naval power, but to what extent, and to what end? Analysis 
of the character and composition of China’s current and future naval fleet yields insights 
into these important questions. This chapter examines recent developments among 
China’s surface combatants, considers the future trajectory of China’s surface fleet, and 
discusses implications for the U.S. Navy. 
Steel in the Water
The PLAN boasts the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious 
warfare ships in Asia (table).4 Combining licitly and illicitly imported technology with 
indigenous development, the PLAN has rapidly narrowed technology and capability 
gaps between itself and other modern navies. It is now pursuing quality over quantity, 
while still seeking cost-effective systems. 
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Any analysis of the trajectory of the 
PLAN surface fleet must consider the 
capabilities of its sensors and weap-
ons and how they compare to similar 
U.S. Navy capabilities. This analysis 
will focus on six key capability areas: 
antiair warfare (AAW), antisurface 
warfare (ASUW), antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW), helicopter operations, 
carrier operations, and amphibious 
capabilities. 
Antiair Warfare 
Historically a weak area for the PLAN, 
the antiair warfare capabilities of the 
surface fleet have significantly improved 
over the last decade, now featuring mid- 
and long-range surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs). This affords the PLAN a new 
area-air-defense (AAD) capability, al-
lowing it to operate more confidently 
farther from land-based radar and air 
coverage and to venture into far seas. In 
contrast, current war-fighting concepts 
favor a more cautious surface cam-
paign—using guided-missile destroyers 
(DDGs) as AAW pickets, for example—
from within the First Island Chain, a 
campaign that sensibly takes advantage 
of China’s land-based antiaccess and 
area denial (A2/AD) network. 
U.S. AAD capabilities, with the SM-2, SM-3, and forthcoming SM-6 weapons, generally 
still retain a significant edge over Chinese systems in terms of range, sensor networking, 
and battle management. 
The PLAN has twenty-eight destroyers in active service with varying levels of AAW pro-
ficiency. The import of four Sovremenny-class destroyers (Type 956, 956-EM) from Rus-
sia aside, the Chinese shipbuilding industry has improved its ability to create modern 
and competitive naval combatants through the iterative and methodical construction of 
Selected Elements of the Chinese Surface Fleet
Ship Type/Class In Service
Destroyers 28
Type 052D 1
Type 052C 7
Type 051C 2
Type 052B 2
Type 051B 1
Type 956, 956-EM 4
Type 052 2
Type 051 9
Frigates 49
Type 054A 16
Type 054 2
Type 053 variants 31
Corvettes (Type 056) 9
Missile boats 175
Type 022 83
Other types 92
Amphibious warfare ships 56
Type 071 LPD 3
Type 072-III LST 9
Type 073-IV LSM 11
Other large & medium 
landing ships
33
Aircraft carriers 1
Hospital ships 6
Fleet replenishment auxiliaries 8
Mine warfare vessels 27
Submarine chasers 75
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various destroyer classes. Notably, the Type 051C Luzhou DDGs integrate a phased-array 
radar and a vertical-launch system equipped with forty-eight Russian SA-N-20 missiles 
(range about 120 kilometers), the PLAN’s first true area-defense SAM. The Type 052C 
Luyang II class features a stealthy design and an automatic detect-and-track, multidi-
mensional, phased-array system embedded in the forward superstructure that integrates 
with forty-eight vertically launched HHQ-9 SAMs (approximately ninety kilometers). 
China’s most modern major surface combatant is the new Type 052D, currently under 
construction. With an expected initial run of at least four ships, some observers expect 
eventual series production—indicating a high level of design maturity.5
The PLAN has forty-nine frigates and is rapidly modernizing its inventory. In 2005, 
the PLAN adopted the stealthy Type 054 frigate, with the limited-range, Crotale-based 
HHQ-7 SAM (about twelve kilometers). The Type 054A has a stealthy hull form and the 
HHQ-16 SAM (forty to seventy-five kilometers);6 it is now in series production. 
In addition to AAD SAMs, modern PLAN surface ships are equipped with a variety of 
capable terminal defenses, such as the eighteen- or twenty-four-round FL-3000-N SAM 
and the Type 730 30 mm close-in weapon system (CIWS). See figure 1.
Figure 1. Selected AAD Missiles of the PLAN and U.S. Navy
Source: Doug Richardson, ed., Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, www.janes.com/. Graphics by Delex Systems, Inc.
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Antisurface Warfare 
Chinese antisurface warfare capabilities have also greatly improved over the last decade. 
Relative to the U.S. Navy, ASUW is likely the area where the PLAN is comparatively 
strongest. It has developed potent, distributed potential striking power by fielding over-
the-horizon-targeting systems and outfitting its range of small and large surface combat-
ants with advanced, longer-range supersonic and subsonic antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) 
having improved electronic systems, multiaxial attack coordination, and terminal 
evasion maneuvers. The PLAN inventory includes the 240-kilometer-range SS-N-22, the 
YJ-62 (220-plus kilometers), the YJ-82 (180 kilometers), and the YJ-83 (160 kilometers).7 
The PLAN has over eighty small surface combatants and missile craft specializing in 
ASUW. The Type 022 Houbei is China’s newest fast attack craft. Stealthy and seaworthy, 
it is well suited for swarming cruise-missile attacks. Additionally, the PLAN is aggres-
sively procuring the Type 056 class of 1,500-ton light corvettes to replace older Type 037 
vessels and provide an intermediate class between the Type 022 and the Type 054A. 
In contrast to the PLAN, the U.S. Navy has deemphasized ASCMs in its surface fleet. 
While some of the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers (hulls 51–78) and the Ticonderoga-class 
cruisers field RGM-84 Harpoon missiles, the newer DDGs (hulls 79 and later) rely on 
the SM-2 for inside-radar-horizon surface-to-surface missile engagements. The Lit-
toral Combat Ship—relying as it does on warfare modules—has no ASCM native to its 
“seaframe,” though the initial ASUW module will integrate a short-range (less than ten 
kilometers) missile. See figure 2.
Antisubmarine Warfare
Antisubmarine warfare has not been a core competence of the PLAN, though the Chi-
nese have made a number of recent improvements. Additional improvement in systems, 
unit-level training, and coordinated operations, however, will be required if the PLAN 
hopes to operate with an acceptable level of risk outside the near seas. Hull-mounted 
medium-frequency sonar, ASW mortars, and torpedoes are commonly found among 
PLAN surface combatants, providing a modest antisubmarine capability highly depen-
dent on ship operating patterns and bathymetric conditions. 
In recent years, the PLAN has increased the use on its new multirole DDGs and guided-
missile frigates (FFGs) of two key components of U.S. Navy surface ASW superiority: 
modern towed-array sonars and embarked helicopters, principally the Z-9C and the Rus-
sian Ka-28. The coordinated use of passive towed-array sonar and ASW helicopters will 
allow the PLAN surface fleet to utilize more effective ASW tactics in a variety of environ-
ments. Commensurately, the role of the “submarine chaser” type has diminished. For 
example, even the Type 056 corvette, which lacks a helicopter hangar, has a towed sonar 
array that offers a definite improvement over the Type 037 Hainan-class subchasers.8 
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Naval Helicopters
Modern naval surface operations heavily rely on helicopters. PLAN aviation has increas-
ingly utilized helicopters for shore-based operations and deployments aboard surface 
combatants. Nonetheless, the PLAN has recognized that demand for the aircraft has 
outpaced procurement, especially in disaster relief and in the Gulf of Aden deployments, 
in which the three-ship flotillas have only carried two helicopters.9 
Demand for helicopters will continue to rise as the PLAN fields surface combatants with 
hangars for extended helicopter operations and as Chinese carriers take to the sea. The 
People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force primarily operates three helicopter types for 
a variety of missions: the Z-9C, the Ka-28, and the medium-lift Z-8.10 Moreover, it has 
imported Ka-31s for the airborne-early-warning (AEW) mission and is funding a Z-15 
project to replace the Z-9s and a “ten-ton helicopter project” to replace the Ka-28s. Of 
note, the Z-9C, the Ka-28, and the Ka-31, when properly equipped, may serve as a data-
link relay for over-the-horizon ASCMs.11 
The PLAN has significantly fewer helicopters than the U.S. Navy. Moreover, even Chi-
nese proponents of increasing the number of helicopters deployed on board ships tend 
to focus on potential scouting and attack operations. Vertical replenishment is covered 
Figure 2. Selected SAMs of the PLAN and U.S. Navy
Source: Richardson, ed., Jane’s Missiles and Rockets. The SM-2 Block IV’s forty-kilometer range is radar-horizon 
limited. Graphics by Delex Systems, Inc.
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only briefly in most Chinese analyses and that on port-to-ship operations, instead of 
intra–task force supply. 
Amphibious Capabilities
Amphibious warfare has retained an important role in the PLAN, given Chinese aspira-
tions to incorporate Taiwan. The PLAN maintains the capability to transport approxi-
mately one mechanized division using fifty-six ships.12 It has replaced older tank landing 
ships with the new Type 072-III Yuting II class and the Type 073-IV Yudeng-class 
medium landing ship. In active service, the PLAN also has three Type 071 Yuzhao-class 
amphibious transport docks, which are based on the U.S. San Antonio class.13 These 
ships, capable of carrying large helicopters and air-cushion landing craft, may indicate a 
growing capability for amphibious operations in distant theaters. 
Aircraft Carriers 
Perhaps most representative of China’s naval ambitions—and a dream of Liu Huaqing—
is its aircraft carrier program. After years of deception and denials, the PLAN has publicly 
announced that it desires aircraft carriers. Although Chinese officials have not revealed 
a fleet size, one Chinese general recommended “at least three”;14 unconfirmed reporting 
has stated the PLAN intends to build two new carriers along the lines of Liaoning, the 
refitted ex-Varyag, followed by two larger and nuclear-powered carriers.15 Operational 
proficiency aside, a navy of four carriers would be formidable in the region.
HQ-10 SAMs and the new Type 1030 CIWS guns have been installed on Liaoning, 
increasing the likelihood that China will consider it more than just a training ship. In 
terms of flight training, over the last several years China has produced a cadre of pilots 
to operate off carrier decks at Liaoning mock-ups ashore in China. Additionally, training 
at the NITKA Center in Ukraine and on Brazil’s Clemenceau-class aircraft carrier has 
allowed the PLAN to gain experience from other nations. Regarding carrier aircraft, the 
PLAN has developed the carrier-capable Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, an unlicensed vari-
ant of the Su-33.16 There has also been speculation that China’s new J-31 stealth fighter 
could be carrier capable.17 
The J-15 (or other aircraft) would operate using a STOBAR (short takeoff but arrested 
recovery) ski-jump system on Liaoning. This will likely restrict its maximum takeoff 
weight. For this reason, future Chinese carriers may incorporate a CATOBAR (catapult-
assisted takeoff but arrested recovery) system. Although the PLAN has Russian Ka-31s 
suitable for the AEW mission, a more-capable fixed-wing AEW project based on the Y-7 
airframe, which would likely require catapult launch, may be in development.18 
In the near term, the PLAN’s aircraft carrier will support national pride more than 
immediate operational requirements. The PLAN will require additional DDGs, FFGs, 
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helicopters, and logistics ships (possibly all organized under a new expeditionary com-
mand structure), not to mention a proficient carrier air wing, in order to integrate truly 
the striking power of the aircraft carrier into its fleet. Chinese observation of and train-
ing with the carriers of other states will accelerate this process. 
From assessment of the current capabilities of the PLAN, it is clear the PLAN is rapidly 
developing world-class capabilities in all combat areas.19 Compared with U.S. Navy sur-
face combatants, PLAN surface combatants, armed with a diverse array of very capable 
ASCMs across the surface fleet, are more capable in ASUW. PLAN capabilities in AAW, 
ASW, and force integration are inferior to those of the U.S. Navy. 
The Three Fleets: Possible PLAN Trajectories
In light of the PLAN’s acquisition and deployment of new platforms, the United States 
and Asian states must consider whether the Chinese surface force has an overarching 
trajectory. It is widely accepted that the PLAN has demonstrably improved both its naval 
capabilities and its capacity to exert from the Chinese mainland control over the near 
seas. What remains subject to debate is the objective of these capabilities. The second 
half of this chapter explores this question.
The Taiwan Fleet
If the ultimate aim of China’s naval development is solely to constrain the U.S. option 
of intervening in a mainland China / Taiwan war, such a goal appears to be increas-
ingly within reach. Characterized increasingly in the United States as an A2/AD strategy, 
Chinese integration of land, sea, air, and space surveillance and strike capabilities has 
produced an environment in which U.S. naval forces would find themselves considerably 
challenged to operate meaningfully to support Taiwan under relevant timelines. This is 
troubling to many, including American defense planners, who are bound by the Taiwan 
Relations Act. 
Chinese interlocutors have often supported the view that A2/AD capabilities are 
solely focused on the question of Taiwan and that “if the U.S. could abandon Taiwan, 
[China] would cease development of A2/AD capabilities, and other difficult issues 
could be solved.”20 However, the versatility (and thus utility) of the People’s Libera-
tion Army’s A2/AD capabilities and the fact that China has other, growing security 
concerns besides Taiwan strongly suggest that resolution of the Taiwan issue would not 
remove the impetus for continued naval development. 
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The East Asia Fleet
If the PLAN were modernizing to establish China as the regionally dominant naval 
power (superior even to the United States), with control over its near seas, the PLAN 
would likely look much as it does today, though certain capabilities would have to be 
improved. The East Asia Fleet would operate mostly within the near seas but would also 
need a limited capability in the far seas (between the First and Second Island Chains) 
and for distant operations. This fleet would help deter the entry of U.S. forces into the 
region, enable the coercion of neighboring states, allow the establishment of faits accom-
plis relating to maritime territorial disputes, and generally establish China as a regional 
hegemon. 
To realize fully such a fleet, the PLAN requires additional expeditionary surveillance to 
extend coverage and targeting, pushing the U.S. culmination point in battle farther from 
China’s shores. Second, it may require expeditionary troops, such as its marine corps, 
to seize, hold, and man such surveillance sites on islands in dispute. Third, it requires 
amphibious shipping to project expeditionary power. Fourth, it requires coordinated 
AAW capabilities to protect itself from airborne attack. Fifth, it requires comprehensive 
ASW capabilities to protect its amphibious and carrier assets from submarines. Lastly, 
it requires additional submarines of its own to contest U.S. surface forces and aircraft 
carriers. 
The Global Navy Fleet
Were China to seek a globally influential navy, one capable of imposing local sea control 
wherever it wished and capable of protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to 
and from its dispersed economic interests, this would be consistent with some interpre-
tations of the final stage of Liu Huaqing’s “three-step strategic plan,” according to which 
by 2020–50 China would reach military parity with developed countries.21 
To reach such a point, several decades of consistent effort would be needed, and a 
number of capabilities would have to be enhanced. First, the modest underway-
replenishment logistics force of the PLAN would need to expand. There is significant 
indication that the Type 903 project aims to improve capabilities in this area rapidly.22 
Second, the PLAN would need to establish a network of facilities and basing arrange-
ments astride its areas of operation. Given China’s pledge never to base military forces 
outside China, the PLAN could seek facilities arrangements, “places, not bases.” 
Alternatively, it could cooperate at a given location with the host country, which would 
claim Chinese forces were only visiting. Third, helicopter operations from surface 
ships for intra–task force resupply and a host of other missions—among them ASW—
would need to increase greatly. Fourth, coordinated, f leet-level ASW capabilities would 
need to achieve a higher level of proficiency for the PLAN to operate safely in distant 
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waters. Fifth, the PLAN would need to develop a carrier fleet, or an alternative air-
asset-generating platform, that could provide constant surveillance and striking power. 
Lastly, the PLAN would require additional nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to 
threaten adversary SLOCs credibly. 
What Is the Surface Fleet’s Trajectory?
On the basis of assessment of the three fleet constructs and of the PLAN’s current 
capabilities and trends, it appears that China aims to achieve a regionally dominant and 
globally capable navy in the next decade, a navy falling somewhere between the East 
Asia Fleet and the Global Fleet. The surface fleet will continue its ASUW expertise while 
improving its AAW and ASW capabilities, in that order. The PLAN focus will remain 
on potential conflicts in the near seas while it creates a limited set of capabilities useful 
in more distant scenarios. Faced with national development priorities in this period of 
“strategic opportunity,” China is unlikely to assume the high cost of full transition to 
a globally influential, power-projection navy in the near term. Instead, it might slowly 
integrate carrier groups in a “hybrid” force focused on the western Pacific but capable 
of limited force projection. Nonetheless, if China’s perception of its comprehensive na-
tional power and the favorable local correlation of forces continues to increase, Chinese 
naval aspirations will also gradually ascend, and the navy will shift to a more balanced, 
sea-control force rather than a sea-denial one. 
What are some of the challenges China will face as it strives for a regionally dominant 
and globally capable navy? One potential factor affecting the growth trajectory of the 
surface fleet could be the state’s shipbuilding capacity and fiscal resources. However, 
critical examination reveals robust capacity on both fronts. Backed by a prosperous 
commercial industry, China’s military shipbuilding capacity and capabilities may pose a 
far more significant challenge in a long-term competitive dynamic than once did those 
of the Soviet Union. Moreover, China’s moderately paced naval development has not 
strained the capabilities of shipyards or forced the nation to choose between expanding 
the navy, on one hand, and other components of the “national fleet,” such as civil mari-
time organizations, on the other. On the contrary, the other elements of the national 
fleet are greatly increasing production while naval production also increases. Another 
possible challenge to the surface fleet’s trajectory could arise if the PLAN encountered 
production difficulties with more advanced designs. However, the success of the Type 
052C and the Type 054A suggest that China is quite capable of producing world-class 
surface combatants. 
Strategic choices among “joint” capabilities could also shape China’s shipbuilding strat-
egy and larger maritime defense strategy. If the PLAN chose to rely on the shore-based 
A2/AD complex to deliver ASUW strikes over long range, it could conceivably reduce the 
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number of surface combatants, as fewer would be necessary to meet planning needs. We 
assess this as unlikely, for three principal reasons. First, it is improbable that the open-
ocean surveillance “scouting effectiveness” of the A2/AD complex will be reliable enough 
in wartime conditions to merit reducing shipboard sensors and weapons.23 Second, 
institutional inertia on the part of the PLAN in connection with the current shipbuild-
ing program would be difficult to overcome rapidly. Third, China’s emerging operating 
patterns make a reduction in surface combatants unlikely; in fact, they may increase in 
number, thereby constituting a greater portion of the fleet. 
The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence anticipates that the PLAN’s total order of battle 
will remain relatively steady, with the surface force maintaining seventy major combat-
ants through 2020.24 By 2016–17, as Chinese sea-denial capabilities reach a high level of 
effectiveness, the PLAN may gradually begin to adopt a sea-control fleet design that will 
likely require greater numbers of surface combatants. Additionally, such missions as ex-
tended operations in distant seas, SLOC protection, response to nontraditional threats, 
and possibly noncombatant evacuation operations will require larger numbers of new, 
large DDGs and FFGs on station, though marginal efficiencies arising from the multi-
mission capabilities of modern ships may decrease the need slightly. 
Analysis of the PLAN surface-fleet trajectory suggests that certain leading indicators 
could serve as “wild cards,” factors that might put in question analytical assumptions 
and possibly the fleet trajectory. If China conducts a major expansion of its modest 
underway-replenishment program (as it may now be doing), that could point to PLAN 
ambitions to operate farther from China.25 Furthermore, if the PLAN were to expand 
its SSN program, that might indicate an interest in conducting sea-denial or SLOC-
interdiction operations at significant ranges, also putting into question its trajectory. 
Implications for the U.S. Navy and East Asian Allies
The United States has adopted with China a hedging approach that seeks to maximize 
cooperative opportunities for engagement while maintaining credible, forward-stationed 
combat power in the Asia-Pacific. The interaction, both cooperative and adversarial, 
of the U.S. Navy and its Asian allies and partners with the PLAN has increased in the 
last several years, and China’s neighbors have expressed reservations over the direction 
of its “peaceful development,” specifically the trajectory of its military forces. Chinese 
actions—including harassment of U.S. Navy ocean-surveillance vessels, condescension 
toward other countries at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, Beijing’s response to North 
Korea’s sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan, and serious confrontations at 
sea with Korean, Filipino, and Japanese maritime forces—have been the source of much 
anxiety in the region.
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In turn, the Barack Obama administration has renewed its attention on the region, with 
a “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific” that dedicates increased intellectual capital and resources 
to efforts in the region. Hope for cooperation with the PLA springs eternal. However, 
American diplomatic engagement with China over the last several years has progressed 
and regressed as Chinese leaders interrupt military exchanges and confidence-building 
measures in response to such U.S. actions as arms sales to Taiwan. Additionally, the 
prospects remain very low for an “Incidents at Sea–style” agreement or cooperation in 
the distant seas tending to influence China’s intentions away from revisionist efforts to 
counter the security architecture in the Pacific. 
Faced with the likely trajectory of the Chinese surface fleet and of the PLA as a whole, 
the U.S. Navy must analyze how it can efficiently and effectively respond to the chal-
lenges that the United States and its Asian allies and partners will face. In a period of 
long-term strategic competition, the U.S. government must examine changes in force 
structure, posture, and operations to meet the rising challenge. Chief among these initia-
tives is the counter-A2/AD Air-Sea Battle Concept, which will likely result in significant 
improvements in U.S. force posture, strategy, and tactics in the Asia-Pacific. 
In developing Air-Sea Battle, the services face the challenge of operating close to and 
within China’s A2/AD network, confronting the perils embodied in Adm. Horatio 
Nelson’s adage that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” Yet allies, access, and interests may re-
quire the United States to do just that. Strategic force dispersal and increased underway 
refueling and reloading may significantly improve the survivability of U.S. forces. But in 
addition to moving some forces out, the United States must find novel ways to dig others 
in. It could explore subtle ways to create conditions in which U.S. forces are intermixed 
(in an undemanding way) with the forces of our allies, thus increasing the risk for China 
of horizontal escalation with multiple U.S. allies. 
In terms of credibly threatening the Chinese center of gravity, an extended blockade at 
sea and on land, primarily targeting energy flows, has been considered as an option.26 
While an extended blockade would play a role in a major war, the latent strategic effects 
of such a campaign would not be felt in China for weeks or perhaps months, making it 
a questionable deterrent to possible Chinese moves to establish a fait accompli in the re-
gion. Moreover, such an approach might spark fears of abandonment among allied states 
and weaken the very security architecture the United States is working to defend. 
Thus the United States must learn not only to “lay siege” to the fort but also to (in vary-
ing degrees) assault it. Fortunately, the Asia-Pacific is not a blank slate. Working to maxi-
mize cooperation with allied and partner states, the U.S. Navy could greatly inhibit the 
freedom of the PLAN, “penning in” the Chinese fleet. Nelson’s warning applies as much 
to the PLAN as it does to the U.S. Navy. The undersea domain could be surveyed with 
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overhead and underwater infrastructure—thereby turning dangerous proximity to the 
Chinese mainland into an advantage—and the U.S. Navy could develop ways to block 
straits if necessary, using mines; mobile, ground-launched ASCMs; and other methods. 
Moreover, as expressed in the Joint Operational Access Concept, the United States could 
leverage external lines of operation to conduct credible, multiaxial strikes.27 
As for programs, the U.S. Navy could support a variety of new weapons aimed at 
countering the A2/AD challenge, with such platforms and capabilities as antiship mis-
siles, ground-based offensive fires, long-range unmanned vehicles, aerial and undersea 
infrastructure and weapons, electronic warfare, and electromagnetic and directed-
energy weapons. The U.S. Navy could also seriously explore sea-based conventional 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles to complicate PLA planning. Launched from 
ships, these weapons would count against neither the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty nor New START limits on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A sub-
marine variant would significantly alter the calculus of Chinese planners with respect 
to the threat of American SSNs. 
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 Abbreviations and Definitions
A  A2/AD antiaccess / area denial 
 AAD area air defense
 AAW antiair warfare
 AESA active electronically scanned array
 AEW airborne early warning
 AIP air-independent propulsion
 AIS Automatic Identification System
 ASBM antiship ballistic missile
 ASCM antiship cruise missile
 ASUW antisurface warfare
 ASW antisubmarine warfare
 AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the U.S.   
  Airborne Warning and Control System, in the E-3 Sentry]
C C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence   
  systems
 C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,    
  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
 CAST China Academy of Space Technology
 CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery
 CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
 CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile
 CEP circular error probable
 CIWS close-in weapon system 
 CMC Central Military Commission
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 COMINT communications intelligence
 CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group
 CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
D  DDG  guided-missile destroyer
  DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation
 DoD Department of Defense [U.S.] 
E EEZ  exclusive economic zone
 ELINT electronic intelligence 
 EO electro-optical
 ESM electronic support measures
 EW electronic warfare
F FAE fuel-air explosive
 FDO flexible deterrent option
 FFG guided-missile frigate
G GAD General Armaments Department
 GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya   
  navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)
 GPS Global Positioning System
 GSD General Staff Department
H HALE high-altitude, long-endurance
 HE high explosive
 HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar
I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit
 IRST infrared search and track 
 ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
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K kg/kN kilograms per kilonewton
 km kilometers
 KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]
L LCS Littoral Combat Ship
 LO low-observable
 LRPS long-range precision strike
M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N nm nautical mile
O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [U.S.]
 OTH over-the-horizon
 OTHR over-the-horizon radar
 OTHT over-the-horizon targeting
P PLA People’s Liberation Army
 PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
 PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
 PLANAF People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
 PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
 PRC People’s Republic of China
S SAM surface-to-air missile
 SAR synthetic aperture radar
 SIGINT signals intelligence
 SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
 SLOC sea line of communication
 SS diesel-electric submarine
 SSB ballistic-missile submarine
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 SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
 SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
 STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery
 SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull
T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship
 TEL transporter-erector-launcher
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
 USN U.S. Navy
V VHF very high frequency
 VLF very low frequency
W w/t weight-to-thrust
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